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A drifter with no name and no past, 
driven purely by desire, is convinced 
by a beautiful woman to murder her 
husband. A hard-drinking detective 
down on his luck becomes involved 
with a gang of criminals in pursuit of a 
priceless artifact. The stories are at once 
romantic, pessimistic, filled with anxiety 
and a sense of alienation, and they define 
the essence of film noir.
Noir emerged as a prominent 
American film genre in the early 1940s, 
distinguishable by its use of unusual 
lighting, sinister plots, mysterious 
characters, and dark themes. From The 
Maltese Falcon (1941) to Touch of Evil 
(1958), films from this classic period 
reflect an atmosphere of corruption 
and social decay that attracted such 
accomplished directors as John Huston, 
Alfred Hitchcock, Billy Wilder, and 
Orson Welles.
The Philosophy of Film Noir is the 
first volume to focus exclusively on 
the philosophical underpinnings of 
these iconic films. Drawing on the 
work of diverse thinkers, from the 
French existentialist Albert Camus 
to the Frankurt school theorists Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, 
the volume connects film noir to the 
philosophical questions of a modern, 
often nihilistic world.
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Opening with an examination of what 
constitutes noir cinema, the book 
interprets the philosophical elements 
consistently present in the films—
themes such as moral ambiguity, reason 
versus passion, and pessimism. The 
contributors to the volume also argue 
that the essence and elements of noir 
have fundamentally influenced movies 
outside of the traditional noir period. 
Neo-noir  films such as Pulp Fiction 
(1994), Fight Club (1999), and Memento 
(2000) have reintroduced the genre to a 
contemporary audience.
As they assess the concepts present in 
individual films, the contributors also 
illuminate and explore the philosophical 
themes that surface in popular culture. 
A close examination of one of the most 
significant artistic movements of the 
twentieth century, The Philosophy of 
Film Noir reinvigorates an intellectual 
discussion at the intersection of popular 
culture and philosophy.
Mark T. Conard, assistant professor of 
philosophy at Marymount Manhattan 
College in New York City, is the coeditor 
of The Simpsons and Philosophy and 
Woody Allen and Philosophy.
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Foreword
In the fall of 1976, when I wrote the article “No Way Out: Existential Mo-
tifs in the Film Noir” for Sight and Sound (vol. 45, no. 4, pp. 212–17), little
would I have expected that some twenty-five years later a collection of es-
says under the title The Philosophy of Film Noir would be published. Yet
here it is, a welcome indication of how far we have traveled in terms of
public awareness and scholarly respectability. Indeed, in 1976, the term film
noir was little known beyond a coterie of French and American cineasts
and derided by some as a specious classification created in a post hoc man-
ner and not worthy of serious critical attention. By now, the ontology of
film noir seems to be settled in its favor, although epistemological argu-
mentation rages on. Anyone interested in tracing the course of this argu-
mentation over the past quarter century would be well advised to consult
the appendices in Film Noir: An Encyclopedic Reference to the American Style
(ed. Alain Silver and Elizabeth Ward, with Carl Macek and Robert Porfirio,
3rd ed., rev. and expanded [Woodstock, N.Y.: Overlook, 1992]) as well as
the Film Noir Readers (Alain Silver and James Ursini, eds., Film Noir Reader
[1996; New York: Limelight, 2001], Film Noir Reader 2 [New York: Lime-
light, 1999], and Film Noir Reader 4 [New York: Limelight, 2004]; and Rob-
ert Porfirio, Alain Silver, and James Ursini, eds., Film Noir Reader 3 [New
York: Limelight, 2001]), which, taken together, cover virtually all the con-
troversies surrounding the field of film noir scholarship and evidence the
debt that such scholarship owes to Alain Silver.
That the essence of film noir is yet to be distilled is implicit in the
excellent essays contained in this volume, each of which sees film noir
through a slightly different lens. The essays here go well beyond my earlier,
somewhat simplistic effort to extract a “philosophy” of film noir in terms
of an outlook on life that these diverse films seemed to share—an attitude
toward existence that was akin to modern existentialism, particularly as it
evolved in postwar France. Perhaps that is why it was the French cineasts
who were the first to identify the cycle. But, if I may be allowed to indulge
myself a bit here, I would like to take issue with their assertion (and that of
other critics following in their wake, myself included) that what was sur-
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prising in these early films noirs was the degree to which they went against
the grain of that native-bred optimism that seemed to define the American
character (so well articulated by Alexis de Tocqueville in the early nine-
teenth century). If we take an extensive historical look at this American
character, we can detect a dark side implicit in it from its very beginnings,
one that predated those vaunted attributes of self-reliance and individual
enterprise associated with “Yankee ingenuity” and those virtues inherent
in the Jeffersonian agrarian ideal, the yeoman farmer.
That dark side can surely be seen in the culture and lifestyle of our
Puritan ancestry, a heritage quite at odds with the new breed of “Ameri-
can” exemplified by Benjamin Franklin (at least as he presented himself in
his Autobiography, a work that itself went a long way toward papering over
those differences). Nathaniel Hawthorne’s fiction in turn dramatized this
dark side by showing how it worked itself out in the psyche of nineteenth-
century America. Yet the distinctively American bias given to transcenden-
talism by Emerson and Thoreau—the faith in the natural world and the
emphasis on self-reliance—should have purged America of its darkest in-
clinations. Walt Whitman, writing before, during, and after the trauma of
the American Civil War, is an exemplar in this regard. For, despite the dislo-
cations engendered by that war, he retained his belief in the power of the
individual spirit to overcome all odds. Emersonian transcendentalism, how-
ever, did not fare as well in the fiction of Melville and Poe. The “voyage”
into nature could end in disaster, as in Melville’s Moby Dick, just as the
Yankee entrepreneurial spirit could degenerate into the crass materialism
of The Confidence Man, a prophetic work given the excesses of America’s
Gilded Age, and one that questioned the validity of any sort of faith.
The work of Edgar Allan Poe is particularly relevant to anyone tracing
the antecedents of American film noir. Short tales such as Ms. Found in a
Bottle and The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym left the outcome of the
transcendental voyage quite problematic. But it was Poe’s arabesque tales
that called into question the power of human reason. These “grotesque”
stories harked back to an earlier tradition of gothic literature, yet, more
often than not, they eschewed the supernatural in favor of such themes as
murder, revenge, betrayal, and entrapment, and they were frequently cen-
tered around the figure of a fatal woman. And they paved the way for such
future practitioners as Cornell Woolrich. As if in an effort to maintain his
own sanity, Poe also wrote his stories of ratiocination and, in so doing,
created the prototype for the classic private detective, an agent of order
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both moral and social. In reaction to this classic detective, Dashiell Hammett
helped create the modern “hard-boiled private eye,” whose allegiance was
only to a highly personal and private code, whose style was virtually every-
thing, and who attempted to survive in a universe as chaotic as anything in
Poe.
At the turn of the century, the pragmatism of William James, with its
emphasis on radical empiricism, proved to be the philosophic death knell
for Emersonian transcendentalism. And as America moved into the twen-
tieth century, it was beset with a variety of “isms”—Darwinism, determin-
ism, Freudianism, Marxism—all of which challenged the integrity of the
individual. Social Darwinism went so far as to provide a rationale for an
abusive variety of capitalism that, unchecked, placed the plutocrat at the top
of the social ladder. Not that the works of Spencer, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer,
or Freud were part of the mass culture of that era. Few beyond the well
educated would have even been familiar with them. But their influence on
American fiction, especially on those writers who felt a kinship with liter-
ary naturalism, was profound. And large numbers of Americans did read
authors like Frank Norris, Theodore Dreiser, and Jack London, who, along
with others of their ilk, reduced the human being to a monad, little more
than Dreiser’s “waif amidst forces.”
By the twenties, the publishing industry was changing, and fiction be-
came increasingly accessible to an increasingly literate American public.
Pulp magazines began to replace the older dime-novel format as a mass
outlet for fiction. Priced from ten to twenty-five cents, pulps were printed
on coarse newspaper stock with glossy, colorful, and often lurid covers.
More important, they provided a medium for those “penny-a-word” writ-
ers who were at the center of the hard-boiled school, among them Hammett,
Chandler, and Woolrich. With the introduction of the paperback in the
thirties, the pulps had a competitor in the marketplace (and one that would
completely displace them in the fifties). Now both lowbrow fiction (e.g.,
Cain, McCoy) and high-brow fiction (e.g., Hemingway, Steinbeck, Faulkner)
could be purchased for well under a dollar, and American authors could
achieve a popularity that was unthinkable in the nineteenth century. In a
very real sense, the films noirs of the classic period represented Hollywood’s
attempt to capitalize on the public taste for crime, violence, and sexuality, a
taste already made palatable by the publishing world.
As Hollywood turned increasingly during the thirties to themes of crime
and violence, films moved well beyond the clean parlors of the classic who-
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dunit to deal with gangsterism and other social issues. Yet, by making the
environment the main determinant of aberrant behavior, these films dis-
played a greater affinity for literary naturalism than for the hard-boiled
tradition (see The Public Enemy [William A. Wellman, 1931], Dead End
[William Wyler, 1937], Wild Boys of the Road [William A. Wellman, 1933]).
It wasn’t until the forties that a confluence of factors, many of which are
discussed in the essays contained herein, allowed Hollywood to capture the
essence of that literary tradition expressed through a series of films that we
have come to call film noir.
I do not wish to ignore the social and historical dimensions of this
confluence, however, since culture does not exist in a vacuum. Certainly,
the rapid succession of two world wars punctuated by a depression pro-
pelled the evolution of the hard-boiled tradition, while its social conse-
quences may have conditioned audiences to accept the bleak view of the
world expressed in both American literature and American film. Nor do I
wish to underestimate the effect of the foreign influence. Throughout the
thirties and forties, America became the major refuge for a group of artists,
intellectuals, and writers that I have elsewhere termed the Germanic émigrés.
Many of these settled in southern California; some, quite naturally, gravi-
tated to the film industry. Most were fleeing fascist Europe. It seems evi-
dent to me that they contributed much to that expressionist style of
Hollywood filmmaking as it evolved from the gangster and horror films of
the thirties to become a defining motif of the films noirs of the forties and
fifties. What seems questionable to me is that their morbid sensibilities,
quite explicable in the light of their experiences in their homelands (many
were of Jewish descent), somehow explain the pessimistic trajectory of film
noir. More likely, perhaps, is that they were drawn to the dark strain of
American culture that I have been tracing here, a strain for which they had
an understandable affinity. In any case, no one can accuse them of failing
to do justice to the cinematic equivalent of that dark strain as it worked its
way through the culture of America in the thirties, forties, and fifties.
The atmosphere of fear and paranoia that pervades film noir was fa-
miliar enough terrain for those Germanic émigrés, given the precarious-
ness of their existence in war-ravaged Europe (recall Professor Warren’s
admonition to the heroine of Robert Siodmak’s The Spiral Staircase [1946]:
“Don’t trust anyone!”). And, while the life experiences of most Americans
were far less precarious, the psychological effects of World War II and its
aftermath (the loss of insular security, the Red Scare, the nuclear threat)
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would have made such an atmosphere something less than foreign. If such
be the case, one might speculate on what contemporary filmmakers, filling
the void left by film noir with today’s neo-noir thrillers, will produce in the
wake of 9/11.
Robert Porfirio
xiv Robert Porfirio
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Introduction 1
1
Introduction
A drifter, driven purely by desire, is convinced by a beautiful woman—a
femme fatale—to murder her husband. A whiskey-drinking, chain-smoking
detective becomes involved with a gang of ruthless criminals in pursuit of
a priceless artifact, for which they’re all willing to kill. An insurance sales-
man is lured by a restless, avaricious housewife to murder her husband for
the insurance money. Another detective, this one sleepy eyed and trench
coated, is hired by a gangster to find a woman who tried to kill him and
then absconded with his money—except, when the detective finds her, he
takes up with her himself, only later to be betrayed by her. The claustro-
phobic settings are awash in deep shadows, the streets are rain swept, it
always seems to be night, and the atmosphere is charged and angst ridden.
We know the stories; we love the noir style, at once romantic and pessimis-
tic; we sympathize, maybe even identify, with the doomed antihero; the
anxiety and sense of alienation are uncomfortably familiar. All true
enough—but what does any of this have to do with philosophy?
Actually, quite a lot, as it turns out.
First, what is film noir? (And immediately we find ourselves on philo-
sophical ground: questions both about the essence of a thing, what makes
it what it is, and about definition are philosophical in nature.) Critics tend
to identify the classic noir period as falling between 1941 and 1958, begin-
ning with John Huston’s The Maltese Falcon and ending with Orson Welles’s
Touch of Evil, two masterpieces of noir. This period, not coincidentally,
lasts from America’s involvement in World War II through the postwar era.
We can easily identify classic film noir by the constant opposition of light
and shadow, its oblique camera angles, and its disruptive compositional
balance of frames and scenes, the way characters are placed in awkward
and unconventional positions within a particular shot, for example. But,
besides these technical cinematic characteristics, there are a number of
themes that characterize film noir, such as the inversion of traditional val-
ues and the corresponding moral ambivalence (e.g., the protagonist of the
story, who traditionally is the good guy, in noir films often makes very
questionable moral decisions); the feeling of alienation, paranoia, and cyni-
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cism; the presence of crime and violence; and the disorientation of the
viewer, which is in large part accomplished by the filming techniques men-
tioned above. Some paradigmatic examples of classic films noirs are Double
Indemnity (Billy Wilder, 1944), The Postman Always Rings Twice (Tay
Garnett, 1946), The Big Sleep (Howard Hawks, 1946), and Out of the Past
(Jacques Tourner, 1953).
These classic noir films have their roots both in the hard-boiled litera-
ture of the thirties and forties (think here, e.g., of James M. Cain, Raymond
Chandler, David Goodis, and Horace McCoy) and in the German/Aus-
trian immigration during and after the war, given that a number of very
important writers, directors, and other film technicians were German or
Austrian émigrés.
In addition to these classic noir films, there are more recent films that
are often identified as neo-noir since—while falling outside the classic time
period and (typically) not in black and white—they share the inversion of
values, the alienation and pessimism, the violence, and the disorientation of
the spectator. Reservoir Dogs (Quentin Tarantino, 1992), Blue Velvet (David
Lynch, 1986), Taxi Driver (Martin Scorsese, 1976), and Memento (Christo-
pher Nolan, 2000) are often considered to be examples of neo-noir.
Now, French existentialist philosophy was contemporaneous with clas-
sic film noir and shares some of its themes, if not its outlook and tone.
While most critics agree that there wasn’t a direct influence of the existen-
tialists on the films, those philosophical themes are clearly present in the
movies, themes like moral ambiguity, reason versus passion in human de-
cision making and action, the meaning of life, and pessimism.
The present volume, then, investigates the philosophical themes and
underpinnings of these films and also uses the movies as a vehicle for ex-
ploring and explicating traditional philosophical ideas. It comprises thir-
teen essays from scholars in both philosophy and film and media studies.
The essays are written in nontechnical language and require no knowledge
of philosophy to appreciate or understand.
In part 1, “The Essence and Elements of Noir,” my “Nietzsche and the
Meaning and Definition of Noir” gives a history of the attempts at defin-
ing film noir and then—using Nietzsche’s claim that God is dead—makes
a modest proposal for seeing and understanding film noir in a new light.
Jason Holt, in “A Darker Shade: Realism in Neo-Noir,” claims that the real
heart and essence of noir is realized only after the classic noir period is
over, in neo-noir films. In “Moral Clarity and Practical Reason in Film
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Noir,” Aeon J. Skoble contends that, contrary to the common view that
noir films depict and perhaps promote a world without ethics and values,
these movies actually present significant moral lessons. Read Mercer
Schuchardt claims next, in his essay “Cherchez la Femme Fatale: The Mother
of Film Noir,” that The Jazz Singer (Alan Crosland, 1927) should be con-
sidered the first film noir since it is the first film to announce or acknowl-
edge the death of God. In “From Sherlock Holmes to the Hard-Boiled
Detective in Film Noir,” Jerold J. Abrams argues that the hard-boiled de-
tectives of film noir follow the detective logic of their non-noir predeces-
sors (like Holmes) but that they inhabit a significantly different reality than
those predecessors do—one in which there is no escape from the maze of
the world.
Part 2, “Existentialism and Nihilism in Film Noir,” begins with “Film
Noir and the Meaning of Life,” in which Steven M. Sanders explores film
noir’s (largely pessimistic) ideas about life’s purpose, meaning, and value.
Next, in “The Horizon of Disenchantment: Film Noir, Camus, and the Vi-
cissitudes of Descent,” Alan Woolfolk contends that the noir antihero lives
in a disenchanted world, one that is “not so benign,” and one that he can
neither fully escape nor fully embrace. And, last, in “Symbolism, Meaning,
and Nihilism in Quentin Tarantino’s Pulp Fiction,” I argue that Quentin
Tarantino’s neo-noir classic Pulp Fiction (1994) is really about nihilism and
the principal characters’ attempts at finding or reclaiming meaning and
value in a nihilistic world.
In part 3, “Six Classic Films Noirs,” Paul A. Cantor asserts, in “Film
Noir and the Frankfurt School: America as Wasteland in Edgar Ulmer’s
Detour,” that the classic noir Detour (1945) offers a vision of American life
that is strikingly similar to that of the Frankfurt school theorists Horkheimer
and Adorno and that, because of the influence of German émigrés, film
noir is less of a purely American phenomenon than previously thought.
Next, in “Knowledge, Morality, and Tragedy in The Killers and Out of the
Past,” Ian Jarvie asks why noir films, full of violence, angst, and treachery,
are successful and entertaining and whether they might fit Aristotle’s defi-
nition of tragedy and thus engage the viewer by means of the catharsis that
they provide. R. Barton Palmer argues, in “Moral Man in the Dark City:
Film Noir, the Postwar Religious Revival, and The Accused,” that there is an
important subgenre of noir films that emphasizes spiritual redemption and
eschews the typical noir angst-filled despair, and he takes as his paradigm
case William Dieterle’s The Accused (1949). Then, in “On Reason and Pas-
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sion in The Maltese Falcon,” Deborah Knight discusses the traditional philo-
sophical treatment of the relation between reason and passion, using John
Huston’s noir masterpiece to demonstrate that rational action usually has
some underlying emotion associated with it and that, while the femme
fatale is in this case motivated by reason alone, the detective displays a
proper balance between reason and emotion. Finally, in his “Ride the Pink
Horse: Money, Mischance, Murder, and the Monads of Film Noir,” Alain
Silver claims that Robert Montgomery’s classic Ride the Pink Horse (1947)
contains interesting parallels to the philosophical and aesthetic principles
of Arthur Schopenhauer.
At the heart of this volume are our abiding fondness for and apprecia-
tion of these wonderful movies. We sincerely hope and believe that our
analyses will deepen and enrich your respect for and understanding of them,
not merely as works of art, but as philosophically interesting texts in their
own right, especially if you love them as much as we do.
Nietzsche and the Meaning and Definition of Noir 5
Part 1
The Essence and Elements of Noir
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Nietzsche and the Meaning and Definition of Noir 7
Nietzsche and the Meaning
and Definition of Noir
Mark T. Conard
The Postman Always Rings Twice (Tay Garnett, 1946) was adapted from a
novel by the writer of hard-boiled fiction James M. Cain. Interspersed
throughout the movie is voice-over narration by the protagonist, Frank
Chambers (John Garfield), indicating that he is recalling events in the past.
Frank is a drifter who takes a job at a remote diner owned by an older man,
Nick (Cecil Kellaway), after getting a look at Nick’s stunning young wife,
Cora (Lana Turner). There is a strong sexual attraction between Frank and
Cora, and, after one aborted attempt, they succeed in killing Nick and mak-
ing it look like a car accident in order to be together. A suspicious DA,
however, hounds them and finally tricks Frank into signing a statement
claiming that Cora murdered Nick. Cora beats the rap, and the lovers are
bitterly estranged for a short period. In the end (after some other twists and
turns), they come back together, knowing that they’re too much in love to be
apart, knowing that they’re fated to be together. Ironically, they have a car
accident in which Cora is killed. The DA prosecutes Frank for Cora’s murder,
and Frank is convicted and sentenced to death. We learn at the end that he
has been telling the story to a priest in his prison cell, awaiting execution.
Postman displays all the distinctive conventions of film noir—the noir
look and feel as well as a typical noir narrative, with the femme fatale, the
alienated and doomed antihero, and their scheme to do away with her hus-
band. It has the feeling of disorientation, pessimism, and the rejection of
traditional ideas about morality, what’s right and what’s wrong. Further, a
great many noir films were either adapted from hard-boiled novels or heavily
influenced by them. Finally, Postman is told in flashback form through
Frank’s voice-over, another noir convention. Indeed, Postman is consid-
ered to be a classic film noir.
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But what does that mean? What exactly is film noir? Is it a genre (like a
western or a romantic comedy)? Is it a film style constituted by the deep
shadows and odd scene compositions? Is it perhaps a cycle of films lasting
through a certain period (typically identified as 1941–58)? Is noir a certain
mood and tone, that of alienation and pessimism? Each of these answers,
among others, has been given as an explanation of just what film noir is.
And, given that there is widespread disagreement about what film noir is,
there is likewise disagreement about which films count as noir films. Clearly,
Postman is a noir film, but is Citizen Kane (Orson Welles, 1941), for ex-
ample? Or, perhaps more pointedly, is Beat the Devil (1953) or The Trea-
sure of the Sierra Madre (1948)? Like The Maltese Falcon (1941), both star
noir legend Humphrey Bogart, and both were directed by John Huston,
but, whereas The Maltese Falcon is considered to be a noir film, indeed a
classic noir, the other two movies are often not so regarded.
In this essay, I’ll give a brief history of the various attempts at defining
film noir. I’ll then discuss Nietzsche and the problem of definition, and I’ll
conclude by making a modest proposal for a new way of looking at film
noir and the problem of its definition.
Socratic Definition
Before examining the various proposed definitions of film noir, I want to
look at one approach to the question of definition generally, namely,
Socrates’. As a philosopher, Socrates took as his central concern ethics: he
wanted to know how to live his life, and he believed that the key to living
well was knowledge, specifically, knowledge of the virtues. In order to be
pious or just, Socrates believes, one must know what piety and justice are.
So, in Plato’s dialogues,1 in order to achieve the knowledge he wants, Socrates
searches for the forms of virtues.
Plato’s theory of forms is a theory of universals and essences. A univer-
sal is the category into which things fall. So, for example, individual, physi-
cal chairs or desks are what philosophers call particulars, whereas the
category chair or desk is the universal, or the species, under which those
physical items are organized. Particulars are concrete, individual things;
universals are abstract categories. So, if the form (the universal) is film
noir, then the particulars would be the individual films that fall into that
category: Out of the Past (Jacques Tourneur, 1947), The Maltese Falcon, and
so on.
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But, more than this, the notion of the forms is the cornerstone of
Plato’s metaphysics, his theory about the nature of reality. For Plato, the
continuously changing everyday world of physical objects and events,
the particulars, that we see and hear around us is not ultimate reality; it
is a pale imitation, like a shadow on a cave wall (to use Plato’s famous
analogy).2 Ultimate reality is not what we perceive with our five senses.
Rather, it’s what we grasp with our minds, the universals. The forms are
intelligible rather than sensible, they lie outside space, time, and causal-
ity, and they’re eternal and unchanging. Further, the forms are the es-
sences of the particulars: they’re what make the individual physical objects
and events what they are. If someone wants to know what this individual
thing made up of plastic, metal, and fabric is, you mention the form:
chair (or chairness, the essence of any physical object of that type). The
individual object comes into existence, changes and decays, and ultimately
is destroyed. The form, on the other hand, remains the same forever. So,
even if every chair in the world were destroyed, what it means to be a
chair—that essence and form—would, according to Socrates, still be the
same.3
So, when Socrates asks for a definition, he is not asking for a dictionary
definition, which tells us the way to use a word. Rather, he wants a descrip-
tion of the form. He wants in his case to know what real, essential proper-
ties the virtues have. In our case, if we can follow Socrates’ lead and articulate
the form of film noir, then we’ll know exactly what we’re talking about, and
we’ll be able to identify anything of that type.
So is there, in fact, a way of identifying the form of film noir? Can we
pick out its essential properties and articulate them in a definition?4
Defining Film Noir
IT’S A GENRE
There is now a relatively long history of discussion about film noir and, as
I mentioned above, a continuing debate about what noir really is.5 One of
the central issues involved in defining film noir is whether it constitutes a
genre. So what’s a genre?6 Foster Hirsch says: “A genre . . . is determined by
conventions of narrative structure, characterization, theme, and visual de-
sign.” And, as one of those who argues that film noir is indeed a genre, he
finds that film noir has these elements “in abundance”:
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Noir deals with criminal activity, from a variety of perspectives, in
a general mood of dislocation and bleakness which earned the style
its name. Unified by a dominant tone and sensibility, the noir canon
constitutes a distinct style of film-making; but it also conforms to
genre requirements since it operates within a set of narrative and
visual conventions. . . . Noir tells its stories in a particular way, and
in a particular visual style. The repeated use of narrative and visual
structures . . . certainly qualifies noir as a genre, one that is in fact as
heavily coded as the western.7
So film noir is a genre, according to Hirsch, because of the consistent tone
and the storytelling and visual conventions running through the films of
the classic noir period. We see all these features, for example, in The Post-
man Always Rings Twice, as I mentioned above: the tone of dark cynicism
and alienation, the narrative conventions like the femme fatale and the
flashback voice-overs, and the shadowy black-and-white look of the movie.
James Damico likewise believes that noir is a film genre—and pre-
cisely because of a certain narrative pattern. He describes this pattern as
the typical noir plot, in which the main character is lured into violence,
and usually to his own destruction, by the femme fatale. Again, this is ex-
actly the pattern of Postman: Frank is coaxed into killing Cora’s husband
and is ultimately destroyed by his choices and actions. Damico, unlike
Hirsch, however, denies that there is a consistent visual style to the films: “I
can see no conclusive evidence that anything as cohesive and determined
as a visual style exists in [film noir].”8
IT’S NOT A GENRE
Those who deny that film noir is a genre define it in a number of different
ways. In the earliest work on film noir (1955), for example, Raymond Borde
and Étienne Chaumeton define noir as a series or cycle of films whose aim
is to create alienation in the viewer: “All the films of this cycle create a
similar emotional effect: that state of tension instilled in the spectator when
the psychological reference points are removed. The aim of film noir was to
create a specific alienation.”9
Andrew Spicer also identifies noir as a cycle of films that “share a simi-
lar iconography, visual style, narrative strategies, subject matter and
characterisation.” This sounds a good deal like Hirsch’s characterization,
but Spicer denies that noir can be defined as a genre (or in most other
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ways, for that matter) since the expression film noir is “a discursive critical
construction that has evolved over time.”10 In other words, far from being
a fixed and unchanging universal category, like one of Plato’s forms, film
noir is a concept that evolved as critics and theorists wrote and talked about
these movies and was applied retroactively.11
Further, in arguing against Damico’s version of noir’s essential narra-
tive, Spicer points out that “there are many other, quite dissimilar, noir
plots” than the one Damico describes.12 Classic examples might include
those of High Sierra (Raoul Walsh, 1941) and Pickup on South Street (Samuel
Fuller, 1953), neither of which includes a femme fatale who coaxes the pro-
tagonist to commit a violent act against a third man.13 In Pickup, for ex-
ample, the pickpocket Skip McCoy (Richard Widmark) steals classified
microfilm from a woman, Candy (Jean Peters), on the subway. She’s carry-
ing it for her boyfriend, who is—unbeknownst to her—passing govern-
ment secrets along to the Communists. The story, then, concerns the efforts
of the police to get McCoy to turn the film over to them, which would
mean admitting that he’s still picking pockets, thereby putting him in danger
of becoming a three-time loser; and it concerns the efforts of the conspira-
tors to retrieve the film from McCoy by any means necessary, including kill-
ing his friend and information dealer Moe (Thelma Ritter). This is a classic
example of a film noir, but it doesn’t follow Damico’s narrative pattern.
Spicer goes on to say: “Any attempt at defining film noir solely through
its ‘essential’ formal components proves to be reductive and unsatisfactory
because film noir, as the French critics asserted from the beginning, also
involves a sensibility, a particular way of looking at the world.”14 So noir is
not simply a certain plot line or a visual style achieved by camera angles
and unusual lighting. It also involves a “way of looking at the world,” an
outlook on life and human existence.
In addition to its character as a series or cycle of movies, film noir is
often identified by, or defined as, the particular visual style, mood, tone, or
set of motifs characteristic of the form. Raymond Durgnat, for example,
says: “The film noir is not a genre, as the western and gangster film, and
takes us into the realm of classification by motif and tone.”15 The tone is one
of bleak cynicism, according to Durgnat, and the dominant motifs include
crime as social criticism, gangsters, private eyes and adventurers, middle-
class murder, portraits and doubles, sexual pathology, and psychopaths.
Paul Schrader likewise denies that noir is a genre. He says: “[Film noir]
is not defined, as are the western and gangster genres, by conventions of
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setting and conflict, but rather by the more subtle qualities of tone and
mood.” He thus rejects Durgnat’s classification by motif and focuses his
definition on the important element of mood, specifically that of “cyni-
cism, pessimism and darkness.” He continues: “Film noir’s techniques em-
phasize loss, nostalgia, lack of clear priorities, insecurity; then submerge
these self-doubts in mannerism and style. In such a world style becomes
paramount; it is all that separates one from meaninglessness.”16
In a classic essay, Robert Porfirio says that “Schrader was right in in-
sisting upon both visual style and mood as criteria.” The mood at the heart
of noir, according to Porfirio, is pessimism, “which makes the black film
black for us.” The “black vision” of film noir is one of “despair, loneliness
and dread,” he claims, and “is nothing less than an existential attitude to-
wards life.” This existentialist outlook on life infusing noir didn’t come
from the European existentialists (like Sartre and Camus), who were roughly
contemporaneous with the classic American noir period. Rather: “It is more
likely that this existential bias was drawn from a source much nearer at
hand—the hard-boiled school of fiction without which quite possibly there
would have been no film noir.”17 The mood of pessimism, loneliness, dread,
and despair is to be found in the works of, for example, Raymond Chan-
dler, Dashiell Hammett, James M. Cain, and David Goodis, whose writings
were a resource for and had a direct influence on those who created noir
films in the classic period, as I mentioned above. I’ll have more to say about
Porfirio and the existentialist outlook of noir films below.
Finally, R. Barton Palmer likewise rejects the definition of noir as a
genre, calling it instead a “transgeneric phenomenon,” since it existed
“through a number of related genres whose most important common
threads were a concern with criminality . . . and with social breakdown.”
The genres associated with noir include “the crime melodrama, the detec-
tive film, the thriller, and the woman’s picture.”18 In other words, whatever
the noir element in a film noir is, it can be expressed through a number of
genres—melodrama, thriller, etc.—and so film noir is not itself a genre. It’s
“transgeneric.”
IT CAN’T BE DEFINED
Another writer, J. P. Telotte, focuses his discussion of film noir’s definition
on the issue of genre, sidestepping, perhaps prudently, the issue of whether
any of these characterizations of film noir do in fact establish it as a genre.
The element of noir films that Telotte claims unites them—without neces-
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sarily providing a basis for calling noir a genre19—is their rejection of tra-
ditional narrative (storytelling) patterns. More than any other type of popu-
lar film, Telotte says, “film noir pushes at the boundaries of classical
narrative.” This classical narrative would be a straightforward story told
from a third-person-omniscient point of view, which assumes the objec-
tive truth of a situation, involves characters who are goal oriented and whose
motivations make sense, and has a neat closure at the end (boy gets girl
etc.). Telotte goes on to say: “[Noir] films are fundamentally about the prob-
lems of seeing and speaking truth, about perceiving and conveying a sense
of our culture’s and our own reality.”20 So what’s common to noir films,
according to Telotte, is unconventional or nonclassical narrative patterns,
and these patterns point to problems of truth and objectivity and of our
ability to know and understand reality. One technique underpinning or
establishing these nontraditional patterns is the nonchronological order-
ing of events, often achieved through flashback. As we saw, this is the tech-
nique used in Postman, but the best example of it is perhaps The Killers
(Robert Siodmak, 1946), which brilliantly weaves together Jim Reardon’s
(Edmond O’Brien) investigation of Ole Andersen’s (Burt Lancaster) death
with flashbacks that tell the story leading up to the murder. Other tech-
niques are the use of sometimes incoherent plotlines, as in The Big Sleep
(Howard Hawks, 1946), and characters whose actions aren’t motivated or
understandable in any rational way. For example, why does Frank agree to
go ahead with the second (and successful) attempt on Nick’s life in Post-
man when it’s such a poor plan and sure to get them caught?
Whereas Telotte sidesteps the issue of definition, James Naremore puts
his foot down and concludes that film noir can’t be defined. “I contend
that film noir has no essential characteristics,” he says. “The fact is, every
movie is transgeneric. . . . Thus, no matter what modifier we attach to a
category, we can never establish clear boundaries and uniform traits. Nor
can we have a ‘right’ definition—only a series of more or less interesting
uses.” One reason film noir can’t be defined, according to Naremore, is
that, as mentioned above, the term is a kind of “discursive construction,”
employed by critics (each of whom has his or her own agenda), and is used
retroactively. The other reason has to do with the nature of concepts and
definitions generally. Most contemporary philosophers believe that we don’t
form concepts by grouping similar things together according to their es-
sential properties—the technique employed by Socrates and seemingly by
most film theorists who study noir. Rather, says Naremore, we “create net-
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works of relationship, using metaphor, metonymy, and forms of imaginative
association that develop over time.” In other words, our concepts are not
discrete categories but rather networks of ideas in complex relations and
associations, networks that we form with experience. Consequently: “Cat-
egories form complex radial structures with vague boundaries and a core of
influential members at the center.”21 This certainly seems to describe film
noir. We all agree that there is a core set of films—such as Double Indemnity
(Billy Wilder, 1944) and The Maltese Falcon—in the noir canon. But the
boundary is so fuzzy that we disagree about whether a great many others—
for example, Casablanca (Michael Curtiz, 1942), Citizen Kane, and King Kong
(Merian C. Cooper and Ernest B. Schoedsack, 1933)—belong there as well.
So Naremore argues that film noir can’t be defined, that it has no es-
sential characteristics. On the other hand, there are those, like Nietzsche,
who would argue that this doesn’t just apply to these movies, that there’s
something problematic about truth and definition generally, even beyond
the issues that Naremore points out about Socratic definition. Before I go
on to say something about what noir is, however, I want to examine briefly
Nietzsche’s position on these issues.
Nietzsche and the Problem of Truth and Definition
Nietzsche holds a version of what we might call a flux metaphysics, the idea
that the world, everything, is continually changing, that nothing is stable
and enduring. Consequently, he argues, any concept of being—something
that remains the same throughout change, like Plato’s forms, God, or even
the self or the ego—is a fiction. Interestingly, he argues that language is one
of the primary sources of this fiction. That is, it’s impossible to grasp and
articulate a world that’s continually in motion, one in which nothing ever
stays the same. Thus, “understanding” the world, and articulating that un-
derstanding, becomes a matter of “seeing” parts of the flux as somehow
enduring and stable; that is, it means falsifying what our senses tell us.
One of these falsifications is the subject/predicate distinction that’s built
into language. For example, we say lightning flashes as if there is some thing
or subject lightning that somehow performs the action of flashing. Simi-
larly, we say I walk, or I talk, or I read, as if there is some stable ego, self, or
subject that is somehow separate from these actions. According to Nietzsche,
however: “There is no such substratum; there is no ‘being’ behind doing,
effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed—the
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deed is everything.”22 In other words, in a world in flux, you are what you
do. Further, the “doer” or subject created by language is, Nietzsche argues,
the source of the concept of being, a stable, unchanging, permanent reality
behind the ever-flowing flux of the world:
We enter a realm of crude fetishism when we summon before con-
sciousness the basic presuppositions of the metaphysics of language,
in plain talk, the presuppositions of reason. Everywhere it sees a
doer and doing; it believes in will as the cause; it believes in the ego,
in the ego as being, in the ego as substance, and it projects this faith
in the ego-substance upon all things—only thereby does it first
create the concept of “thing.” Everywhere “being” is projected by
thought, pushed underneath, as the cause; the concept of being
follows and is a derivative of, the concept of ego.
The fiction begins as merely a stable self, the idea that the ego is something
enduring and unchanging and separate from its actions (as opposed to being
constituted by those actions), but soon is translated into being, that is, for
example, into Plato’s forms and a divinity. Nietzsche says: “I am afraid we
are not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar.”23
This falsification introduced by reason and language certainly makes
truth, objectivity, and indeed definition problematic, to say the least. In an
early and influential essay, Nietzsche says: “Truths are illusions which we
have forgotten are illusions.”24 Elsewhere: “All concepts in which an entire
process is semiotically concentrated elude definition; only that which has
no history is definable.”25 Nietzsche here seems to be agreeing with Socrates:
a definition must capture the essence of the thing, that which doesn’t change
and thus has no history. The catch here is that, as we’ve seen, Nietzsche
denies that there is any such thing, so he’s denying that anything at all can
really be defined. This is a radical position and seems not to bode well for
the project of defining film noir. However, and perhaps ironically, I think
that it’s Nietzsche who will help us better understand what noir is.
What Is Noir?
To discover what makes a film a film noir, that is, what the noir element in
the film is, it might be instructive to look briefly at noir literature—and
especially so if it’s through the hard-boiled literature that noir films get
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their existential, pessimistic outlook, as Porfirio says. I’ll take as an example
of this literature the 1961 novel Night Squad by David Goodis, the author
of Dark Passage (1946), on which the 1947 Bogart and Bacall/Delmer Daves
film was based.26 The first paragraph of Night Squad reads: “At 11:20 a
fairly well-dressed boozehound came staggering out of a bootleg-whiskey
joint on Fourth Street. It was a Friday night in mid-July and the humid heat
was like a wave of steaming black syrup confronting the boozehound. He
walked into it and bounced off and braced himself to make another try. A
moment later something hit him on the head and he sagged slowly and ar-
rived on the pavement flat on his face.” We instantly recognize here the clipped,
gritty phrasing of the hard-boiled school, the dirty gutter setting, and the
down-on-his-luck character. The boozehound is being mugged by three men
while a fourth, Corey Bradford—who turns out to be the protagonist—
watches from the other side of the street. Bradford is a former dirty cop and
forces the muggers to give him the boozehound’s money. He keeps most of it
for himself but returns a dollar to the boozehound for cab fare home. Instead
of going home, however, the boozehound takes the dollar—his only money—
and goes back into the bootleg-whiskey joint for another drink. Before he
does, he mutters: “The trouble is, we just can’t get together, that’s all.”
Bradford interprets this to mean: “We just can’t get together on what’s right
and what’s wrong.”27
The story largely takes place in a Philadelphia neighborhood known as
“the Swamp,” where Bradford grew up. The area is just as run-down, dirty,
and crime infested as its name implies. In an interior monologue about the
neighborhood, Bradford reflects on how tough the place is, and he has noth-
ing but good things to say about the prostitutes. They’re “performing a
necessary function,” like the sewer workers and the trash collectors: “If it
wasn’t for the professionals, there’d be more suicides, more homicides. And
more of them certain cases you read about, like some four-year-old girl
getting dragged into an alley, some sixty-year-old landlady getting hacked
to pieces with an axe.”28 If the denizens of the swamp couldn’t vent their
violent and sexual impulses with the prostitutes, they’d take them out on
little girls and old ladies. So it’s a good thing we have the pros.
Finally, I’ll mention in passing that the femme fatale of this story, Lita,
is married to the gangster who runs the Swamp. When Bradford first meets
her, Goodis describes her thus: “She was of medium height, very slender.
Her hair was platinum blonde. Contrasting with her deep, dark green eyes.”
And she’s holding a book: “Corey could see the title on the cover. He didn’t
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know much about philosophy but he sensed that the book was strictly for
deep thinkers. It was Nietzsche, it was Thus Spake Zarathustra.”29
What we see here, and what makes this story noir, is the tone and mood,
and the sensibility, the outlook on life, that the critics and writers men-
tioned above discuss. We see bleak cynicism (Durgnat), for example, in the
protagonist’s saving the boozehound from getting mugged, only to keep
his money for himself. We witness the loss and lack of clear priorities
(Schrader) in the same scene and in Bradford’s appraisal of the prostitutes.
Alienation is clearly present (Borde and Chaumeton); the whole story is one
of a man adrift, a man who has lost balance and the meaning and value of his
life. And we see existential pessimism (Porfirio). This is clearly evident both
in the image of the boozehound going back into the bar to spend his last
dollar on another drink and in the dark picture of human nature that Goodis
paints when he discusses the need to vent our violent urges with prostitutes.
One other thing, something related to all these other elements, that
some writers discuss, but that I want to emphasize, is what we might call
the inversion of traditional values and the loss of the meaning of things. That
is, at the heart of the noir mood or tone of alienation, pessimism, and
cynicism we find, on the one hand, the rejection or loss of clearly defined
ethical values (we can’t “get together on what’s right and what’s wrong”)30
and, on the other, the rejection or loss of the meaning or sense of human
existence. In essence, Porfirio is, I think, on the right track in talking about
the noir sensibility as a kind of “existential outlook” on life.
Further, I’m agreeing with those who say that what makes a film a film
noir is a particular mood, tone, or sensibility, a particular outlook on life.
This is clear because it’s that tone or sensibility that, as I said, links the
literature and the films. Thus, the narrative elements (storytelling conven-
tions) and the filmmaking techniques (oblique camera angles, deep focus,
low-key lighting, etc.) are, I think, secondary to the mood or sensibility.
They are used to communicate that mood or sensibility,31 but it’s the latter
that makes the film a noir.
The Death of God and the Meaning of Noir
As I mentioned, Nietzsche can help throw light on what film noir is, de-
spite his skepticism about truth, essences, and definition. One of Nietzsche’s
most infamous and provocative statements is that “God is dead.”32 What
he means by this is that not only Western religions but also Western meta-
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physical systems have become untenable. Both Platonism and Christianity,
for example, claim that there is some permanent and unchanging other-
worldly realm or substance: the forms in the case of the former and God
and heaven in the case of the latter. This unchanging otherworldly some-
thing is set in opposition to the here and now, the changing world around
us (forms vs. particulars; heaven vs. earth, etc.), and it’s the source of, or
foundation for, our understanding of human existence, our morality, our
hope for the future, among other things.
Again, Nietzsche says that the fiction of being is generated originally
through the falsifications involved in reason and language. This concept of
being is exposed as a fiction, Nietzsche argues, in the modern period, when
natural empirical science begins to replace traditional metaphysical expla-
nations of the world. We cease to believe in the myth of creation, for ex-
ample, and modern philosophers tend to reject Plato’s idea of otherworldly
forms. Thus, throughout the modern and into the contemporary period,
religion and philosophy—as metaphysical explanations of the world—are
supplanted by natural science. At the same time, we try to hold onto our
old understanding of human existence, our ethics, an ever-more-feeble belief
in an afterlife, etc. What finally, and gradually, dawns on us, says Nietzsche,
is that, once the latter is lost, there’s no longer any foundation or justifica-
tion for these adjuncts of metaphysics. We realize more and more the hol-
lowness and untenability of our old outlook, our old values.
The result of this is devastating. We no longer have any sense of who
and what we are as human beings. There’s seemingly no foundation any
longer for the meaning and value of things, including ethical values, good
and evil. There’s no longer any hope for an afterlife—this life must be taken
and endured on its own terms. Before the death of God, we knew as good
Platonists or Christians (or Jews or Muslims) who and what we were, the
value and meaning our lives had, what we had to do to live a righteous life.
Now we’re set adrift. We’re alienated, disoriented, off balance. The world is
senseless and chaotic. There’s no transcendent meaning or value to human
existence.
This death of God, then—the loss of permanence, of a transcendent
source of value and meaning, and the resulting disorientation and nihilism—
leads to existentialism and its worldview. Porfirio characterizes existential-
ism as “an outlook which begins with a disoriented individual facing a
confused world that he cannot accept. It places its emphasis on man’s con-
tingency in a world where there are no transcendental values or moral ab-
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solutes, a world devoid of any meaning but the one man himself creates.”33
As a literary/philosophical phenomenon, set in its particular place in his-
tory, existentialism is continental Europe’s reaction to the death of God.
My proposal, then, is that noir can also be seen as a sensibility or
worldview that results from the death of God and, thus, that film noir is a
type of American artistic response to, or recognition of, this seismic shift in
our understanding of the world. This is why Porfirio is right in pointing
out the similarities between the noir sensibility and the existentialist view
of life and human existence. Although they are not exactly the same thing,
they are both reactions, however explicit and conscious, to the same real-
ization of the loss of value and meaning in our lives.
A (Slightly) Different Approach
Seeing noir as a response or reaction to the death of God helps explain the
commonality of the elements that critics have noted in noir films. For ex-
ample, it explains the inherent pessimism, alienation, and disorientation in
noir. It affirms that noir is a sensibility or an outlook, as some hold. It ex-
plains the moral ambiguity in noir as well as the threat of nihilism and
meaninglessness that some note.
As I said, the death of God doesn’t just (or even necessarily) mean the
rejection of religion. For Americans, our belief in what Nietzsche is calling
God, the sense, order, and meaning of our lives and the world, is encapsu-
lated in our idealism: our faith in God, progress, and the indomitable Ameri-
can spirit. Consequently, as Palmer notes: “Film noir . . . offers the obverse
of the American dream.”34 Most argue that the sources of this obversion or
reversal are (or include) anxiety over the war and the postwar period, the
Communist scare, the atomic age, the influx of German émigrés in Holly-
wood, and the hard-boiled school of pulp fiction. Indeed, it’s via these in-
fluences that an awareness or a feeling came over us, seeped into the
American consciousness, that our old ways of understanding ourselves and
the world, and the values that went along with these, were gone or unten-
able. We lost our orientation in the world, the meaning and sense that our
lives had, and clear-cut moral values and boundaries.
The similarities between European existentialism and film noir are, as
Porfirio points out, apparent. In the classic existentialist work The Stranger
(1942), for example, Camus depicts the alienation and disorientation of a
post-Nietzschean world, one without transcendent meaning or value. The
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book’s main character reacts little to his mother’s death, shoots and kills a
man for no good reason, and seems indifferent to his own trial and im-
pending execution. Similarly, when, in The Maltese Falcon, Sam Spade
(Humphrey Bogart) shrugs off his partner’s murder or turns his lover, Brigid
(Mary Astor), over to the police, or when, in The Killers, Ole Andersen
passively awaits his assassins, even after being warned that they’re coming,
we get a sense of the same alienation, the same lack of sense and meaning.
And, since film is a visual medium, these noirish elements are also con-
veyed through lighting and camera techniques. So, for example, extreme
close-ups of Hank Quinlan’s (Orson Welles) bloated face in Touch of Evil
(Orson Welles, 1958) and the tilted camera shot of Mike Hammer (Ralph
Meeker) in a hospital bed in Kiss Me Deadly (Robert Aldrich, 1955) further
serve to express alienation and disorientation.
Finally, considering noir to be a response to the death of God also veri-
fies J. P. Telotte’s claim that noir films are “fundamentally about the prob-
lems of seeing and speaking truth,” since it’s in a post-Nietzschean world,
in the wake of the death of God, that seeing and speaking the truth become
problematic. Consequently, and ironically, what makes truth problematic,
and what makes definition impossible, according to Nietzsche—the aban-
donment of essences, the resulting flux metaphysics, the rejection of any-
thing permanent and unchanging in the universe, that is, the death of
God—is the same thing that makes noir what it is. That is, the death of God
is both the meaning of noir and—if we’re to believe Nietzsche—what makes
noir impossible to define.
Notes
Many thanks to Jason Holt, Bill Irwin, Steven Sanders, and Aeon Skoble, who gave me
assistance and excellent comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
1. The relationship between Plato and Socrates is somewhat complex. Socrates
never wrote anything. He much preferred to engage people in conversation. Plato was
one of Socrates’ friends and pupils. Most of Plato’s writings are in the form of dia-
logues; they’re narratives, and Socrates is very often the main character. Consequently,
when we talk about Socrates saying something, most of the time we’re referring to
what Plato represents him as saying.
2. For the allegory of the cave, see bk. 7, lines 514a–517d, of the Republic.
3. For the theory of forms, see line 65d of the Phaedo or lines 475e–476a of the
Republic.
4. There are many other ways of thinking about definition, both ancient and con-
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temporary. I mention Socrates because his is a classic approach to the issue and be-
cause he makes a nice foil for Nietzsche.
5. I’m not pretending that the history I’m giving is complete or that it mentions
every important work or statement on the topic. I merely want to provide the reader
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A Darker Shade
Realism in Neo-Noir
Jason Holt
Somewhere in between the soft lies of cinema and the harsh truths of
reality, there exists an element of realism in film noir.
—Carl Richardson
Classic film noir ran from the early forties to the late fifties, beginning with
John Huston’s The Maltese Falcon (1941) and ending with Orson Welles’s
Touch of Evil (1958). We might widen the scope a bit, citing the little-known
Stranger on the Third Floor (Boris Ingster, 1940) as the inception of the
classic period and Odds against Tomorrow (Robert Wise, 1959) as the ter-
minus, but, even without settling the disputes about which should count
as the first film noir and which as the last, the historical limits of the pe-
riod, spanning at most twenty years, are pretty well defined.
Some purists would have it that film noir is essentially circumscribed
by these historical limits, that there can be no noir in any sense after the late
fifties. This view is unnecessarily extreme. Many films made since the end
of the classic period exhibit such strong resemblance to classic noir that
they clearly deserve to be called noir in some sense. Nowadays, the term is
often used generically, applied as much to contemporary films as (retro-
spectively) to those of the classic period. But, even if noir constitutes a
cycle of films (now closed) or a filmmaking movement (now defunct), this
is perfectly compatible with certain films made after the classic period be-
ing dubbed neo-noir (also known as contemporary, postclassic, or modern
film noir). Irrespective of whether film noir constitutes a genre, such modi-
fied use obviously does not flout but rather respects the historical limits of
the classic period.
The question of how to define film noir, or even whether it can be
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defined, is certainly a vexed one.1 Nonetheless, it is worthwhile developing
a working definition. Noir is often characterized in terms of its bleakly
existential tone, cynically pessimistic mood, stylistic elements inherited from
German expressionism (low-key lighting, deep focus, subjective camera
shots, canted angles, and so on), and stories and narrative patterns adapted
from American hard-boiled fiction. These facets of film noir, I would ar-
gue, fall roughly under the rubric stylization, broadly construed. Tone and
mood emerge from style, and the story lines of film noir, for all their con-
trivances, tend to be highly stylized.
Some other important features of noir are less frequently mentioned
and tend to be underemphasized, underappreciated, or outright ignored.
It is surprising, for instance, that many accounts of noir either fail to men-
tion or pass quickly over the fact that it is essentially (among other things)
a type of crime film.2 After all, it was precisely the desire to label and de-
scribe what they saw as a new type of crime film that prompted French
critics to introduce the term film noir in the first place.3 Another insight
from French critics that is often marginalized is the idea that the characters
in films noirs are, from a commonsense point of view, morally ambigu-
ous.4 This is almost a platitude, since what most clearly distinguishes noir
from, say, the more conventional thriller or gangster film is the lack of
clarity with which moral distinctions are drawn. While some noir charac-
ters are unquestionably evil, many have their evil somehow attenuated (e.g.,
by a sympathetic motive or by being fully revealed as such only at the end).
More important, without a hero or heroine of ambiguous moral standing,
noir simply evaporates.
While it has been recognized as somehow involved, realism is undoubt-
edly one of the more consistently underappreciated elements of noir. Real-
ism in noir extends far beyond the verisimilitude of studio production and
location shooting. Not only the settings but also the scenes, the action, the
depiction of violent crime, and the characters involved are all quite realis-
tic by and large. (Realism here is meant in the ordinary sense of being true
to life, facing things as they are, and should not be confused with various
more technical philosophical senses of the term.)5 What prevents a spa-
ghetti western like The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (Sergio Leone, 1966)
from being neo-noir, despite its undeniable noirishness in other respects,
is that the prowess of the main characters (in particular Clint Eastwood’s
“Man with No Name”) is elaborated well beyond plausibility, mytholo-
gized, in fact. Like the spaghetti western, however, one of the most distinc-
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tively realistic features of noir is the role (or lack thereof) that values play in
the characters’ lives. In providing a spectrum of characters that shade from
the morally ambiguous through the completely amoral, noir behavior—in
terms of motive, action, and outcome—mirrors an often unacknowledged
and significantly unpleasant chunk of human existence. The downbeat
endings typical of noir are generally far more lifelike than those usually
found in alternative fare.
The reason that realism has been underrated, I think, is that it enters
into a sort of dynamic tension with the more obvious element of night-
marish, surreal stylization, much of which, however, can be subsumed un-
der realism, especially the sort of realism I focus on here. As Carl Richardson
puts it: “The real world is shadowy, crime-ridden, web-like, amoral, illogi-
cal.”6 The tone and mood of film noir are apropos of how things really are,
a sense of reality, not distorted, but conveyed by expressionist techniques
and convoluted plotlines. These capture a psychological realism, if nothing
else, a sense of the world as it can be and often seems. The moral ambiguity
of characters is no less realistic. But, while the scope and importance of
realism in film noir are greater than is usually thought, it is unlikely that all
its stylistic elements can be brought comfortably under the heading real-
ism. To hedge my bets, my working definition of noir will be “stylized crime
realism,” where each term in the formula is understood as explained above.7
In this essay, I explore realism in neo-noir by examining a cross section
of films, paying particular attention to the moral ambiguity of characters
and the outcome of their actions in the neo-noir world. Not only will this
help distinguish noir from neo-noir in a nontrivial way, but it will also
reveal a philosophically germane and crucial part of what, all along, has
been the essence of noir. While most of the films selected hold a certain
charm for me, almost all are uncontested members of the neo-noir class.
Collectively, they serve as a representative sample. Where there is some
doubt, I speak to it. If there is any glaring omission here, it is the work of
Martin Scorsese.8 However, just as some noir commentators are loath to
discuss Alfred Hitchcock, seeing him as sui generis, so too do I demure
from engaging Scorsese here.
No More Spades: Harper and Chinatown
In the early phase of classic noir, the figure of the private detective was
most highly visible.9 So too with neo-noir, which was more or less sporadi-
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cally produced in the sixties and seventies before being fully revived in the
eighties. Leaving aside such interim films as Shock Corridor (Samuel Fuller,
1963), neo-noir began with Harper (Jack Smight, 1966). One of the most
obvious and, in many ways, best noirs of the seventies was Chinatown (Ro-
man Polanski, 1974). Both Harper and Chinatown are important early neo-
noirs. Each is about a mystery-entangled private eye, and each has an ending
that is paramount to establishing the significance of the whole.
Harper begins with the private detective Lew Harper (Paul Newman)
making a face at the stale coffee he has made from recycled grounds, which
leads us to expect a radical departure from the classic noir detective. Even
so, and despite the sixties setting, most of the film proceeds like any classic
noir. Elaine Sampson (Lauren Bacall) hires Harper to investigate the dis-
appearance of her husband, who turns out to have been kidnapped and is
being held for ransom. Sampson’s daughter Miranda (Pamela Tiffin) seems
to have no interest in the matter, while the houseguest and pilot Allan
Taggert (Robert Wagner) seems too eager to help. The real villain, however,
is Albert Graves (Arthur Hill), the Sampsons’ lawyer and Harper’s friend.
Graves, having finally killed his employer, is found out by Harper and taken
back to the Sampsons’ home along with the ransom money.
While Harper encounters the usual cavalcade of noir characters, and
although his attitude is more nonchalant than that of the classic noir detec-
tive, what sets Harper apart, and finally rewards our expectation from the
first scene, is the denouement. In a moment of great drama, Harper walks up
the Sampsons’ driveway, intending to return the money and incriminate
Graves, all the while knowing that Graves is aiming a loaded gun at him.
Unable to shoot his friend in the back, Graves uncocks the gun, and Harper,
hearing this, essentially relents, dropping the money and raising his hands in
a half-shrugging gesture of self-mockery, which severely undercuts the drama
of the moment, ending the film on an ambiguous, almost absurd note.
In Chinatown, which is set in Los Angeles in the late thirties, the pri-
vate eye Jake Gittes (Jack Nicholson) is hired to investigate the civic engi-
neer Hollis Mulwray (Darrell Zwerling) by a woman (Diane Ladd) posing
as his wife, Evelyn. On flimsy evidence, Gittes leaks a story of Mulwray’s
infidelity to the press, causing the real Evelyn (Faye Dunaway) to confront
him. Mulwray turns up drowned in a reservoir, and Evelyn hires Gittes to
find the killer. Gittes’s investigation leads to Noah Cross (John Huston),
Evelyn’s father, who is responsible for the ongoing drought in the area and
is fraudulently buying up depreciated land. Once romantically involved with
A Darker Shade 27
Evelyn, Gittes learns that the young woman he saw Mulwray with is Evelyn’s
sister/daughter and Cross’s daughter/granddaughter, Katherine (Belinda
Palmer). In attempting to help Evelyn and Katherine flee to Mexico, Gittes
fails. Evelyn is shot and killed by police, and Cross, having orchestrated
Mulwray’s murder, is free to reclaim Katherine, escaping justice entirely.
Harper and Gittes, each in different ways, exhibit the departure of the
neo-noir detective from such classic noir counterparts as Sam Spade and
Philip Marlowe. While both neo-noir detectives are nominally competent
in narrowly defined domains, Harper lacks the sort of integrity that al-
lowed Sam Spade to triumph (although Spade would, no doubt, be more
intrigued by Miranda), and Gittes lacks the wherewithal to negotiate the
increasingly dark vicissitudes of the neo-noir world. While less capable,
less admirable than their classic-era prototypes, they are, for that very rea-
son, more realistic. Efforts to correct injustice often enough fail, and, in the
face of this unpleasant fact, sometimes the best that one can hope for is
stoic resignation. As Gittes is finally told: “There’s nothing you can do,
Jake. It’s Chinatown.”
La Nouvelle Femme Fatale: Body Heat and The Last Seduction
While neo-noir began in the sixties, noir’s full resurgence had to wait an-
other fifteen years. Noir came back with a vengeance in the eighties with
the release of Body Heat (Lawrence Kasdan, 1981), at once an homage to
and a reclamation of the classic noir aesthetic. One of the mainstays and
most salient icons of classic noir was the femme fatale, fatal not only to the
sap who falls for her, and whom she manipulates, but also to herself. Neo-
noir revamps the femme fatale. She is no less an object of obsession and
desire, no less dangerous, than she was in the classic period, only this time
around she gets away with it. Where the classic femme fatale suffers for her
crimes, her revamped counterpart prospers.
“You’re not too smart, are you? I like that in a man.” So says Matty
Walker (Kathleen Turner) to Ned Racine (William Hurt) when they first
meet up in Body Heat. Ned, an affable but somewhat incompetent lawyer,
is utterly beguiled, and, after they become involved, Matty has little trouble
convincing him that her loveless marriage to rich husband Edmund (Rich-
ard Crenna) would be best resolved by murder. As agreed, Ned breaks into
their house at night and bludgeons Edmund to death, disposing of the
body in one of Edmund’s abandoned buildings, which he rigs to burn down.
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Edmund’s new will, secretly forged by Matty on Ned’s stationery, is found
invalid, and, instead of receiving only part of the estate, Matty gets it all.
When Matty fakes her own death and absconds with the money to a tropi-
cal island, Ned alone takes the fall.
There is a particularly striking scene when the plan to kill Edmund is
set and, in reference to an earlier conversation, Matty gives Ned a fedora
reminiscent of those worn by classic noir heroes, many of whom are not
only virile, as Ned is, but capable, as he is not. One beautiful shot in the
scene has Matty framed by an open car window, and, as the window goes
up, she is visually replaced by the reflected image of Ned, wearing the hat,
smiling a bit awkwardly but more genuinely than at any other time in the
film. Despite the sap’s greed and lust for the femme fatale, she seduces him
less into crime than into the inflated self-deception of seeing himself as
more competent, more capable, than he knows he really is.
In The Last Seduction (John Dahl, 1994), a fledgling doctor, Clay Gre-
gory (Bill Pullman), in debt to a New York loan shark, makes a major drug
deal. His wife, Bridget (Linda Fiorentino), skips town with the money and
lays low in the small town Beston under the assumed name Wendy Kroy.
Although Harlan (Bill Nunn), a private detective hired by Clay, finds her,
she kills him before he can get to the money. Bridget convinces her new
lover, Mike Swale (Peter Berg), that she is selling murder on the side and,
promising a happy future together, inveigles him into making the next hit
on a certain “Cahill,” who is really Clay. Inept and confused, Mike leaves it
to Bridget to kill Clay and then is goaded into some role-playing where,
Bridget having covertly dialed 911, he “confesses” that he is raping her and
has killed Clay besides.
Whereas the classic femme fatale never escaped justice, the femme fa-
tale of neo-noir, more realistically, often does. This theme has several in-
teresting variations in other films. In Basic Instinct (Paul Verhoeven, 1992),
not only does Nick (Michael Douglas) fail to bring Catherine (Sharon Stone)
to justice, but the pair actually fall in love, albeit in a psychosexually obses-
sive, deranged kind of way. In Bound (Andy and Larry Wachowski, 1996)
too, not only do Violet (Jennifer Tilly) and Corky (Gina Gershon) manage
to steal the money from Caesar (Joe Pantoliano), but they also fall in love.10
For this reason, although they are fatal to certain others, it might be appro-
priate to consider Catherine and Violet would-be femmes fatales and not
the genuine article. Even so, they illustrate interesting variations on the
getting-away-with-it theme.
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Chance and Will: To Live and Die in L.A. and Manhunter
The moral ambiguity of film noir is often a matter of blurring moral dis-
tinctions between the nominally good hero and the villain, whose evil, even
in extreme cases, is somewhat attenuated. A prime example is the neo-noir
work of the actor William L. Petersen, specifically To Live and Die in L.A.
(William Friedkin, 1985) and Manhunter (Michael Mann, 1986). While
Manhunter is often discussed as a neo-noir, To Live and Die in L.A. almost
never is.11 This is, I believe, because it tends to be woefully underrated as a
film, a likely result of its darker tone, blurrier moral distinctions, and much
more downbeat ending, in other words, precisely those features that make
it an even better candidate for noir status. If Manhunter is a neo-noir, there
is no reason to deny that To Live and Die in L.A. is one as well.
In To Live and Die in L.A., Secret Service Agent Richard Chance
(Petersen) tries to bring down counterfeiter “Rick” Masters (Willem Dafoe).
When his partner, Jim Hart (Michael Greene), is killed following a lead,
Chance seeks to bring down Masters by any means necessary. Undercover
with his new partner, John Vukovich (John Pankow), Chance arranges a
phony buy with Masters. To get the front money, triple what the Secret
Service will allocate, on a tip from his informant and “girlfriend” Ruth
Lanier (Darlanne Fluegel) he bullies Vukovich into helping him kidnap a
shady diamond-buyer. The robbery goes bad. The buyer, who is really an
FBI agent, is killed, and Chance and Vukovich, pursued by an army of gun-
men (later revealed to be FBI as well), only narrowly escape. At the buy,
Chance is shot and killed, and Vukovich follows Masters to an old studio,
where, after a struggle, the building burning down around them, Masters
is shot and killed.
The moral ambiguity of the film is quite clear. Masters is a failed painter
whose expressionist canvases belie the cold, exact precision of his counter-
feit work. His often brutal actions always remain within the bounds of a
savvy professionalism, and, despite the unconventional relationship that
he has with his girlfriend (Debra Feuer), he treats her rather well. By con-
trast, Chance extorts sex from Lanier under threat of having her parole
revoked, and, despite the plausible nobility of avenging Hart’s death, he is
driven well beyond the pale of professional and moral standards. In terms
of noirishness, this ambiguity is surpassed only by the film’s downbeat end-
ing. Not only is Chance dead, but, by killing Masters, Vukovich is essen-
tially transformed, his seduction into the noir world now complete. He
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takes Chance’s place in the dark scheme of things, metaphorically becom-
ing Chance. As he says to Lanier in the last scene: “You work for me now.”
At the outset of Manhunter, Will Graham (Petersen), a former FBI agent,
is asked to return to work and help profile and track down a serial killer,
who turns out to be Francis Dollarhyde (Tom Noonan), a.k.a. “The Tooth
Fairy.” He consults Hannibal Lecter (Brian Cox), another serial killer, whom
Graham had caught just before suffering a breakdown and leaving the FBI.
Graham comes up with several new leads by working the evidence, but his
real insights come from watching home movies of the victimized families,
trying to empathize with the killer, and even pretending to be the killer
himself. On the brink of another breakdown, Graham at last realizes that
the killer has seen the home movies, and Dollarhyde, an employee of the
film-processing lab, is quickly identified. Dollarhyde is found at home just
as he is about to kill his coworker (Joan Allen), and Graham empties his
revolver into Dollarhyde’s chest.
Manhunter is replete with aesthetic niceties, leaving aside the extended
scenes in which Dollarhyde is depicted, for all his evil, somewhat sympa-
thetically and Graham’s steady progression from third to second to first
person in describing the killer’s actions. A case in point is Mann’s exquisite
use of background details and architecture in framing and composing shots
as well as his slight, almost imperceptible excisions and repetitions during
certain emotionally charged or action-packed sequences. Also notable are
various color motifs. The clinical whiteness of the cell underscores the tone,
if not the content, of the conversation between Graham and Lecter, each
framed in shots from complementary angles by the same prison bars. In
the last scene, Graham’s son (David Seaman), framed by the homonymous
sun reflected in the ocean, is wearing a shirt that matches Graham’s but
pants that nearly match those of his mother (Kim Greist). Although this
ending is somewhat upbeat, the family having been reunited, it is also some-
what grim, as Graham’s face is scarred with what could be read as the film’s
noir “message”—that what it takes to catch a serial killer is tantamount to
being one and that, in the final analysis, what separates the two is largely a
matter of luck.
The realism of these films is suggested, not only by their grim end-
ings, but also by the moral status of Petersen’s characters, both features
serving as excellent illustrations of how neo-noir elaborates on the moral
ambiguity of noir generally. Such moral ambiguity does not just feel re-
alistic; in the end it is realistic. People we encounter in our day-to-day
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lives are often of morally indeterminate status, either because we have no
relevant information about them, or because we have conflicting evidence.
To disambiguate, we often rely on moral tests, observing how people be-
have when it really counts (i.e., when the chips are down). But, even then,
results can be inconclusive. In real life, we seldom find heroes who are
morally unambiguous holus-bolus. Chance fails the moral test, although
his motive is plausibly noble. Graham passes, but only by a whisker, for,
to thwart Dollarhyde, he must indulge at great risk his own sociopathic
tendencies.
Odd Investigations, One More Time: No Way Out and D.O.A.
Many classic noirs were remade in the eighties.12 While most fail to mea-
sure up, some actually surpass their originals by a less than narrow margin.
This is particularly true, I would argue, of No Way Out (Roger Donaldson,
1987) and D.O.A. (Rocky Morton and Annabel Jankel, 1988), which are
less remakes per se and more reinterpretations of the provocative premises
of the classic noirs The Big Clock (John Farrow, 1948) and D.O.A. (Rudolph
Maté, 1950), respectively. In the first, the hero investigates a murder in
which he, unbeknownst to anyone else, is the prime suspect. In the second,
the hero attempts to solve his own murder.
No Way Out begins with Navy Captain Tom Farrell (Kevin Costner), in
line for a Pentagon position under Senator David Brice (Gene Hackman),
romancing Susan Atwill (Sean Young), Brice’s mistress. Knowing that she
has been with another man, Brice kills Atwill in an obsessively jealous rage,
Farrell seeing him at her house just prior to the murder. Brice’s aide Scott
Pritchard (Will Patton) removes incriminating evidence from the scene,
and the murder is blamed on Atwill’s other man. To keep the investigation
in-house, the suspect is conveniently identified as the subject of an unsub-
stantiated rumor, “Yuri,” a Soviet spy allegedly working in the Defense
Department. Under Brice, Farrell is assigned to lead the murder investiga-
tion/Yuri spy hunt, but there is no corroborating evidence of Brice’s guilt,
and all the evidence points to Farrell himself. Although Farrell hinders the
investigation surreptitiously, a witness who saw him with Atwill catches a
glimpse of him in a corridor of the Pentagon, leading to a massive room-
to-room search. Dodging the witnesses, Farrell finally manages to escape
from the Pentagon just as he is identified as the suspect. He is taken to a
safe house and interrogated by agents who turn out to be KGB. Not only is
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it now believed by the Americans that he is Yuri, but it also turns out against
all odds that he actually is Yuri.
There are a number of nice things about the film that bear mention.
First, several details foreshadowing the twist are subtle enough not to be
noticed as significant. At the bar at the posh president’s reception where
Farrell first meets Atwill, he orders Stoli, a Russian vodka. His landlord,
who is perhaps a bit too friendly, has a detectable Eastern European accent.
Also, and more centrally, there is a delightful play on the relation between
justification and truth. The Pentagon has good reason to believe that Farrell
is the one who killed Atwill, which is false, but no good reason to believe
that he is Yuri, which is true. That evidence is no guarantee of truth is a
lesson worth learning.
Another odd investigation is the subject of D.O.A. Dexter Cornell (Den-
nis Quaid), an English professor and erstwhile novelist, declines to read
the first novel of Nick Lang (Rob Knepper), his talented but pestering stu-
dent, until Nick falls to his death past Dex’s office window. Dex later learns
that his estranged wife, Gail (Jane Kaczmarek), had been having an affair
with Nick. After a night of binge drinking with admiring student Sydney
Fuller (Meg Ryan), Dex feels ill and goes to the hospital, where a blood test
reveals that he has been poisoned and has only a day or two to live. He
returns to Gail’s house just in time to see her killed by an unknown assail-
ant. Eluding the police, who suspect him, and with Sydney’s help, Dex em-
barks on a desperate quest to solve his own murder. After a number of false
leads, he confronts his seeming friend and colleague Hal Petersham (Daniel
Stern), who turns out to have poisoned Dex and killed Nick and Gail so as to
plagiarize Nick’s novel and publish it as his own. In the ensuing struggle, Dex
shoots and kills Hal before staggering to the police station and recording his
statement, before his time is up, of the whole affair on video.
Morton and Jankel’s D.O.A. is presented as continuous with and, at the
same time, a departure from Maté’s original version. Continuity is estab-
lished by the basic premise, of course, but more so by the opening and
closing sequences in black-and-white: at the beginning, when Dex stumbles
through the rain and into the police station, and, at the end, when, his
statement concluded, he walks out into the night. Despite minor errors in
depicting how such institutions are run, having the story take place in and
around the hallowed halls of academe is truly inspired. In many ways, al-
though often in subtler forms, the ivory tower can be just as petty, dark,
and sinister as any mean streets.
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Moral ambiguity is a key part of these remakes’ noir-style realism. Be-
hind our initial sympathy for Farrell lies a niggling doubt (why did he be-
come involved with his boss’s mistress?), and, when he is finally unmasked
as having worked for the KGB, not only is it revealed that they coerced him,
but he also walks out on them at the end. Our sympathy for Dex is likewise
diluted by various personal and professional failings. No less realistic are
the downbeat endings of both films. The KGB spy escapes, and the profes-
sor solves his own murder only and inevitably to die soon after somewhere
in the night.
David Lynch: Blue Velvet and Lost Highway
My working definition of noir, again, is “stylized crime realism.” In this
section, I examine two neo-noirs by David Lynch, Blue Velvet (1986) and
Lost Highway (1997), which may seem, the latter especially, to push my
definition to the breaking point. Bearing in mind the dynamic tension be-
tween stylization and realism, the former would seem to dominate in Lynch’s
nightmarish world. But, for all their stylization, for all their surreality, what
the nightmares are about (inadequacy, betrayal, the evil of which human
beings are capable) is as realistic as the nuances of psychopathology that
Lynch routinely exploits. The world is wild at heart and weird on top.
Blue Velvet begins with Jeffrey Beaumont (Kyle MacLachlan) finding a
severed human ear, which he brings to Detective John Williams (George
Dickerson). Williams’s daughter Sandy (Laura Dern) informs him that the
case concerns the lounge singer Dorothy Valens (Isabella Rossellini). Pos-
ing as a fumigator, Jeffrey enters her apartment and steals a set of keys, but,
when he returns to do more snooping, Valens surprises him, and he must
watch from a closet while Frank Booth (Dennis Hopper) engages her in
sadomasochistic sex disturbingly charged with fetishism and Freudian role-
playing. Jeffrey, romantically involved with Valens, learns that Frank, the
leader of a local crime gang in cahoots with corrupt cops, has kidnapped
Valens’s husband and son—the ear was her husband’s—so as to extort sex
from her. After Frank takes Jeffrey for a “joyride,” brutally beating him, the
police raid Frank’s place. Frank escapes and hunts for Jeffrey at Valens’s
apartment, but Jeffrey shoots and kills Frank, and Valens, although her
husband is dead, is reunited with her son.
Although Jeffrey is for the most part a sympathetic character, his mo-
tives remain morally ambiguous. As Sandy puts it, we don’t know whether
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Jeffrey is “a detective or a pervert.” His family, always watching classic noir
on TV, warns him not to go “down by Lincoln,” the bad part of town, but
he does. The ending is so saccharine, so artificial, that it subverts itself.
Back in the family, and paired now with Sandy, Jeffrey is reensconced in
the absurd surface appearances of a Norman Rockwell version of small-
town America, leaving the seething, violent noir world beneath untouched.
In Lost Highway, the jazz tenor saxophonist Fred Madison (Bill Pull-
man), unable to satisfy his wife Renee (Patricia Arquette) sexually, receives
from an anonymous source increasingly invasive videotapes of their home,
the last of which shows Fred, in a fit of madness, having killed Renee. He is
imprisoned for the crime. More and more unstable (and looking a lot like
David Lynch), Fred metamorphoses into Pete Dayton (Balthazar Getty)
and is subsequently released. Pete resumes his job as an auto mechanic,
once back at work meeting and becoming involved with Alice Wakefield
(Arquette, again), the girlfriend of the crime boss Mr. Eddy (Robert Log-
gia). Alice convinces Pete to commit a robbery with her, on the promise
that they will use the proceeds to run away together. In the desert, ostensi-
bly to meet a fence, Alice abandons Pete, at which point he metamorpho-
ses back into Fred. He finds Renee at a hotel with her lover, Dick Laurent
(Loggia, again), whom he kidnaps and murders. The police catch up with
Fred outside his house, and Fred takes off, racing down the highway with a
long line of police cars in hot pursuit.
There are several surreal, metaphysically peculiar, even supernatural
elements of Lost Highway, and these may exclude the film from the neo-
noir class or make it at most a sort of neo-noir hybrid. First, there is the
loop. At the beginning, someone informs Fred via intercom that Dick
Laurent is dead. At the end, it is Fred himself who speaks into the intercom
and does the informing. Then there is the mystery man in black (Robert
Blake), who seems at one point to be in two different places at once: at a
cocktail party with Fred and inside Fred’s house. The mystery man appar-
ently represents homicidal jealousy, and this, together with the loop, sug-
gests that Fred’s house is something of a metaphor for his mind. He informs
himself (i.e., becomes aware) that Dick Laurent is dead. The jealousy raging
within him (i.e., at home) is so vivid that he imagines seeing it in the flesh,
projecting it into a semblance of concrete existence. The element that is most
disconcerting, however, is the pair of metamorphoses. But, at one point, Fred
relates, tellingly: “I like to remember things my own way . . . not necessarily
the way they happened.” This suggests yet another nonliteral reading. Pete’s
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story can be seen as the noir-stylized version of Fred’s story as Fred wants to
remember it. Note that, while Fred is sexually inadequate, Pete is capable,
virile. When Pete is working as a mechanic, Fred’s jazz piece comes on the
radio, causing Pete to have a severe headache. This is the real profession in-
truding on the imagined one. In the same way, despite the fevered pitch of
Fred’s imagination, his disappointment forces its way into Pete’s story (when
Alice abandons him), bringing Fred back, once more, to himself.
Such interpretations give Lost Highway a less surreal and more realistic
flavor, at least beneath the surface. The same can be said of Blue Velvet’s
artificial happy ending. Add to this the moral ambiguity of Jeffrey and Fred/
Pete, and Lynch’s noir-style realism becomes discernible as an element of
his oeuvre.
On the Q.T.: Reservoir Dogs and Pulp Fiction
On the strength of Reservoir Dogs (1992) and Pulp Fiction (1994), Quentin
Tarantino is the standout neo-noir director of the nineties. Reservoir Dogs
is, somewhat ironically, the quintessential neo-noir heist film, notable for
spending, in direct contrast to typical heist films, hardly any time at all on
the details of the planning or execution of the crime itself. Pulp Fiction is a
tapestry of interwoven noir stories whose common thread becomes clear
only toward the end. Despite the obviously stylized elements, both films
exhibit a gritty realism about criminal violence and its underlying causes.
This is particularly evident in the quick cuts to and lingering shots on the
physical aftermath of actions whose extreme brutality is triggered by acci-
dent as much and as often as by will.
For the most part I will let these films speak for themselves. Up first is
Reservoir Dogs. Joe Cabot (Lawrence Tierney), a crime boss, and his son
Nice Guy Eddie (Chris Penn) bring together an ad hoc gang to pull a jewel
heist. Each gang member is given a color code name, including the princi-
pals Mr. Blonde (Michael Madsen), Mr. White (Harvey Keitel), Mr. Pink
(Steve Buscemi), and Mr. Orange (Tim Roth), an undercover cop. The gang
steals the loot but must shoot their way out, scrambling to reunite at the
designated hideout, a warehouse. During a carjacking, Mr. Orange is shot
and seriously wounded by the driver, whom he then shoots dead. He and
Mr. White repair to the warehouse, where Mr. Pink, having stashed the
loot, airs suspicions that they have been set up. Returning with a hostage
policeman (Kirk Baltz), whom he tortures while the other gang members
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are absent, Mr. Blonde is shot and killed by Mr. Orange. When the gang
returns, Cabot accuses Mr. Orange of being the rat. But Mr. White defends
him, resulting in a Mexican standoff in which everyone gets it but Mr. Pink,
who runs off with the diamonds, then is possibly shot by the police. Dying,
Mr. Orange finally confesses to the wounded Mr. White, who then shoots
him as the police arrive.
In Pulp Fiction, Vincent (John Travolta) and Jules (Samuel L. Jackson)
do a job for their boss, Marsellus Wallace (Ving Rhames), narrowly escap-
ing with their lives. On the return drive, Vincent accidentally shoots and
kills Marvin (Phil Lamarr), their inside man, which forces them to repair
to a suburban home, where the Wolf (Harvey Keitel), a consultant sent by
Marsellus, oversees the cleanup and disposal of the evidence. Vincent and
Jules then have breakfast at a diner, which Ringo (Tim Roth) and Yolanda
(Amanda Plummer) attempt to hold up. Though Jules gets the drop on
Ringo, he lets the couple go, having already decided to quit “the life” him-
self. Vincent and Jules return to Marsellus, who has just paid Butch (Bruce
Willis) to take a dive in an upcoming fight. Perhaps that night, Vincent
takes Marsellus’s wife, Mia (Uma Thurman), to dinner at his boss’s behest.
Presumably mistaking it for cocaine, Mia overdoses on Vincent’s heroin,
and he rushes her to his dealer’s (Eric Stoltz) house for a lifesaving adrena-
line shot. On a future night, Butch wins his fight, having bet heavily on
himself against the highly inflated odds. He meets up with his girlfriend,
Fabienne (Maria de Medeiros), at a motel. The next morning, Butch re-
turns to his apartment to retrieve his father’s gold watch. By chance, he
gets the drop on Vincent, who is staking out the apartment, and kills him
with his own gun. On the way back, he runs, again by chance, into Marsellus,
whom he tries to run over, smashing up his car. Both are injured, and
Marsellus chases Butch, shooting at him, into a shop, where both are
knocked unconscious. They wake up bound and gagged. Butch frees him-
self and returns to save Marsellus, and, in recompense, Marsellus lets Butch
go on the condition that he never return to Los Angeles.
Despite Tarantino’s bravado in presenting both narratives nonsequentially,
their endings are far more traditional than cutting-edge, making his style
of neo-noir more the exception than the rule. In Reservoir Dogs, no one
gets away with his misdeeds, except possibly Mr. Pink, whose levelheaded
“professionalism” almost justifies it. Those who survive in Pulp Fiction do
so on the strength of having somehow redeemed themselves, effectively
elevating them into a state of moral ambiguity. However, while the ending
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of Reservoir Dogs is appropriately downbeat, the last scene in Pulp Fiction
is of Jules and Vincent strutting out of the diner, their guns stuck in their
shorts, to the accompaniment of an ultra-hip instrumental sound track.
Because of this lighthearted, upbeat ending, one might be loath to include
Pulp Fiction in the neo-noir class. Still, while the “sequential” ending is not
downbeat, the “narratival” endings are. Plus, the sequential ending could
be seen as making one or both of the following, much darker points: (1)
redemption doesn’t really matter; (2) the fact that nothing matters doesn’t
really matter either.13
The Darker Shade
There are a number of obvious differences between classic noir and neo-
noir. First off, the former films are predominantly black-and-white, while
the latter are predominantly color productions. Certain devices, such as
voice-over narration by the protagonist, have been largely phased out, ex-
cept on rare occasions, when the point is to evoke the classic era. The spo-
radic use of black-and-white in neo-noir, whether throughout the film or
in select scenes, also serves this purpose. The sex is more explicit, the vio-
lence more graphic, more extreme, and the forces at work behind both are
of a decidedly darker hue. The Production Code, under which classic films
noirs were produced, severely limited what could be depicted, how it could
be depicted, and, perhaps most important, how it all came out in the end.
Once the Production Code was superseded by the ratings system, under
which neo-noirs were and are produced, the darker shade could be painted
in broad brushstrokes. What once had to be suggested could now be shown.
It might seem a trivial matter that the ratings system allows much more
explicit and extreme sex and violence than the Production Code did. And
perhaps it is. It might also seem trivial that filmmakers now have much
greater freedom in deciding how plots will be resolved and whether they
even will be. But this is not so. Not only can a film be much more realistic
generally, but it can also end much more realistically. As I said, part of what
holds film noir together is the realistic appraisal of people’s motives, ac-
tions, and outcomes. Often enough, people really do have dark, indetermi-
nate motives, committing shadily suspicious, evil, and excessively violent
acts. But, while the outcomes of noir in general are realistically downbeat,
the Production Code required classic noir to exhibit poetic justice, “mor-
ally permissible” endings where the victims are irretrievably lost or defini-
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tively reclaimed and the guilty get what’s coming to them. Under the aus-
pices of the ratings system, neo-noirs exploit the much more realistic pos-
sibility that, often, the guilty fail to get their comeuppance.
The reason that such endings are more realistic is clear enough. While
neo-noir by no means has an exclusive right to such endings, it does serve
to reinforce a valuable lesson, especially in light of most mainstream and
many alternative films, which are replete with poetic justice. In philoso-
phy, it is common to speak of the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of infer-
ring what ought to be the case (a value) from what merely is the case (a
fact), the illicit attempt to derive ought from is. The inverse, inferring fact
from value rather than value from fact, is hardly ever discussed, although it
is equally fallacious. I call this the normativistic fallacy. That something
should be does not mean that it is or that it will be. Of course, it is also
fallacious to infer that, because something ought to be the case, it won’t
be—we might call these varieties the optimist’s fallacy and the pessimist’s
fallacy, respectively—and so, despite being a corrective to the unwarranted
optimism implied by the vast majority of films, neo-noir might be seen as
equally erroneous. But neo-noir has the advantage. The foundation of
mainstream optimism is patently escapist, whereas that of neo-noir is trans-
parently realist. Neo-noir enjoins us to face facts in a way that purely es-
capist cinema necessarily denies us. Pessimism is irrational only when the
world fails to warrant it.
While neo-noir distinguishes itself from classic noir by showing the
normativistic fallacy for what it is, writ large, the prodigal departure seems
worthy of its lineage, even somehow a vindication of it. In fact, it could be
argued that this most important element of realism was at the very heart of
film noir all the way along, its final form, its telos, its ultimate purpose. The
fact that it was latent in classic noir and only fully realized in neo-noir is of
no particular consequence. Classic noir did scene by scene what neo-noir
does throughout, only, because of poetic justice, less consistently. People
ought not to have bad motives or commit bad acts, but often enough they
do. By contrast, the endings of classic noirs, an artifice of the Production
Code and compliant creative intentions, almost always ring a little off, false,
not only to life, but, much worse, to themselves. A most unfortunate illus-
tration is The Postman Always Rings Twice (Tay Garnett, 1946), an other-
wise fine noir that ends with Frank (John Garfield) explaining, for the
audience, the poetic justice that he has received! The better classic noirs
downplay poetic justice within allowable limits, making it seem less a mat-
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ter of moral necessity or accidental rectitude and more a matter of pure
chance, with no significance besides. Notice how poetic justice fades, dis-
placed, almost to the point of irrelevance, at the end of The Maltese Falcon,
a grimly perfect fit, or Double Indemnity (Billy Wilder, 1944), a note so
delicate, so poignant, that justice is really beside the point. Realism, about
values in particular, has always been an essential part of the essence of noir.
Values alone have nothing to do with what really happens.
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Moral Clarity and Practical
Reason in Film Noir
Aeon J. Skoble
Don’t be too sure I’m as crooked as I’m supposed to be.
—Sam Spade, The Maltese Falcon
Film noir is a genre identified by a variety of stylistic conventions: unset-
tling or otherwise odd camera angles, the dramatic use of shadow and light,
hard-boiled dialogue, settings that emphasize isolation and loneliness. The-
matically, film noir is typically said to be characterized by moral ambi-
guity: murky distinctions between good guys and bad guys, ambivalence
about right and wrong, conflicts between law and morality, unsettling in-
version of values, and so on.1 I will argue that there is some pedagogical
moral value to the ostensible moral murkiness and that, in fact, films noirs
are less morally ambiguous than they are generally said to be. In other
words, there are ethical lessons we can derive that belie the superficial ap-
pearance of lack of moral clarity.
I have in mind several broad ways in which we see this occur. First,
when there is a “right thing to do” but the alternatives are attractive (for
whatever reason), the seeming moral ambiguity is in fact an exercise in
ethical decision making. Second, when true justice or righteousness is in
conflict with prevailing norms of justice or right, we actually have an in-
stance of refuting subjectivism (the view that right and wrong are entirely
subjective, that whatever I feel is right is right “for me”) and affirming
moral realism (the idea that moral judgments are in some sense true or
false claims about the world or that right and wrong are objectively know-
able properties). Third, there can be something morally edifying about fic-
tional portrayals of morally flawed characters—if the right sorts of things
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happen.2 My examples will, I hope, show that film noir as a genre isn’t as
morally problematic as it is often assumed to be.
Ethical Ambiguity and Moral Decision Making
The first way we can derive ethical lessons from film noir can be illustrated
by situations in which there is a “right thing to do” but in which the alter-
natives are attractive. In such situations, the apparent moral ambiguity
might be better thought of as an exercise in ethical decision making.
For example, in The Postman Always Rings Twice (Tay Garnett, 1946),
while it may seem attractive to murder a man in order to take up with his
wife, this is, of course, not morally right. The narrative actually dramatizes
this, first by showing the process by which the drifter Frank Chambers
(John Garfield), enticed by an archetypal femme fatale, the alluring and
disgruntled wife (Lana Turner), deliberates about and arrives at the deci-
sion to commit the murder of her husband, Nick (Cecil Kellaway). The
narrative then goes on to illustrate that this was in fact the wrong deci-
sion—Chambers gets sent to the gas chamber. (We see the same narrative
in Double Indemnity [Billy Wilder, 1944], in which an insurance salesman
and a married woman hatch a plan to murder the woman’s husband and
collect the insurance.)3
In contrast, in The Maltese Falcon (John Huston, 1941), while Sam Spade
(Humphrey Bogart) is perhaps tempted to keep his silence about the crimes
of Brigid O’Shaughnessy (Mary Astor) in order to pursue a romance with
her, he weighs all the factors and makes a decision about what is the right
thing to do. Among Brigid’s crimes, of course, is the murder of Spade’s
own partner, as part of her larger complicity in the pursuit of the Maltese
Falcon. Spade offers a variety of reasons for his decision, many of which
are plainly prudential—for instance, if he let her get away with it, she’d
“have something over” him, and he could never be sure she wouldn’t one
day turn on him.
It would be a mistake, in other words, to infer from the presence of po-
tentially countervailing reasons that there isn’t any basis for decision mak-
ing. The narrative portrayals of ethical decision making illustrate that there
are such things as good reasons, reasons of moral significance, reasons that
can be both rationally justified and action guiding—regardless of whether
the protagonists come to the right decision. Indeed, both Spade’s and
Chambers’s deliberations (to which the audience is privy, either through
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dialogue or that other noir staple, the voice-over) are highly instructive ex-
amples of what in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle calls practical reasoning—
the deliberation from both principles and experience that leads to action.
For Aristotle, reason tells us not only how to realize a goal but also which
goals are themselves conducive to our overall well-being. Aristotle’s con-
cept here, eudaimonia, can be partly understood as “happiness,” but that
translation misses the long-term, ongoing sense that is perhaps better cap-
tured by “flourishing.” Understood this way, the good life isn’t identical
with (episodic) happiness or contentment or amusement but instead is a
life well lived overall.
For instance, Chambers may be “rationally” deriving an “effective” plan
to commit murder (as opposed to simply beating Nick to death in the drive-
way), but it is a failure of rationality to regard the entire plan as being
conducive to, or even compatible with, a flourishing existence. As alluring
as Cora is, Chambers is deceiving himself, making a mistake about the na-
ture of his own good (never mind that of his victim) in concluding that
murdering Nick and running off with Cora will bring about his own well-
being. In contrast, while Sam Spade can partially see the attraction of tak-
ing up with Brigid, he is not blinded by this. He understands that to turn a
blind eye to Brigid’s murderous ways would be literally suicidal, so “not
playing the sap” and turning her in for murder is clearly the more pruden-
tial move for him. Although most would argue that Sam Spade acts rightly
and Frank Chambers wrongly, both characters are deliberating about which
action to take, and we the audience see the ethical ramifications of the
results of these deliberations.
Subjectivism and Moral Realism
The second sort of situation is that in which true justice or righteousness is
in conflict with prevailing norms of justice or right. In this case, we actually
have an instance of affirming moral realism and rejecting subjectivism. For
instance, consider Touch of Evil (Orson Welles, 1958), in which Mike Vargas
(Charlton Heston), a Mexican lawman honeymooning in a border town,
inadvertently discovers a corrupt American lawman, Hank Quinlan (Orson
Welles), collaborating with the very narcotics operation he has been investi-
gating. Here, the fact that Quinlan is a police officer doesn’t actually entail
any inversion of values. On the contrary, the contrast between good and evil
characters in Touch of Evil is plain: Vargas, Al Schwartz (Mort Mills), and
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later Pete Menzies (Joseph Calleia) are good, and Quinlan and Joe Grandi
(Akim Tamaroff) are bad. It’s entirely coincidental and, moreover, irrelevant
that some of the bad guys are police officers; this fact doesn’t interfere with
the audience’s ability to discern the varying morals of the different charac-
ters. So for Vargas to seek both to arrest Grandi and to expose Quinlan is not
a contradiction or even a conundrum. Although employed as a lawman,
Quinlan is, in fact, a criminal, so it’s morally correct for Vargas to pursue
him.4 Not only does Quinlan interfere with Vargas’s investigation, but he is
complicit in Grandi’s attempt to intimidate Vargas by means of implicating
his new bride (Janet Leigh). Hence, Quinlan becomes the target of Vargas’s
pursuit, not qua lawman, but qua wrongdoer. So, unless we start from the
premise that all actions performed by police officers are by definition right-
ful, this fails to be an instance of moral ambiguity.
Another example of a deceptively superficial conflict between true and
apparent justice is in The Maltese Falcon. Consider Spade’s admonition to
Brigid: “Don’t be too sure I’m as crooked as I’m supposed to be.” Even if
Spade has fashioned a reputation for being amoral, he nevertheless does
demonstrate a sense of objective right and wrong. He notes that, “when a
man’s partner is killed, he’s supposed to do something about it,” and that
to do otherwise is dangerous (“bad for every detective everywhere”), sug-
gesting some sort of moral code to which he subscribes, one that he will
not violate simply out of physical attraction. When he sums the situation
up—“You killed Miles, and you’re going over for it”—he also makes it clear
that he is making a decision informed by practical reasoning, despite any
possible inclination to the contrary. It’s not just duty-based reasoning (it’s
bad for every detective) but also prudential (he can’t be sure that she won’t
eventually kill him).
On the other hand, actually amoral noir characters, like Chambers or
Double Indemnity’s Walter Neff (Fred MacMurray), also do not represent an
inversion of values since their decisions and actions are presented to the audi-
ence as wrong. Their schemes do not produce the desired results and are thus
poor examples of practical reasoning. These protagonists may be nihilists, but
the films are not thereby nihilistic, inasmuch as the films portray their charac-
ters’ impulsiveness or narcissism as ultimately fruitless or self-destructive.
Duty and Virtue
When people do the right thing for wrong reasons or seem morally con-
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flicted, we have occasion to contemplate the distinction between an ethics
of duty and other ethical frameworks, such as Aristotle’s ethics of virtue.
When Spade or Marlowe bends the rules, that isn’t a genuine example of
moral conflict; it’s an example of an ethics of duty being supplanted by an
ethics of virtue or of justice.
Our chief philosophical champion of an ethics of duty is the eighteenth-
century German philosopher Immanuel Kant. On Kant’s moral theory (laid
out, e.g., in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]), once a
rule can be shown to be rationally justifiable, violations of that rule can
never be justified. Kant sees morality as a categorical imperative—a moral
duty that all rational creatures have by virtue of its being universally appli-
cable, given a rational standpoint. A paradigmatic case for Kant is the prohi-
bition against lying: a rational creature, the argument goes, could not will
that dishonesty be the universal law; hence, we have a duty to be honest in all
circumstances. It’s hard to reconcile most of what Spade and Marlowe do in
the course of their investigations with that! But that doesn’t imply that they
are immoral—it implies that they are immoral on a Kantian theory.
The larger question is, then, whether we have good reason to accept
this theory, and, as I’ve argued elsewhere,5 we have good reason not to. Not
only does a Kantian insistence on honesty get in the way of sneaky private
detective ruses, such as Marlowe’s posing as a rare book expert, but it also
means that a Belgian ought not lie to the Nazis about Jews hiding in the
attic; it means that the Underground Railroad operator ought not lie to the
slave catchers looking for runaways.
Nearly two thousand years before Kant, Plato preemptively addressed
this sort of fetishism about rules (chiefly in the Republic) by showing that,
if justice is objective, no rule-based ethic will be satisfactory to realize it. It
takes little imagination to envision circumstances in which justice is better
served by violating, rather than following, moral rules, even if those rules
are generally good guidelines for our deliberations. For Plato, there is an
objective and universal reality to justice, which we can discover through
philosophical contemplation. We come to acquire a conceptual apprehen-
sion of the form of Justice, and then we will know how the concept applies
in the particulars, not the other way around. The law may be just or unjust,
and so too may an agent of the state be just or unjust.
In other words, even if it’s true that in general we ought not to lie, the
same principles of justice that make that correct also necessitate lying in
other cases, for instance, in the fugitive slave example. So when films noirs
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show good protagonists breaking rules in the pursuit of justice (e.g., Spade
lying to the police), this represents no inversion of values and is in fact
morally instructive—it demonstrates the objective nature of justice. When
the noir protagonist is breaking rules in pursuit of unjust goals, of course,
such as plotting the murder of a lover’s spouse, this is shown to be wrong
regardless of which rules are in place.
Moral and Immoral Role Models
Finally, following Aristotle, and contra Plato, there can be something mor-
ally edifying about fictional portrayals even of morally flawed characters—
if the right sorts of things happen. Plato is concerned about the morally
corrupting effect of artistic portrayals of vice. Since, on his view, art is
supposed to be mimetic, that is, an imitation of reality, negative portrayals
of reality can encourage people to emulate the wrong things. We should
thus be skeptical about the edifying value of films noirs, on the grounds
that amoral antiheroes present bad role models. But, on the Aristotelian
view, we can learn moral lessons from flawed characters, provided that
they suffer appropriate consequences.
Role models are important for Aristotle, not only in the artistic con-
text, but more fundamentally in the context of moral education and self-
development. One contributing factor in my deliberations about the correct
course of action is a consideration of how a similar decision might be
handled by someone who is flourishing, someone known to be wise and
sensible. In real life, I need to consider these role models in the context of
my own circumstances, but it’s also relevant how artists portray character
and deliberation. It would be incorrect on this view to show a thief and
murderer prosper as a result of his immoral acts, for example, or to invert
values by portraying theft and murder as noble pursuits. But which classic
noir does this? As I have been arguing, noirs frequently do not present in-
verted values, moral subjectivism, or antiheroism. They are more often
concerned with bringing murderers to justice and so on.
But even in those films noirs in which we are entirely concerned with
immoral acts (Double Indemnity, Postman), the protagonists do not pros-
per or flourish. If bad things happen to bad people, that’s as morally edify-
ing as when good things happen to good people. We have no need to fear
that impressionable young minds will come away from The Postman Al-
ways Rings Twice thinking that killing a man so you can take up with his
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wife is a noble, or even remotely feasible, life choice. No one would think
of Frank Chambers as a role model. In those noirs that center around im-
moral acts, these acts are punished. Typically, killers are killed, cheaters are
busted, and thieves go to prison. Sometimes we see vicious types trying to
make amends late in life: either they successfully reform themselves (e.g.,
Kiss of Death [Henry Hathaway, 1947]), in which case we are seeing mor-
ally correct drama, or they try and fail (e.g., High Sierra [Raoul Walsh,
1941]), resulting in tragedy in the classic sense, which is also morally cor-
rect from an Aristotelian point of view. Either way, it is not the case that we
are presented with morally corrupting role models. The superficial seedi-
ness of some noir heroes (e.g., Sam Spade) is ultimately of less consequence
than is their integrity. Other noir heroes (e.g., Mike Vargas) aren’t even
superficially seedy—they’re straightforwardly moral, albeit navigating their
way through a corrupt world. Viewing that through an Aristotelian lens
offers an adequate response to Platonic concerns about role modeling.
Some might argue that noir is supposed to be morally ambiguous but
that, because of Production Code pressures from the Hays Office, film-
makers were basically forced to tack on endings in which bad characters
get what’s coming to them, as in the case of Double Indemnity. And such an
argument might be bolstered by the observation that the so-called neo-
noirs, freed from the moral constraints of the Production Code, do some-
times show people getting away with theft and murder and, to all
appearances, prospering as a result.6 But, even if there were censorship pres-
sures in some noirs, many others do not hinge on this—The Maltese Fal-
con, The Big Sleep (Howard Hawks, 1946), Kiss of Death, Touch of Evil do
not—enough to support my contention that noirs should not be thought
of as essentially characterized by moral ambiguity and inversion of values.
Even if it were the case that Postman might have been made differently,
that wouldn’t amount to a genre-defining attribute. It would just mean
that Postman had a morally ambiguous theme, not that film noir as a genre
did. Also, inasmuch as our conception of film noir is essentially the prod-
uct of a dozen or so landmark films, the counterfactual is irrelevant: we
need to consider the Double Indemnity that was made, not the one that
might have been made.7
So where’s the moral ambiguity, the inversion of traditional values,
that is supposed to pervade film noir? We’ve got the lonely settings; we’ve
got the strange camera angles; we’ve got the unsettling use of light and
shadow; we’ve got the hard-boiled dialogue; we’ve got the femmes fatales.
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But we also have, it turns out, a body of films which showcase practical
reason and ethical decision making, in settings that affirm moral realism
and explicitly reject nihilism. Perhaps surprisingly, films noirs end up be-
ing more about moral clarity.
Notes
I am grateful to Mark T. Conard and Steven M. Sanders for helpful comments and
suggestions.
1. See, e.g., the introduction to this volume.
2. To avoid quibbles, I will make my case using only canonical examples, films
that everyone would concede are, in fact, noir. If any modern-day neo-noirs bolster
my argument, I will mention them in the notes.
3. Compare the neo-noirs Body Heat (Lawrence Kasdan, 1981), which has the
same plot, and A Simple Plan (Sam Raimi, 1998), which has a different plot but the
same self-destructive outcome.
4. Likewise, in the neo-noir L.A. Confidential (Curtis Hanson, 1997), it’s morally
correct for Ed Exley (Guy Pearce) and Bud White (Russell Crowe) to pursue the cor-
rupt Captain Smith (James Cromwell).
5. See my “Virtue Ethics and TV’s Seinfeld,” in Seinfeld and Philosophy, ed. W.
Irwin (Chicago: Open Court, 2000), and “Virtue and Vice in The Lord of the Rings,” in
The Lord of the Rings and Philosophy, ed. Gregory Bassham and Eric Bronson (Chi-
cago: Open Court, 2003).
6. See, e.g., Body Heat, whose femme fatale, Matty Walker (Kathleen Turner), is
shown enjoying the pleasures of a tropical retreat after arranging for the murder of
her wealthy husband by the hapless Ned Racine (William Hurt).
7. And there are plenty of neo-noirs in which, in contrast to Body Heat, wicked-
ness is, indeed, punished, with no Hays Office pressure, e.g., Blue Velvet (David Lynch,
1986), A Simple Plan, and L.A. Confidential.
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The Mother of Film Noir
Read Mercer Schuchardt
It was during the summer of 1946 that French moviegoers discovered a
new type of American film.
—Raymond Borde and Étienne Chaumeton
In 1946 French critics having missed Hollywood films for five years saw
suddenly, sharply, a darkening tone, darkest around the crime film.
—Raymond Durgnat
In 1946 French critics, seeing the American films they had missed during
the war, noticed the new mood of cynicism, pessimism and darkness which
had crept into the American cinema.
—Paul Schrader
In 1927, nineteen years before French critics were to notice a change in
American cinema, a film was released that gave birth to what would—a
generation later—be recognized in its maturity as a new genre. The hall-
mark characteristics of this new type of “dark film”—retroactively dubbed
film noir by the French critics—were, nevertheless, present in primordial
form in the structure, plot, and fabric of a film that was the first of its kind:
a film that displayed to the world the very metaphysical crisis under which
the film industry itself would operate for the next one hundred years.
In fact, on opening night, October 6, 1927, three of the most signifi-
cant events in film history occurred simultaneously. First was the birth of
the talking motion picture. This technological triumph has until now
eclipsed all subsequent realizations.1 Second was the establishment of New
York over Los Angeles as the archetypal American cinematic city, with the
result that the location would ever after receive more miles of film footage
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than any other.2 Third was the symbolic triumph of the image over the
word by the assimilation of the word into the image and by the representa-
tion of reality to such a degree of verisimilitude that reality no longer held
primacy among audiences. This had two subsequent effects that are still
with us today: (a) the metaphysical replacement of the transcendent nar-
ratives of Western religion with the quotidian narratives of filmed enter-
tainment; and (b) the physical replacement of church, synagogue, and
theater by the movie palace as the weekly destination of choice for the
mass audience.
The Essence of Noir
Consider these themes: a spiritual medium that moves and talks; the dis-
covery of a murder without the discovery of a corpse; power and domi-
nance; a bleak, melancholic atmosphere; anxiety; dark lighting; action taking
place in the city at night; foul play; and moral ambivalence. Are these not
the essential ingredients for the genre of film noir? And are these not the
essential elements in the first feature credited with spoken dialogue? Are
these not the elements that constitute the essence of the classic film The
Jazz Singer, directed by Alan Crosland and starring Al Jolson?
The spiritual medium is, of course, the medium of film itself, the most
technologically perfected form of Plato’s ancient cave that modern man
has ever devised. Unlike Plato’s chained inhabitants, we are willful prison-
ers, seated facing forward to watch the shadows thrown onto the wall by
the technological fire behind and above us, the projector. We return to this
cave regularly for the willful suspension of our disbelief because, in fact,
the illusion of reality that the silver screen presents to us is so much more
satisfying and, thereby, persuasive than the reality outside the theater.
The murder that is discovered is the death of God,3 whose body is never
found but is metaphorically represented in the film by the corpse of Papa
Rabinowitz, who has died on his birthday. Papa’s birthday presents are four
redundant and, now that he’s dead, doubly useless prayer shawls, which
also symbolically serve as the burial cloth for orthodoxy itself since his
death and birthday also occur in the film on Yom Kippur, the highest of
Jewish holy days. In this way, not only does Papa Rabinowitz symbolize
Judaism, but his birthday death becomes a symbol of the ouroboros, the
snake eating its tail in constant death and constant regeneration. In the
film, the regeneration is symbolized by Jakie Rabinowitz, and Jakie’s career
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choice serves as a redefinition of religiosity—a Judaism that accommo-
dates secularism. The dominance of spiritual leadership shifts from a pa-
triarchal, language-based power to a matriarchal, image- and emotion-based
power.
The bleak, melancholic atmosphere and the anxiety are themselves
wrought by the very process through which this deicide occurs. The dark
lighting is, perhaps, a function of black-and-white film, although the ac-
tion taking place at night is a function of both most action occurring in-
doors (where it is timeless or else “always night”) and the action itself being
almost exclusively devoted to either the evening prayers in the synagogue
or the opening curtain of the theater show. The foul play is intellectual and
theological, a deliberate and controlled shifting of the moral center of the
universe from an external God to the internal voice residing within the
protagonist. In psychological terms, this may seem like progress. In theo-
logical terms, however, it is a question of the descriptive versus the prescrip-
tive view of worship: Do we as humans take our sacred scriptures as merely
descriptive of how the ancients did it and feel free to add to it with our own
contemporary cultural innovations? Or do we take them to mean that God
has given us a prescriptive definition of how it should be done and, there-
fore, that we should not add to it anything that is not already prescribed in
the book? Historically, the orthodox (of any faith) have always leaned to-
ward the prescriptive view, which progressives see as being too literal or
narrow-minded. Jakie Rabinowitz uses many of his lines of dialogue in the
film to recast the terms of religion in order to make the descriptive mode
more acceptable.
Finally, the moral ambivalence is retroactive. It is only now, after living
with the effects of this primordial murder for four generations, that we can
begin to sense the unease with which those first bold sons, like Abraham
before them, smashed their fathers’ idols and went west, not to Canaan,
but to Hollywood to found their own new religion. Moviegoers today are
the great-great-grandsons and great-great-granddaughters of The Jazz
Singer, and, since we know that Mama is still with us (at the end of the film
and as a metaphor for sound film itself), we may benefit by reflecting once
more on how God the father (represented by Papa Rabinowitz) died.
The Story
Here is how Neal Gabler summarizes the story:
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The plot of The Jazz Singer is simplicity itself. Cantor Rabinowitz,
the seventh4 Rabinowitz to become a cantor and the patriarch of
his Lower East Side congregation, assumes that his only son, Jakie,
will follow the tradition. But Jakie would rather sneak off to the
local saloon to entertain, and when his father catches him there
and forbids him from ever setting foot there again, the boy runs
away.
Years pass. Jakie Rabinowitz has become Jack Robin, a night-
club singer. But Jack is barely scraping by until a pretty chorus girl
named Mary catches his act and later convinces a producer to sign
him up for a new musical revue. Though Jack now returns home
and is welcomed back by his mother, his father is unforgiving. The
dilemma is set when Cantor Rabinowitz, apparently sagging un-
der the weight of his broken heart, cannot sing the Kol Nidre, the
Jewish plea for forgiveness, on Yom Kippur, the Jewish day of atone-
ment and the holiest of Jewish holidays. The congregation pres-
sures Jack to stand in, but Jack’s Broadway revue, its producers
obviously insensitive to the Jewish audience, happens to be open-
ing the same night. As the screenplay puts it, “Jack is besieged by
the old life and the new, filial duty against life’s ambition, the past
against the future.”5
The Jazz Singer was originally a stage play that opened on Broadway on
September 14, 1925. The movie version, which came out two years and one
month later, is nearly identical. There are just two key differences: (1) George
Jessel, the Broadway star, was replaced by Al Jolson in the film version; and
(2) the film adaptation changed the ending of the play significantly, giving
it a meaning diametrically opposed to that of the original script. Seen at
the time as a function of changing times, the new ending was, in fact, more
the result of the new medium of sound film itself, about which more later.
The film’s plot follows a single character and, as such, revolves almost
exclusively around the question of authentic Jewish identity and whether
it can be modified successfully to include the modern world yet still please
God. By extension, the film takes on questions of race, culture, gender, and
history to consider whether religious identity is a fulfiller or a constrainer
of destiny. What the film clearly shows, as Gabler points out, is that Ortho-
dox Judaism and the culture of the Roaring Twenties do not mix well; there
is no compromise that will satisfy either party. Yet, by virtue of the film’s
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publicity as the first “talkie,” the real meaning of The Jazz Singer has been
overlooked: it represents the first time that the death of God is announced
to the world through a mass medium. Nietzsche’s announcement through
the voice of “the madman” in 1882 was contained in a small and not widely
read print publication.6 The Jazz Singer, on the other hand, employed the
medium of film, ensuring that the message got out to more people than
were currently attending either synagogue or cathedral or church in America
of the day. And this death—from which all moral ambivalence over subse-
quent cinematic death flows—is why The Jazz Singer should be considered
the first film noir text.
What Nietzsche Predicted
God’s death, whether literally or figuratively understood, has profound
consequences for the future. Here is how Tom Wolfe described it a hun-
dred years after Nietzsche’s death:
Nietzsche said that mankind would limp on through the twentieth
century “on the mere pittance” of the old decaying God-based
moral codes. But then, in the twenty-first, would come a period
more dreadful than the great wars, a time of “the total eclipse of all
values” (in The Will to Power). This would be a frantic period of
“revaluation,” in which people would try to find new systems of
values to replace the osteoporotic skeletons of the old. But you will
fail, he warned, because you cannot believe in moral codes with-
out simultaneously believing in a god who points at you with his
fearsome forefinger and says “Thou shalt” or “Thou shalt not.”7
The Jazz Singer reveals both the death of God and the attempt to get by “on
the mere pittance” of the old codes. Let us consider the key moments of
the film to see the means by which this deicide is achieved.
The film opens with the conventional title card of an old silent film:
In every living soul,
a spirit cries for
expression—perhaps
this plaintive, wailing
song of Jazz is, after
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all, the misunderstood
utterance of a prayer.
The establishing shot shows us a busy street on Manhattan’s Lower East
Side. The Jewish ghetto is thriving with pedestrian traffic and happy chil-
dren on a merry-go-round. The title card tells us:
The New York Ghetto—
throbbing to that rhythm of music
which is older than
Civilization.
We are then introduced to the mother and father of Jakie Rabinowitz,
the film’s protagonist. Jakie, whom we first meet as a twelve-year-old boy,
enjoys singing all those “raggy-time songs” in the local saloon. His father is
introduced to us in the negative: “Cantor Rabinowitz, chanter of hymns in
the synagogue, stubbornly held to the ancient traditions of his race.” The
key word, stubbornly, becomes a foreshadowing of the fate that both his
faith and his fatherhood will undergo. Jakie’s mother, on the other hand, is
introduced in the positive: “Sara Rabinowitz. God made her a woman, and
Love made her a Mother.” It only barely needs mentioning that, in Jewish
tradition, household authority goes to the father but Jewishness is passed
on through the mother. By the film’s conclusion, both the authority and
the inheritance of a new definition of Jewishness will derive from the
mother.
Mom versus Dad
Immediately, the yin of the female and the yang of the male are set in op-
position, and the word-biased religion of the judgmental father (a devoutly
religious man of the book, the word, and the chant) is set in opposition to
the holistic, image-biased love of the all-forgiving mother. The father’s
“word nature” and the mother’s “image nature” are confirmed from their
very first dialogue, concerning Jakie’s whereabouts while he is off singing
in a saloon:
FATHER: Tonight, Jakie is to sing Kol Nidre—he should be here!
MAMA: Maybe our boy doesn’t want to be a cantor, papa.
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FATHER: What has he to say? For five generations a Rabinowitz
has been a cantor—he must be one!
Shortly afterward, we see Mama glance at a picture of Jakie on the wall. Later,
Papa, who won’t have it, says to the boy: “I never want to see you around here
again!” Mama venerates Jakie’s image, while Papa cannot even stand the origi-
nal from which the facsimile has been made. Mama will figuratively hold
him in her heart; Papa will literally obliterate him from his mind.
The meddlesome middleman Moishe Yudleson is introduced to us as
“rigidly orthodox, and a power in the affairs of the ghetto.” From the very
beginning, he is portrayed as slightly hypocritical, as a little too righteous,
a religious man who nevertheless enjoys both his beer and the “raggy-time
songs” of the saloon until, alas, he discovers that it is one of the cantor’s
own sons singing.
Jakie, at age twelve (i.e., just before he becomes a man in Jewish tradi-
tion), is presented to us as a mama’s boy from start to finish. All his songs—
from his opening “My Gal Sal” to his famous closing number—are overtly
feminine in subject matter. Through the course of his life that the film
portrays, it is only through the undying and devoted love of his (somewhat
smothering) mother and the stern encouragement of his love interest that
he is able to rid himself (and, by extension, we the audience are able to rid
ourselves) of the shackles of his father’s religiosity. By the time Jack Robin
sings “Mammy” at the film’s conclusion, we know that he is a case of per-
manently arrested development, a pre–bar mitzvah boy in a postreligious
age. Sustained by show business externally and his mother’s love internally,
he is helped along by the implied love of the “shiksa” (Mama’s term) dancer
Mary Dale, whose desire to see him succeed in show business is so deter-
mined that it exceeds even her desire for Jack’s love.
In order for God to die a slow and acceptable death (this is entertain-
ment, after all, not interment), the narrative takes us through three distinct
progressions. The first is to reveal God as, in fact, God, the power in the
universe that gives meaning and sustenance to all creation. Papa declares
this most directly when he threatens physical punishment for Jakie’s sa-
loon singing: “I’ll teach him better than to debase the voice God gave him!”
It is clear, in this scene, that God really is God in the film’s narrative. The
Hebrew God claims to be the one true and all-powerful God of the uni-
verse, and this is clearly the intended view of Papa’s character.8 Mother
chimes right in: “But Papa, our boy does not think like we do.” As previ-
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ously suggested, and as the key word think here in Mama’s sentence con-
firms, the film consistently represents the father as the left-brain, control-
ling, dominant intellect and the mother as the simultaneous, emotional,
holistic, and artistic side. What Mama really means is that the boy does not
think at all; rather, he feels. He feels the music, feels the gestalt, intuitively
feels the perception of abstract patterns, which he reveals to his parents
later, in the film’s dialectic-swapping conclusion. These are among our first
clues that the real battle being waged is that of, not the past versus the
future, but anima versus animus, or the psychic energies associated with
the female versus the psychic energies associated with the male. As Erich
Neumann explains:
It is in this sense that we use the terms “masculine” and “femi-
nine” . . . not as personal sex-linked characteristics, but as sym-
bolic expressions. . . . The symbolism of  “masculine” and
“feminine” is archetypal and therefore transpersonal; in the vari-
ous cultures concerned, it is erroneously projected upon persons
as though they carried its qualities. In reality every individual is a
psychological hybrid. . . . It is one of the complications of indi-
vidual psychology that in all cultures the integrity of the personal-
ity is violated when it is identified with either the masculine or the
feminine side of the symbolic principle of opposites.9
Papa, of course, has no interest in psychology; he merely wants obedi-
ence. Jakie does, indeed, receive a whipping—while his mother cries—and
he then makes good on his promise to run away from home. He leaves New
York and heads to Los Angeles, where he becomes one among many trying
to make it big. The title card tells us:
Jakie Rabinowitz had become Jack Robin,
the Cantor’s son—a Jazz Singer,
but fame was still an uncaptured bubble.
It is in Los Angeles that Jack Robin meets Mary Dale (“I caught your
show in Salt Lake City”), who is, if not Mormon, then presumably not
Jewish. When Moishe reads Jack’s letter about her aloud to Mama, it is her
line, “Maybe he’s fallen in love with a shiksa?” that tips us off to her Yid-
dish. Yet the fact that he is reading the letter to her implies that she is illit-
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erate. This is a strange scene because a later one—when Yudleson enters
the backstage area of the theater, looks at the NO ADMITTANCE sign, and says,
“Who’s smoking?”—indicates that he himself is illiterate. Retrospectively,
we realize that, while Yudleson cannot read English, Mama cannot read
either English or Yiddish. The strangeness is that Mama’s illiteracy is seen
as a positive sign of her simple and pure-minded affection for her son while
Yudleson’s is a sign that he (and, by extension, the cantor) is not merely
simpleminded but provincial, quaint, and “of the past.” Here again the
film offers an ever-so-subtle suggestion that a woman’s illiteracy is her
strength whereas a man’s is his weakness, a view that contributes to the
undermining of the logocentric tradition of patriarchal orthodoxy.
Metaphysical Geography
In his move from New York to Los Angeles, Jakie sheds his Jewishness and
takes on a gentile moniker in order to adapt. The film posits this move as
the moment that the “new” Jewishness becomes defined. Subsequent dia-
logue reveals to us how normal this was at the time, another ghetto girl
named Rosie Levy having become Rosemary Lee in the process of captur-
ing fame’s bubble. By the time the film concludes, Jakie is not just a goy but
a goy in blackface, taking on two additional racial layers in order to conceal
his racial/religious roots.
Neal Gabler confirms this habit in the culture of the day, describing
how the play’s star, George Jessel, described Warner Brothers’ acquisition
of the film rights: “Both signings—those of Jessel and The Jazz Singer—
indicated something about Harry Warner’s objectives. Jack claimed his
brother ‘desperately’ wanted the rights to The Jazz Singer. Jessel said he
wasn’t sure how desperate Harry was, only that Harry had told him ‘it would
be a good picture to make for the sake of racial tolerance, if nothing else.’
But Jessel apparently didn’t know that racial tolerance was one of the few
causes that could really animate Harry. Other Jewish moguls shied away
from their Judaism and hid it. Harry paraded it.”10
But, if Jakie’s conversion to the new Jewishness occurs in Los Angeles,
his return to rebaptize the old Jewishness with his new definition of it starts
in Chicago, midway between New York and Los Angeles. It is there that he
gets the news that he is going to open his first Broadway show. It is also
there, we later learn, that Mary Dale, the only other woman in his life be-
sides Mama, pulled the strings for him to get that Broadway show.
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In Chicago, Jakie goes to the “Last Chicago Performance” of Cantor
Rosenblatt singing sacred songs. Watching him sing, Jakie feels nostalgic
and, in a special-effects shot, sees his father’s face in the synagogue singing
and smiling down at him, proud of him. This is not simply the last perfor-
mance of this particular cantor. It is the film’s way of telling us that this is
the end of an era of orthodox Judaism—when Jakie returns to New York,
his father dies, and his father’s orthodoxy dies with him.
To the viewer, the film creates an intensely depressing tension: we want
the protagonist to achieve his dream, but we also see in stark terms just
what price he (and his religion) will have to pay for it. As Robert Porfirio
writes: “It is the underlying mood of pessimism which undercuts any at-
tempted happy endings and prevents the films from being the typical Hol-
lywood escapist fare many were originally intended to be. More than lighting
or photography, it is this sensibility which makes the black film black for
us.”11 The purported happy ending of The Jazz Singer is, I contend, a
screenwriter’s whitewash of the film’s underlying core, the philosophical
embodiment of that mood of pessimism that will undercut “any attempted
happy endings” or escapism that films were meant to be. From here on
out, as the subsequent history of film noir shows, there really is no such
thing as a happy ending because a happy ending cannot result from an
insoluble dilemma.
Porfirio goes on to quote William Barrett in explaining the restraint of
geography on the spread of existentialism in America, an insight that lends
itself directly to The Jazz Singer’s plotline: “The American has not yet as-
similated psychologically the disappearance of his own geographical fron-
tier, his spiritual horizon is still the limitless play of human possibilities,
and as yet he has not lived through the crucial experience of human fini-
tude.”12 Significantly, it is his (and, by extension, Hollywood’s) existential-
ist consumption of the West Coast that is itself the motivating force turning
Jakie back toward New York: there is nowhere else to go. Having existen-
tially defined himself as “no longer Jewish,” he commits the same sin that
proves to be the salvation of the Hebrew race—like Abraham, he smashes
his fathers’ idols and goes west, not to Canaan, but to Hollywood to rede-
fine what it means to be Jewish. But, having achieved that through film, as
Gabler shows (see below), Jakie has now used up his spiritual horizon. The
only possible journey left is a return to New York, where, in a bold act of
authentication, he converts the old Jews to his new religion. It is, thus, dou-
bly interesting that both Jakie and Hollywood do make (in this film in
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particular and in film history overall) this return to New York as the new
home of both the new Jewishness and the front lot.13
Porfirio is succinct in his explanation of existentialism: “Existentialism
is an outlook which begins with a disoriented individual facing a confused
world that he cannot accept. It places its emphasis on man’s contingency in a
world where there are no transcendental values or moral absolutes, a world
devoid of any meaning but the one man himself creates.”14 It is into this
world that Jakie, leaving behind the orthodoxy he can no longer accept,
must create a new life for himself in the wider world of the theater. But,
further, he must come back to New York and redeem the meaning of reli-
gion he has made for himself in the eyes of his father, in order that he may
be, if not absolved, then at least at peace. His freedom, authenticity, and
responsibility give him the chutzpah to recast the call of the cantor into the
song of the jazz singer. Abraham, the father of the world’s three monothe-
isms, is said to have left Mesopotamia in the east and traveled west to start
a new religion in Canaan: the worship of one God.15 In becoming Jack
Robin, Jakie Rabinowitz has done the reverse: he has redefined Judaism so
that it now includes, if not multiple gods, then at least multiple ways of
defining, interpreting, and responding to God. In orthodox terms, how-
ever, this is not something that man should have power to do: only God
can define how man should worship God. In terms of existentialism, after
the damage is done, Jakie is left with the obverse of his freedom and au-
thenticity: the comfort of his mother; the support of his girlfriend; and the
sickness, loneliness, and nausea that accompany any new faith with a con-
gregation of one.
Prescriptive versus Descriptive
Jakie’s return to New York triggers the final climactic showdown between the
old definition of Judaism (prescriptive) and the new one (descriptive)—and
Jakie’s victory is hard-won and bittersweet. Unlike the play, in which, ac-
cording to Gabler, “the Jewish entertainer forsakes show business and takes
his father’s place in the synagogue,” the film tries to have it both ways, offer-
ing a solution that pleases both the orthodox and the nonorthodox. Gabler
describes the dissolution of the film’s final dramatic tension as follows:
Jack’s quandary is that he can bring Judaism to show business,
but he cannot bring show business to Judaism—which is to say
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that Judaism cannot be reinvigorated or revitalized in America or
by America. It is alien to it. . . .
How does Jack’s (and the Jews’) intractable problem suddenly
get resolved? It is certainly not because Jack has found some way to
navigate between these competing claims or because one has ca-
pitulated to the other, as Zukor and Mayer had surrendered their
Judaism. The answer is that the movie, swiftly and painlessly, dis-
solves the problem altogether. Within the bounds of theatrical re-
alism this could never happen, but the movies, after all, are a world
of possibility where anything can happen, and of all the themes of
The Jazz Singer, this might have been the most important and the
most telling for the Hollywood Jews. The movies can redefine us.
The movies can make us new. The movies can make us whole.
And that is precisely how the Hollywood Jews would use them.16
But Gabler’s analysis glosses over several key moments and misses en-
tirely the significance of the mother in undermining (or overriding) the
authority of the father in the question of Jewish identity. For what the
film’s progression shows us is a specific semantic trick by which the denial
of God (i.e., his death in the mind of the believer) is accomplished.
During the first confrontation between Jakie and his estranged father,
the cantor yells at his son: “A singer in a theater—you from five genera-
tions of cantors!” Jakie fires right back with his brand of self-righteous
religious philosophy: “You taught me that music is the voice of God! It is as
honorable to sing in the theater as in the synagogue! My songs mean as
much to my audience as yours to your congregation!”
The Snake Eats Its Tail
Thus attempting philosophical parity between the two practices, Jakie’s
dialogue in the film’s last twenty minutes reveals the last two steps in the
three-stage progression of God’s death. The second step reduces God from
being the God of the universe to simply being one god among many in the
pantheon of cultural gods to choose from. What we worship is, etymologi-
cally, simply that which we “ascribe worth to,” and Jakie’s insistence that
the theater is just as legitimate as the synagogue makes this point clearly.
This is revealed in the scene where Moishe Yudleson comes with Mama to
the theater to urge Jakie back to the synagogue to sing the Kol Nidre in his
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dying father’s place. Yudleson uses manipulation and guilt in his attempt
to persuade Jakie: “Would you be the first Rabinowitz in five generations
to fail your God?” Here, the “your God” is significant, and we hear it again
subsequently. Jakie, for his part, fires back with his newly minted theology:
“We in the show business have our religion too—on every day—the show
must go on!”
As he lies dying, Papa Rabinowitz suddenly sits up and says: “My son
came to me in my dream. He sang Kol Nidre so beautifully. If he would only
sing like that tonight, surely he would be forgiven.” Here, the film has the
voice of orthodoxy capitulate, equating the loveliness of the singing (the form)
with the moral and metaphysical significance of the song (the content).
In the dressing room, as Jakie puts on blackface—perhaps in mourn-
ing, as the timing of this scene’s dialogue and action seems to suggest—the
internal tension mounts to a fever pitch and is revealed in the dialogue
between Jakie and Mary Dale:
MARY: I’m afraid you’re worrying about your father.
JAKIE: I’d love to sing for my father, but I belong here—but there’s
something after all in my heart, maybe it’s the call of the ages—the
cry of my race.
MARY: I understand, Jack, but no matter how strong the call—
this is your life.
Jakie goes to the mirror and sees himself in blackface; then his image dis-
solves to the synagogue’s cantor scene, and then back:
JAKIE: The Day of Atonement is the most solemn of our holy
days—and the songs of Israel are tearing at my heart.
MARY: Your career is the place God has put you. Don’t forget
that, Jack.
JAKIE: You’re right. My career means more to me than anything
else in the world.
MARY: More than me?
When Jakie mouths the words, “Yes, even more than you,” Mary’s face
becomes happy as ever, and her title card exclaims: “Then don’t let any-
thing stand in your way! Not even your parents—not me, not anything!”
Up until this point, the viewer is under the illusion that the curtain is
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about to go up on Jakie’s musical debut on Broadway. After Jakie receives a
further dose of Jewish guilt from his mother and Moishe Yudleson, the
manager comes out and lets the other shoe drop: “Hurry Jack! This dress
rehearsal’s just as important as the show tonight!” With this, the film breaks
the tension and offers the first suggestion that we might be able to have it
both ways: Jakie can miss the dress rehearsal, sing the Kol Nidre in the
synagogue, and return in time for the eight o’clock curtain. Instead, he
chooses the opposite. He goes onstage for the rehearsal, and his mother
exclaims as she looks up to the heavens: “Here he belongs. If God wanted
him in His house, He would have kept him there.” God’s powerlessness is
hinted at here by the mother, and it is significant that Jakie’s song opens
with the lines: “When things go wrong and they don’t want me, Mother, I
still have you.”
Jakie then goes home instead of debuting on Broadway, but not to sing
in the synagogue. As he says: “I came to see Papa.” After being reassured by
Jakie that he is healthy, Cantor Rabinowitz opens his eyes and says: “My
son, I love you.” Then Mama adds: “Maybe if you sing [at synagogue],
your Papa will get well.” Another progression of dramatic tension ensues
between Jakie, Mama, Moishe, Mary, and the manager until, finally exas-
perated, Mama says: “Do what is in your heart Jakie—if you sing and God
is not in your voice, your father will know.” Dethroned, and effectively
dead, God is now eliminated in this third stage of the process. He has now
been reduced to a stage prop to accessorize Jakie’s voice, like some primi-
tive synthesizer.
Yet the Broadway crowd has gathered, awaiting, as we see in a close-up
shot of the theater program, the opening curtain of a show called April
Follies. Is this an Easter celebration? Is this the film’s suggestion that Jakie
has given up his Jewishness simply to serve the trivial religiosity of a Chris-
tianity that has baptized former pagan holidays? Or is it a reference to April
Fool’s Day, and is Jakie the fool? Either way, it is significant to remember
that these events transpire on the night of Yom Kippur, the Day of Atone-
ment (which occurs between the end of September and the beginning of
October), so the April Follies show is suggestively out of season.
The Kol Nidre
Jakie finally relents and decides to sing the Kol Nidre in his father’s place in
the synagogue. The Kol Nidre is itself the source of some interesting subtext
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in the film. As the opening prayer of Yom Kippur, it sets the tone for much
that follows. The literal translation of the prayer, which is sung in Hebrew
in the film, is as follows: “All vows, obligations, oaths, anathemas, whether
called ‘konam,’ ‘konas,’ or by any other name, which we may vow, or swear,
or pledge, or whereby we may be bound, from this Day of Atonement unto
the next (whose happy coming we await), we do repent. May they be deemed
absolved, forgiven, annulled, and void and made of no effect; they shall not
bind us nor have power over us. The vows shall not be reckoned vows; the
obligations shall not be obligatory; nor the oaths be oaths.”17
This translation, however, has competing interpretations. According
to Tracey Rich:
This prayer has often been held up by anti-Semites as proof that
Jews are untrustworthy (we do not keep our vows), and for this rea-
son the Reform movement removed it from the liturgy for a while.
In fact, the reverse is true: we make this prayer because we take vows
so seriously that we consider ourselves bound even if we make the
vows under duress or in times of stress when we are not thinking
straight. This prayer gave comfort to those who were converted to
Christianity by torture in various inquisitions, yet felt unable to break
their vow to follow Christianity. In recognition of this history, the
Reform movement restored this prayer to its liturgy.18
Yet no translation of the Kol Nidre appears in The Encyclopedia of Jew-
ish Symbols (which mentions it only in passing in the entry on Yom Kip-
pur), nor is there a discussion of it in Douglas Rushkoff ’s critical perspective
on his own religion, Nothing Sacred.19 Tracey Rich says only this of the Kol
Nidre: “The evening service that begins Yom Kippur is commonly known
as Kol Nidre, named for the prayer that begins the service. ‘Kol nidre’ means
‘all vows,’ and in this prayer, we ask G-d to annul all personal vows we may
make in the next year. It refers only to vows between the person making
them and G-d, such as ‘If I pass this test, I’ll pray every day for the next 6
months!’”20 Historically, there is some speculation that the prayer referred
to vows made in the past year until the eleventh century, when it was changed
to refer to vows made in the coming year. In either case, modern transla-
tions always refer to the coming year.
Gabler does address the Kol Nidre, however problematically, when he
claims (in a note on his discussion of The Jazz Singer): “Pointedly, the ‘Kol
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Nidre’ is a song of renunciation. Its first lines are ‘All the vows that we made
that were false to our faith and all the promises and oaths which once we
swore shall be void now and forever more.’ In short, Jack sings his renun-
ciation of the secular world.”21 There are two potential problems with this
interpretation. The first is that Gabler seems to have added the words “that
were false to our faith” to the opening line. The second is that, in the con-
text of the film, the prayer of the Kol Nidre can legitimately be read nega-
tively, as a renunciation of the religious life itself. Indeed, this reading could
be the film’s key theological moment if the sympathetic viewer wishes to see
Jakie both leave the synagogue to enter the theater and at the same time
remain a Jew whose name is written in the book of life. Jakie’s conscience is
cleaner under this reading than under Gabler’s, for renouncing one’s father’s
faith is precisely what the film is about.
In either case, at the conclusion of the Kol Nidre, Papa opens his eyes
for one last time before dying and says: “Mama, we have our son again.” A
special-effects shot (which George Lucas clearly borrowed for the final scene
of Return of the Jedi [1983] years later) shows the ghost of Papa Rabinowitz
smiling in good health and gently touching Jakie’s right shoulder approv-
ingly. God is dead, Papa is dead, but at least I didn’t kill them, Jakie’s con-
science tells him. In classic film noir style, the rule of cherchez la femme is
borne out: Mama Rabinowitz provides the psychological motivation to
dethrone Papa’s old religion, and Mary Dale provides the final dagger to
the heart. This is why it is so significant that Mary Dale gets the last line of
the scene, reminding the viewer that all is not well in the state of orthodox
religion. She looks on Jakie singing and says: “A Jazz singer—singing to his
God.” This repetition of “his God” reconfirms for the viewer the idea that
the Hebrew God is now simply one among many, a lesser god among a
newly ecumenical pantheon that now includes theater and cinema among
its houses of worship. And, as the film’s conclusion shows us, this is the last
time Jakie will sing to this particular god: for ever after, he sings to his
goddess.
As Neuman suggests (see above), and as Leonard Shlain repeatedly
points out, men are like words and women like images.22 While both males
and females have left- and right-brain hemispheres, Shlain, a neurosur-
geon, contends that the balance of power goes to the right brain in women
and to the left brain in men. What The Jazz Singer’s progression really re-
veals is the feminine image of the film medium as victorious over the mas-
culine word of both synagogue and theater, explaining why the changed
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ending could work only in the movie version, not in the stage play. Only by
assimilating the words into a talkie can Jakie Rabinowitz, now Jack Robin,
truly declare: “You ain’t heard nuthin’ yet!” Jakie commands the film’s final
scene as the new religious leader at the temple of Broadway. It is a temple,
just as the movie house is a temple, that is ecumenical in religious, racial,
and economic terms. The show must and, indeed, does go on, and every-
one (who can afford a ticket) gets a vision of paradise. Jakie is singing to
his mother, the love that sustained his rebellion, and his song is one of
devotion to that archetypal force that he and subsequent cinema right down
to the Wachowski brothers’ 1999 The Matrix (Latin for “mother”) will
worship. He sings “Mammy” as Mama, sitting in the front row, swoons in
religious ecstasy to the voice with a tear and a (small-g) god in it.
In their classic essay, the first that attempted to define film noir, Borde
and Chaumeton claim: “All the films of this cycle create a similar emo-
tional effect: that state of tension instilled in the spectator when the psycho-
logical reference points are removed. The aim of film noir was to create a
specific alienation.”23 The Jazz Singer, then, is the film in which the psycho-
logical reference points are first removed. The Jazz Singer is nothing less
than the story of their removal. As a film, it is a family drama; as a meta-
physical noir, it is a documentary. As film is now on a par with sacred
scripture in contemporary culture, The Jazz Singer is film history’s Book of
Genesis—it tells not the fall of man but the fall of God. The films retroac-
tively labeled film noir by French critics that occur from 1941 to 1958 are
explorations and details of the existing fact. In them, we are not thrown
into the abyss; rather, we are already in it, along with the protagonist, from
the moment the projector’s light passes through the first frame.
The Future of Film Noir History
If Jack Robin and Mary Dale do eventually get married and have children, then
much of subsequent noir history is metaphorically explained. As nineteen-
year-old college dropouts, these children begin roaming the streets of New
York and San Francisco. I imagine them all grown up with nowhere to go,
eventually becoming self-employed private detectives, investigating the death
of a God they never knew, and feeling ambivalent, nauseous, and moody as a
result. They, in turn, produce some very interesting grandchildren.
Among the grandchildren is one Kaiser Lupowitz, the detective put on
the case to find God in Woody Allen’s brilliantly hard-boiled short story
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“Mr. Big.”24 While not a film, this short story could serve as the origin of
the idea of the “existential detective”—the basis for David O. Russel’s exis-
tential comedy I Heart Huckabees (2004), in which the young idealist Albert
Markovski (Jason Schwartzman) hires a team of existential detectives, not
to find God per se, but to find meaning. Another pair of existential detec-
tives can be found in Jake Schram (Ben Stiller) and Brian Finn (Edward
Norton), a “God squad” duo of rabbi and priest who believe in the love of
the same girl in Keeping the Faith (Edward Norton, 2000). These films use
love or absurdity to deal with the existential crisis.
Among The Jazz Singer’s other descendants are the spiritual devotees
of Tyler Durden’s (Brad Pitt) neo-noir Fight Club (David Fincher, 1996).
Tyler’s mantra, which he imparts to his cult members, is a perfect embodi-
ment of that which Jack Robin fought so hard to achieve; free of their
psychological reference points, they engage in self-inflicted violence for
their existential authentication, becoming in the process “the all-singing,
all-dancing crap of the world.” That most of these films are comedies (even
granting that Fight Club is a black comedy, une comedie noir?) reveals how
uncomfortable we still are as a culture in considering religion seriously as a
metaphysic tonic.
But, if the show must go on, then we should not be surprised at all if
the future of film history—especially the further evolution of film noir—
eventually leads our protagonists back to the synagogue.
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From Sherlock Holmes to
the Hard-Boiled Detective in
Film Noir
Jerold J. Abrams
A maze is a house built purposely to confuse men; its architecture, prodi-
gal in symmetries, is made to serve that purpose.
—Jorge Luis Borges
The time of film noir is Hemingway time—dark and cold, moody and
mean, existentially void and grossly atomistic. Here is a “house built to
confuse men” and lead them all about in a synthetic prison of their own
design. This dark maze of the night is everywhere and nowhere, and the only
one who knows it clean is the hard-boiled detective, who navigates its thou-
sand hidden passageways. Sam Spade, Philip Marlowe, and Mike Hammer—
these are the classic noir detectives, each one stoic and detached, a cold
Cartesian spectator with no hope for redemption and no reason to care. The
individuals he meets are entirely self-contained, wrapped in their own fear
and self-interest—all terribly malevolent. Of course, true to form, the crimi-
nal is always exposed by film’s end—but that ending only ever marks a worse
beginning. For, beyond the mere simplicity of whodunit, what is really un-
covered in all great film noir is a world in which far more questions about the
darkness of human nature remain fundamentally unanswered. Indeed, within
this unlimited labyrinth of being, there is no safe place to hide, no final hid-
den doorway, and, ultimately, no possibility of escape.
Mazes, Clues, and Detectives
Now, at first glance, the detective model and the labyrinth might not ap-
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pear to have too much in common—but, in fact, they are two of a kind.
Consider the ancient myth of the maze. King Minos of Crete had Daedalus
build a labyrinth with a Minotaur inside (“a monster with a bull’s body
and human head,”1 although the opposite works too) who was fed on a
steady diet of young Athenians. Quite reasonably outraged, Prince Theseus
of Athens plotted to enter Minos’s maze. On his arrival in Crete, however,
something unexpected happened to Theseus—he met the young and beau-
tiful Ariadne (none other than Minos’s daughter), and the two fell in love.
Ariadne, not wanting to lose Theseus inside the terrible maze, equipped
him with a sword and a “clue of thread” for safety. Theseus then trailed the
thread behind him as he entered the maze, killed the Minotaur with his
sword, and was able to escape by following the thread back to the entrance.
This has always been a popular story. But it really seeped into the fab-
ric of modern literature when writers like Sir Arthur Conan Doyle drew
directly from it in order to form what we today know as the classic detec-
tive story. And, while they aren’t always obvious, the influences of the myth
of the maze are certainly evident. For, in the hands of Conan Doyle, the
Minotaur is now the criminal, trapped in an underworld “labyrinth of
crime”; the “clue of thread” is now the “thread of clues” (clues as signs to
be detected); and, of course, the noble Theseus becomes the formidable
detective Sherlock Holmes. Take, for example, the story of The Sign of Four,
in which Dr. John Watson (the narrator and friend of Holmes) tells us that
his and Holmes’s present crime case is “a labyrinth in which a man less
singularly endowed than my fellow-lodger might well despair of ever find-
ing the clue.”2 Clearly, the ancient myth is evident here. And this is hardly
an isolated instance: in fact, Watson is constantly describing the world of
crime as a “labyrinth” (or sometimes a “maze”) and continually noting the
need to find the “string of clues.”3 Indeed, the same template is perfectly
evident in so many contemporary detective stories.4 Think, for example, of
Borges’s stories “The Garden of Forking Paths,” “Death and the Compass,”
“Ibn Hakkan al-Bokhari, Dead in His Labyrinth”—all these involve detec-
tives navigating labyrinths. Or take Umberto Eco’s novel The Name of The
Rose (1980), a murder mystery about labyrinths set in the Middle Ages.5
It’s the same with film noir too. In fact, it’s fair to say that American
film noir is simply the most recent natural heir of the classical myth of the
maze. That quintessential American detective genre is filled with hard-boiled
shamuses navigating labyrinths in the night. And I am hardly the first one
to notice. Much of the credit for noticing the labyrinthine character of film
From Sherlock Holmes to the Hard-Boiled Detective 71
noir must be given to Foster Hirsch and his remarkable analysis in The
Dark Side of the Screen. According to Hirsch, it’s the same in virtually every
major hard-boiled film noir: “The original request for finding the missing
person leads the private eye into a maze.”6 Similarly, and more recently,
Nicholas Christopher takes up this point, rightly demarcating in his Some-
where in the Night three levels of the maze in classic film noir: the city, the
human condition, and “the labyrinth of the hero’s inner workings.”7 Hirsch
and Christopher are right on target in their respective analyses. However,
their points can, I think, be pushed further still. For it is in film noir—and
in some contrast to the adventures of Sherlock Holmes—that we find a
new and unique form of labyrinth to have emerged, one that is quite spe-
cific to the hard-boiled detective of American cinema.
Umberto Eco on the Philosophy of Labyrinths
In fact, according to Eco, there are “three kinds of labyrinth” (or “maze”).8
The first one is the “classical Greek maze,” with all the old star characters—
Theseus, Ariadne (with her string), and, of course, the Minotaur. In this
maze, according to Eco, you can enter and leave without difficulty; and,
while the string may help a little, the only real problem is the Minotaur.9
Certainly, this is the most popular version of the maze, probably because
for a long time (from ancient Greece to the Middle Ages) it was thought to
capture something very real about the nature of the universe10—think, for
example, of The Divine Comedy, of Dante and Virgil navigating the laby-
rinth of hell with the Minotaur/devil at the center.
To be sure, it was a pretty good model (for a while anyway)—it ex-
plained a lot about reality. The classical Greek maze hit all the right medi-
eval buttons. The world is terribly deceptive, hard to know, and frankly
downright dangerous—but not to worry, for, with the “string of faith,”
you can avoid the devil and escape the deceptive maze of this earthly life,
arriving safely at the pearly gates of heaven. But then things changed, as
they have a tendency to do in history. The Renaissance happened—and
suddenly a new maze came with it. This new maze, according to Eco, was
the “mannerist maze,” named after the sixteenth-century movement in art
marked by a characteristically mazy distortion of perception. Now the maze
becomes multistoried and more distorted, with upside-down staircases, each
leading into another—an hour inside, and you don’t know where are you are.
Which room is which? Trapdoors and mirrors watching mirrors—nothing is
72 Jerold J. Abrams
what it seems in the mannerist maze. No need for a Minotaur either—the
mannerist maze of modernity “is its own Minotaur.”11 Social fragmentation,
moral skepticism, cultural pluralism—the mind splinters forth in a mil-
lion different directions. Just getting out (with your sanity intact) is really
all the challenge requires. But that will never happen unless you have the
all-important modern version of the Ariadne’s string—and this (à la
Descartes and Kant) is nothing other than “pure reason.”
Of course, as I said, things have a tendency to change, and this applies
to the mannerist maze too. Its days were numbered. True, it worked for a
while, until Nietzsche anyway, and then . . . whoosh! Into thin air: pure
reason was gone as well, that age-old archaeological dig for the faculty of
rationality had uncovered only “will to power.” So the Enlightenment
willowed, and a new dark age descended on humanity and, with it, the
third form of labyrinth. Pioneered in large part by the American philoso-
pher Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914)12 and later by the French philosophers
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari—this is the labyrinth of unlimited clues,
or the “rhizomatic labyrinth.”13 The term rhizome actually comes from the
study of agriculture: it refers to a structure that grows sideways (horizon-
tally), and, in fact, in every direction, rather than vertically (like a tree,
from the ground up and out of a singular trunk). Like grass or seaweed, or
the Internet, or even language, a rhizome, according to Deleuze, has “nei-
ther beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) from which it grows
and which it overspills.”14 As a labyrinth, the rhizome has no center; it has
no perimeter; and, worst of all, it has no way out.15 Here, the Minotaur is
still the form of the labyrinth itself (as in the mannerist maze), but now
there is no escaping him with reason (or faith, or any combination of the
two). For every Ariadne’s string only ever leads further into the labyrinth.
The Rhizomatic Maze Structure in Noir
It is the rhizomatic maze that, I would like to suggest, is what we really
mean by the maze of film noir. In order to make this point, I’ll begin by
giving an analysis of a noir film that is right on the border between man-
nerist maze and rhizomatic maze—to make the distinction clearly. Con-
sider the film Lady in the Lake (Robert Montgomery, 1947). Here, our
hard-boiled detective is Philip Marlowe (Robert Montgomery), who is busy
filling his pockets with rice. Why? Well, he tells us quite explicitly: “I read a
story once, how a detective carried rice in his pocket. He walked along—he
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distributed it, kernel for kernel.” Of course, the story here is none other
than “Hansel and Gretel,” in which two children are twice forced by their
wicked mother to enter a forest maze, to get lost and die. The first time the
young Hansel (or would-be Theseus) cleverly fills his pockets with pebbles
and uses them as his Ariadne’s string; the second time, however, he has
only breadcrumbs, which are soon eaten by the forest animals. Lost, Hansel
and Gretel discover a house made of candy that belongs to a witch (a fe-
male Minotaur), who wants to eat them. But they kill the witch, make off
with her riches, and return to their father, their mother (who is also really
the witch) having died in the meantime.
The relevance of this story to the film Lady in the Lake is plainly evident—
for Marlowe’s string of rice is intended to lead into the labyrinth toward
the Minotaur, in this case another evil woman (like the witch), namely,
Mildred Havelend (Jayne Meadows). Moreover, Havelend used to be a
blonde but is now a brunette because she is masquerading as Chrystal
Kingsby, the now-drowned “lady in the lake.”16 So Mildred/Chrystal is the
two-faced female witch/Minotaur—the same form found in “Hansel and
Gretel.” Marlowe, however, is in over his head. His trail of rice has been
ruined (just like Hansel’s breadcrumbs) by the two-faced cop/criminal Lieu-
tenant DeGarmot (Lloyd Nolan), who has covered for Mildred.17 So the
cops arrive, with little to no string to follow, only after Marlowe has been
shot. Now, as I noted, this is a borderline case between a mannerist maze
and rhizomatic maze. For, while the string doesn’t lead out, and Marlowe
has been shot, he does, in fact, recover and lives happily ever after with
Adrienne Fromsett (Audrey Trotter)—whereas he should have died on the
floor (with no escape from the labyrinth).
As a contrast to this film, consider the much better (and more rhizomatic)
noir film The Third Man (Carol Reed, 1949). Set in postwar Vienna, dur-
ing the Occupation, the film takes as its context a labyrinthine weave of
four cultures set against a dark Gothic Viennese cityscape. The Third Man
is essentially a detective story about a pulp fiction writer, Holly Martins
(Joseph Cotten), who gathers clues about his missing friend Harry Lime
(Orson Welles). Lime—apparently dead and buried even before Martins
arrives—is, however, quite alive, although nevertheless “underground,”
both figuratively, in the sense that he is a criminal, and literally, in the
sense that he is in the sewer. The sewer is, moreover, structured distinctly
as a labyrinth.18 Each tunnel leads to other tunnels (some large and oth-
ers narrow) amid twisting and winding staircases. Passageways reveal dead
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ends, and darkness makes determining direction nearly impossible. Flash-
lights bounce glare off timeworn, shiny stones on curving walls, and flow-
ing water creates that classic “house of mirrors” effect found in all great
labyrinths.
But, most important, Lime is unable to escape. At the end of the film,
he finds his way to the top of the sewer system, after being shot. He barely
gets his fingers up through the sewer grate, just cresting the seal between
lower and upper Vienna—but to no avail. He collapses, dead. Yet, not only
does he not escape the labyrinth of the sewer, but it is also simply impos-
sible for him to escape the wider and more rhizomatic labyrinth of Viennese
crime. For the labyrinth of the sewer is simply a maze within a maze and
the former merely a representation of the latter. It is a mannerist maze con-
tained within the rhizomatic maze of occupied Vienna. There was no es-
cape either way. Lime is trapped in a world of crime, always hunted, never
safe—and he can’t even trust his friends.
This remarkable theme of the maze within a maze (like Shakespeare’s
play within a play, “The Mousetrap” within Hamlet) is also discussed by
Eco in the postscript to The Name of the Rose. Indeed, Eco does exactly the
same thing in his story: the acting detective William (a medieval Sherlock
Holmes) and his apprentice monk Adso (his Watson) must solve a murder
mystery by navigating a library that is structured like a maze, in order to
slay the Minotaur/librarian at the center. Commenting on this story, Eco
writes: “The labyrinth of my library is still a mannerist labyrinth, but the
world in which William realizes he is living already has a rhizome struc-
ture: that is, it can be structured but is never structured definitively.”19 It is
precisely this realization that Lime comes to as well: he acquiesces to Holly
and acknowledges that he must be shot. There can never be any escape for
him from the wider rhizomatic maze of crime.20
From Holmes to Hard-Boiled: The Anti-Theseus
In fact, it’s fair to say that the rise of the rhizomatic maze marks the most
significant evolution in the modern detective story from Sherlock Holmes
to film noir. For, whereas the maze of the classic detective form represents
a mannerist maze (with an escape), the maze of the noir detective form is a
rhizomatic maze (without an escape). And, on this point, the title of Rob-
ert Porfirio’s 1976 “No Way Out” says it all. Porfirio explains: “The pre-
existential world of the classical detective was ordered and meaningful;
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social aberrations were temporary and quickly righted through the
detective’s superior powers of deductive reasoning. A product of a rather
smug Western society, such a world reflected a Victorian sense of order and
a belief in the supremacy of science. The hard-boiled writers replaced this
with a corrupt, chaotic world where the detective’s greatest asset was the
sheer ability to survive with a shred of dignity.”21 Otherwise put, there is a
“way out” in the Holmes stories, and there is absolutely none in film noir.
And, of course, I quite agree. Moreover, with the shift in maze, there is also
a fundamental shift in the detective character—from the New England
Gothic page to the Hollywood big screen, the original source for all of them
(from Holmes to Marlowe and Spade) being Edgar Allan Poe’s detective
Monsieur C. Auguste Dupin.
Before making this point in full, however, I should note that, for there
to be any significant “differences,” so much too has to remain the same.
And, among these similarities, perhaps the most important is the “posi-
tioning” of the detective character. In all detective fiction, the detective’s
abilities emerge from his positioning between two worlds—the “world of
the cops” and the “world of the criminals.” He’s part of both, but he’s at
home in neither. He can think like a criminal, but he’s on the side of the
cops. Not that they would ever have him—they are, after all, the detective’s
natural opponents, whether they’re from Scotland Yard or the LAPD (noir
typically takes place in Los Angeles). And, when they aren’t telling him to
stay off their turf, they’re chastising his unconventional methods. Ultimately,
however, the police are always completely inept and are eating their words
by film’s end.22 The detective’s lack of place, moreover, contributes to his
(criminal-like) isolation. Dupin, for example, lives alone with his friend
and prefers it that way: “Our seclusion was perfect. We admitted no visi-
tors. . . . We existed within ourselves alone.”23 Holmes, too, lives with Dr.
Watson in isolation from the world. In fact, the Holmes character and the
Dupin character are very much alike. So much so that it’s fair to say (and,
in fact, some have said) that the character of Holmes is more or less copied
outright from Dupin (and Conan Doyle hints at this as well in A Study in
Scarlet).24
But, in noir, this basic classic detective model begins to change consid-
erably. For the hard-boiled detective is even more isolated, even more Car-
tesian: he lives entirely alone and has no friends.25 And this certainly makes
his already asocial nature all the worse. The hard-boiled detective is iso-
lated and angry, hopeless and amoral—he’s a dark character in an even
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darker labyrinth. He’s unrefined and in many ways perhaps unlikable. But,
then, why should he care? As Marlowe (Bogart) puts it: “I don’t mind if
you don’t like my manners. I don’t like them myself. They’re pretty bad. I
grieve over them long winter evenings” (The Big Sleep [Howard Hawks,
1946]). The hard-boiled detective is excessively detached—he moves in the
shadows and at night, ducking into corners and alleyways. Always he stays
“covered,” always cloaked in his massive trenchcoat with the collar up to
hide his throat. Nothing’s getting in there—and not a lot comes out. Hardly
the conversationalist, he’s a man of few words—although, when he does
speak, he’s witty and waxes deadpan innuendo about the evils of the hu-
man soul, as if it’s everyday (nothing really for inquiry). He wears a fedora
with the lid down, just barely revealing his strained brow and penetrating
detective eyes. Physically, he’s expressionless and pretty stiff. He’s strong,
but not very large, and certainly not very tall, although as Marlowe puts it
in The Big Sleep (in his typical wisecracking manner): “Well, I try to be.”
Of course, this is completely the opposite of Holmes, who is tall and
lean and languid, looking every bit the decadent aesthete. Holmes lounges
around a lot and enjoys his contemplative free time, even seeing it as part
of his method. But not the hard-boiled detective. He never rests and is
wound pretty tight: he rarely smiles and quickly gets to the point. He doesn’t
have time, unlike Holmes, to lay out the case with adornments, giving so
many little curlicue details here and there, all speckled with reflections on
the nature of reasons and signs. He just goes about his business, mean as
ever, holding his cigarette out the side of his mouth, even when he’s work-
ing a guy over. He trusts no one and needs no friends, least of all female
friends: women are trouble in his world, sleek and dangerous, beautiful
and deadly. He handles them very carefully.
First-Person Perspective: Sadism versus Masochism
It is this lonely, isolated perspective on the world that is brought to a head
with the first-person voice-over of noir. Of course, it’s true: both detective
forms use a first-person perspective. But there is a key difference: Watson
narrates (to us) about the great Sherlock Holmes, while the hard-boiled
detective tells the story of his own adventures. And, in hearing these two
different styles, we also get different aesthetic feelings: for the pleasures of
hearing about Holmes are intellectually masochistic, meaning pleasures of
being intellectually subordinated (typically for the purpose of learning),
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while the pleasures of watching the hard-boiled detective are intellectually
sadistic, satisfactions derived from imagining ourselves harming others.
So, when we read Poe or Conan Doyle, we actually enjoy being shown our
own weaknesses in the face of a great master detective (not unlike a stu-
dent before a great professor).
The technique actually goes back to Plato, who wrote in dialogues. And
in most of them the form is the same: Socrates leads his interlocutors
through a maze of inquiry, all the while needling them and sort of chastis-
ing them for what they don’t know about truth, or justice, or beauty, or
whatever the matter may be. But, beyond this, Socrates is also telling us,
the readers, that we know nothing more than his interlocutors—and seem-
ingly, all at once, we are invited into the intellectually masochistic plea-
sures of the Platonic dialectic. Similarly, with Watson, his ignorance is ours
too: for we follow Watson as he follows Holmes, and we take our intellec-
tual beatings along the way. As Holmes famously, and rather insultingly,
puts it: “It’s elementary, my dear Watson” (except that Holmes doesn’t re-
ally say this).26
But in noir it is quite different: we identify with the hardened detective
because he’s just like us, an Everyman, not an “Overman” (in Nietzsche’s
terms)27—as Holmes is sometimes made out to be. And we (similarly) en-
joy all his rough sadistic pleasures:28 telling people off, beating up crimi-
nals, and, of course, looking cool doing it. The sadism of the hard-boiled
detective is, moreover, fairly explicit. Take, for example, Murder, My Sweet
(Edward Dmytryk, 1944), in which Ann Grayle (Anne Shirley) tells Marlowe
(Dick Powell): “You’re vicious. You—you take some horrible sort of satis-
faction in seeing people torn apart.” Even the titles of noir films have a
sadistic tone, as Raymond Borde and Étienne Chaumeton write in their
Panorama of American Film Noir: “[Noir films] sometimes had Sadean titles
like Murder, My Sweet and Kiss Me Deadly, and they tended to be derived
from the literature of drugs and alcohol.”29
Adding to this distinction of perspective, a further contrast arises as to
the motivation of the detective, classic or hard-boiled. For Holmes and
Marlowe do what they do for very different reasons. With regard to the
hard-boiled detective, Raymond Chandler sums up his motivation suc-
cinctly: Marlowe does it for a fee and nothing else; he’s every bit the stan-
dard mercenary.30 Poe’s Dupin, however, in strong contrast, does it mainly
for the intellectual pleasure. He’s more upper class than Marlowe. He comes
from a long and aristocratic line, and, even though the wealth is now gone,
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he never resorts to becoming a mercenary—instead, he lives frugally and
focuses on the higher pleasures of the mind.31 Similarly, with Holmes, de-
tective work is hardly just a job; rather, it’s a game, a point made evident in
“The Adventure of the Abbey Grange,” where Holmes rousts Watson:
“‘Come, Watson, come!’ he cried. ‘The game is afoot. Not a word! Into your
clothes and come!’”32
Detective Logic: Abduction
This game in Holmes is pleasurable specifically because it is logical—and
logic, for Holmes, means traditional “deductive logic,” a point that carries
over rather well into film noir. Take, for example, Lady in the Lake, where
CLASSIC: SHERLOCK HOLMES
Setting: less realistic (can be fantastic)
Uses drugs (morphine and cocaine)
First-person singular about friend
Mind: two sides (slow-creative vs. fast-precise)
Lives with friend (Dr. Watson)
Femme fatale (anti-Ariadne) nonessential
Method: science of deduction (but is really
abduction and musement)
Character is intellectual (scholarly)
Natural opponents: Scotland Yard
Artistic (enjoys music, plays violin)
Well traveled (e.g., knows foreign tattoos)
Work is a game (“the game is afoot”)
Upper-class tastes and manners
Tall, languid, nonphysical
Link to medicine with Dr. Watson (detec-
tive clues like medical symptoms)
No regular weapons (save reason)
Smokes a pipe
Form is masochistic
Hobbies: beekeeping, violin, drugs (sting-
ers, violin, needles signify precision)
Mannerist maze
HARD-BOILED: MARLOWE/SPADE
Setting: always realistic (and urban)
Uses alcohol (typically bourbon)
First-person singular voice-over
Mind: steady, even
Lives alone, has no friends
Femme fatale (anti-Ariadne) essential
Implicit method: abduction (without
musement)
Character is nonintellectual
Natural opponents: city cops
Nonartistic
Not traveled
Work is just a job (for fee only)
Middle class: an “Everyman”
Shorter, tough, aggressive (fistfights)
Stories are typically nonmedical
Carries a gun (and shoots people)
Smokes cigarettes
Form is sadistic
No hobbies (flatter character form)
Rhizomatic maze
The Detective Model
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Adrienne Fromsett acknowledges Marlowe’s path of reason: “You quickly
deduced that I left it [a handkerchief] there. Such great blinding brilliance,
Mr. Marlowe.” But the question arises, Is it really deduction, or is it just
guessing? At least for Holmes, the answer is clear: in chapter 1 of The Sign
of Four, “The Science of Deduction,” Holmes plainly insists: “No, no: I
never guess. It is a shocking habit,—destructive to the logical faculty.”33
But, in fact, as many Peirce scholars have pointed out, this is not entirely
correct. Marcello Truzzi, for example, writes: “More exactly, Holmes con-
sistently displays what C. S. Peirce has called abductions.”34 Abduction is
Peirce’s term for “the logic of guessing.” And this, I think, is also exactly
what we find in the hard-boiled detective. Spade, Marlowe, and Hammer—
they all use the method of abduction.35 And this logic contrasts quite dis-
tinctly with deduction (and induction).
Consider the following examples:
DEDUCTION
Rule
Case
Result
INDUCTION
Case
Result
Rule
ABDUCTION
Rule
Result
Case
Induction is basically what we mean when we refer to the scientific method:
generalizing from a set of cases to a rule about them. Deduction, by con-
trast, reasons from a given rule to a result and really doesn’t tell us anything
new. We may, for example, reason from a rule, “All men are mortal,” and a
case, “Socrates is a man,” to the result, “Therefore, Socrates is mortal.”
But, of course, we already knew Socrates was mortal. Here, we’re simply
demonstrating why we know he’s mortal—because we know something
about all men, namely, that they’re mortal. But abduction is different. It
. ..
. ..
. ..
All serious knife wounds result in bleeding.
This was a serious knife wound.
There was bleeding.
This was a serious knife wound.
There was bleeding.
All serious knife wounds result in bleeding.
All serious knife wounds result in bleeding.
There was bleeding.
This was a serious knife wound.36
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reasons not to a rule or to a result but to a “case”—and it is cases that
concern us in detective logic, as in The Case Book of Sherlock Holmes. Why
do we reason to a case? Well, typically, something is amiss, and we want to
know why. Nine times out of ten in detective fiction, it’s a dead body. And
it’s the job of the detective to discover whodunit.37 In doing so, typically he
uses abduction, which may also be put like this:
ABDUCTION
The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course;
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.38
Taking Truzzi’s example above, the dead body gives us a jolt. And, looking
for the cause, we make an abduction. If it were true that this was a knife
murder, then C (excessive bleeding, perhaps sliced clothing too) would be a
matter of course. Noticing that the corpse does, in fact, have these traits, we
guess (perhaps wrongly, but reasonably) that it was, indeed, a knife murder.
Or take another example, this one from The Third Man. Martins fol-
lows and loses Lime, who disappears into thin air. Martins then consults
Major Calloway (Trevor Howard) for help:
MARTINS: I was on that side. His shadow was on that side. And
there are no turnings on either side.
CALLOWAY: What about the doorways?
MARTINS: I tell you, I heard him running ahead of me!
CALLOWAY: Yes, yes, yes. And then he vanished out there, I sup-
pose, with a puff of smoke and like a clap of—
Calloway is thinking now, and then, suddenly, Voilà! He’s got it! The infer-
ence looks like this: The surprising fact occurs that Lime disappeared into
thin air. But, if it were true that a trapdoor is nearby, then Lime’s vanishing
would follow. Hence, there is reason to suspect a trapdoor nearby. Halloway
then tests his guess and finds that he’s right.
Intoxication in Noir
Of course, sometimes the cases are much more difficult than these. And
logic alone may not help us. So, characteristically, the detective will rely on
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unconventional tools to help in achieving the abduction. Now, I noted ear-
lier that Chaumeton and Borde think that film noir derives from the “lit-
erature of drugs and alcohol.” This is partly correct, although there’s a
little more to it than that. In fact, intoxication is essential to the detective’s
method. Remember Watson’s introduction to “The Science of Deduction”—
well, oddly enough, instead of logical syllogisms, Watson actually launches
into a study of Holmes’s drug habit. Watson says: “‘Which is it to-day,’ I
asked, ‘morphine or cocaine?’”39 In mulling over a difficult case, Holmes
will sink into a dreamy, lounging state, often for hours at a time, and then,
of a sudden, he will burst up with the solution. This same method appears
in Dupin as well—and Peirce, in his own comments on Poe, calls this
method musement, which he defines as the “pure play” of the mind.40 It is
this capacity for musement, according to Peirce, that is so essential to ab-
duction. As Peirce puts it, “Those problems that at first blush appear ut-
terly insoluble receive, in that very circumstance,—as Edgar Poe remarked
in his ‘The Murders in the Rue Morgue,’—their smoothly-fitting keys. This
particularly adapts them to the Play of Musement.”41 Effectively, the con-
templative musing state rearranges the clues in a new, enlightening order
so that the abduction may appear in a flash.
We find this vague and dreamy (often intoxicated) state in all good
detective fiction—and certainly this includes film noir as well. Of course,
typically in noir the drug of choice is alcohol, and noir detectives drink as
a rule (although they are often drugged as well). For example, in Kiss Me
Deadly (Robert Aldrich, 1955), Mike Hammer (Ralph Meeker) enters the
bar and says: “Give me a double bourbon, and leave the bottle.” Now, the
noir detective, when he’s hot on the trail, usually remains pretty sober. But,
when stumped or at a standstill, he’ll want to calm his nerves with a drink.
At first blush, this looks quite a bit like the method established in Poe and
Conan Doyle. But, on closer analysis, it’s not entirely clear how integral the
intoxicated state is to the hard-boiled detective’s method. It seems to be
just on the side (just something he happens to do). In fact, there’s really
nothing in classic detective noir that resembles Holmes’s approach, in which
he first gathers clues, then induces intoxication (to rearrange the clues),
only to emerge from La-La Land to say with cold, hard eyes: “I’ve got it!”
Nor (as I noted earlier) is there anything languid and “lying around” about
the hard-boiled detective, listening to classical music, and allowing the mind
to play freely, in order to discover the killer. And this (in my opinion) is the
greatest weakness in the film noir genre. Of course, to be fair, it’s true that
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some neo-noir films do make the right link. For example, in the Hughes
brothers’ From Hell (2001), the detective Fred Abberline (Johnny Depp)
solves the mystery of the identity of Jack the Ripper by way of opium and
absinthe: once in a hallucinatory state, he sees visions of the murders of
prostitutes and gradually solves the case. But, in classic noir, it’s a miss.
The Anti-Ariadne and Her String
Alternatively, however, film noir appears to get the femme fatale of classic
detective fiction just right. No longer the loving Ariadne who helps Theseus
with the string, she is the anti-Ariadne, and she comes clearly into focus in
Conan Doyle’s “The Disappearance of Lady Frances Carfax.” As Watson
relates: “Holmes leaned back in his armchair and took his notebook from
his pocket. ‘One of the most dangerous classes in the world,’ said he, ‘is the
drifting and friendless woman. She is the most harmless and often the most
useful of mortals, but she is the inevitable inciter of crime in others. . . . She
is lost, as often as not, in a maze of obscure pensions and boarding houses.’”42
Once a light at the end of the maze, Ariadne is now just one more flicker-
ing flash among unlimited simulacra—and the string that she holds out to
the detective is typically just long enough to hang him. Here is the origin of
the noir femme fatale and so many of her “class,” as Holmes puts it.
In Kiss Me Deadly, for example, Velda (Maxine Cooper) warns Hammer
about finding the Ariadne’s string: “First you find a little thread. The little
thread leads you to a string. And the string leads you to a rope. And from the
rope you hang by the neck.” Velda is right: Hammer does “pick up the thread,”
as he puts it, and, ultimately, it leads to death at the hands of the two-faced
Minotaur, Lily Carver, who is really Gabrielle (Gaby Rodgers). Gabrielle has
plotted to possess a special box, a Pandora’s box, and she desperately wants
to know what’s inside. Hammer warns her not to open it. But she simply
cannot help herself—slowly, she opens it, and suddenly a screaming white
light, which burns her alive, and then wham! a nuclear explosion.
Indeed, the once-so-valuable Ariadne’s string is always dangerous in
film noir. And so many noir films make this point explicitly. In Alfred
Hitchcock’s Rope (1948), for example, the detective/professor (James
Stewart) discovers the (Ariadne’s) rope used to hang his former student.
The point also emerges very nicely in To Have and Have Not (Howard
Hawks, 1944), where Marie/Slim (Lauren Bacall) walks around Harry
Morgan/Steve (Humphrey Bogart) and Harry asks her: “Find anything?”
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Slim says: “No. No Steve. There are no strings tied to you. Not yet.” And
then, soon after, Slim warns him: “Look out for those strings, Steve. You’re
liable to trip and break your neck.”43
She knows it—the string of signs is dangerous. And, if he follows the clues,
he might hang. Part of the problem is that the clues are never so obvious—
they can lead us so easily astray. And this has largely to do with the nature of
clues, which are defined by Eco (drawing on Peirce again) as one among
three different kinds of detective signs: imprints, symptoms, and clues. All
these detective signs are physically made (or what Peirce calls indexical signs).
Imprints have a one-to-one connection: the footprint looks exactly like the
foot. Symptoms, by contrast, lack this point-to-point relation but are made
directly to appear by their cause; as Eco puts it: “Red spots on the face mean
measles.” And, finally, clues are “objects left by an external agent in the spot
where it did something, and are somehow recognized as physically linked to
that agent.” Here, it is “agents” (persons with motives) who may or may not
have “done it”—and this, according to Eco, is “why a criminal novel is usu-
ally more intriguing than the detection of pneumonia.”44
With this in mind, let’s now consider the matter of who killed Chris
Lavery (Dick Simmons) in Lady in the Lake. Marlowe has some clues: an
empty gun found by Mrs. Fallbrook and a handkerchief from Lavery’s apart-
ment with the initials “AF,” as in Adrienne Fromsett:
FROMSETT: You went to see Lavery?
MARLOWE: And found him dead.
FROMSETT: I repeatedly told you not to go see Lavery.
MARLOWE: What brand of perfume do you wear? Do you recog-
nize it? The initials are AF.
FROMSETT: I don’t have to ask the obvious question, do I?
MARLOWE: I found it on the dresser in Lavery’s bedroom.
FROMSETT: And you quickly deduced that I left it there. Such great,
blinding brilliance, Mr. Marlowe. What am I supposed to say now?
Did you bring a confession for me to sign?
MARLOWE: No, I just thought you’d like to have your handker-
chief back.
Clearly Marlowe suspects Fromsett—but not for very long. After mulling
it over, Marlowe rethinks his original inference about Fromsett: “Maybe a
woman didn’t do it . . . Maybe it was arranged to look that way.” The evi-
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dence is simply too damning. So Marlowe makes a new abduction. If it
were true that someone framed Fromsett, then a startling amount of evi-
dence might be found against her (more than a rational killer would leave),
which there is—so maybe Fromsett didn’t kill Lavery. And, in fact, it was
Mildred Havelend, masquerading as Mrs. Fallbrook.
No Way Out of the Noir Maze
Of course, as I said, Lady in the Lake ends better than it should have and
borders on a mannerist maze. But, for the most part, noir films end badly
and typically emphasize a fundamental inescapability indicative of the
rhizomatic maze. The Third Man does this perfectly. And The Maltese Fal-
con (John Huston, 1941) nails it as well. Spade (Bogart) turns in the woman
he wants for killing his partner. And when he finally discovers the statue of
the falcon—after so many people have been killed—he realizes it’s a fake
(and is obviously amused), just one more illusion leading back into the
labyrinth. It’s the same with Kiss Me Deadly—perfectly rhizomatic. Gabrielle
simply must open the box, killing herself, and blowing up the cottage. Of
course, whether Hammer (now shot by Gabrielle) actually dies is left open.
So the original ending of that film is better: just the explosion, everyone
still in the beach cottage, dead, and then “THE END.” Indeed, in virtually all
great noir films, the detective will pick up the Ariadne’s thread of clues and
solve the case—he may even slay a fleeting representation of the Minotaur.
But the case of all cases, the dark maze of being, simply has no secret es-
cape hatch, no solution at all. And the hard-boiled detective knows as
much—and self-consciously accepts his own isolated fate in the unlimited
rhizomatic labyrinth of evil.
Notes
I am very grateful to Mark Conard and Elizabeth Cooke for reading and commenting
on an earlier draft of this essay. I am also grateful to Richard White and Clarinda
Karpov for conversations on the relation between Shakespeare and Sherlock Holmes
and to Chris Pliatska for conversations on The Third Man.
The epigraph to this essay is taken from Jorge Luis Borges, “The Immortal,” in
Collected Fictions, trans. Andrew Hurley (New York: Penguin, 1999), 189.
1. Thomas Bulfinch, Bulfinch’s Mythology (New York: Random House/Modern
Library, 1934), 125.
From Sherlock Holmes to the Hard-Boiled Detective 85
2. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, The Sign of Four, in The Complete Sherlock Holmes
(hereafter CSH) (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1992), 116.
3. In The Sign of Four, Watson explains that he and Holmes are caught in a “laby-
rinth of streets” (CSH, 99). He also talks in The Sign of Four about “a perfect labyrinth
of landing-places for miles” and “a labyrinth of passages and corridors”; in “The Red-
Headed League” about “an endless labyrinth of gas-lit streets until we emerged into
Farrington Street”; in “The Adventure of the Blue Carbuncle” about “the labyrinth of
small streets which lie at the back of Tottenham Court Road”; and in “The Adventure
of the Engineer’s Thumb” about “a labyrinth of an old house, with corridors, pas-
sages, narrow winding staircases, and little low doors” (CSH, 125, 147, 187, 245, 281).
4. CSH, 492. For further analysis of labyrinths and detective stories, see John T.
Irwin, The Mystery to a Solution: Poe, Borges, and the Analytic Detective Story (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), and Dale Keiger, “A Sleuth in the Gar-
den of Forking Paths,” Johns Hopkins Magazine: Electronic Edition, April 1995, http://
www.jhu.edu/~jhumag/495web/sleuth.html (accessed May 11, 2005).
5. See the postscript to Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose (1980), trans. William
Weaver (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1984), 524–55.
6. Foster Hirsch, The Dark Side of the Screen: Film Noir (1981), with a new intro-
duction by the author (New York: Da Capo, 2001), 169 (see also 122).
7. Nicholas Christopher, Somewhere in the Night: Film Noir and the American
City (New York: Free Press, 1997), 16, 17 (quotation).
8. Eco, The Name of the Rose, 525. Following Eco, I’ll use the terms labyrinth and
maze interchangeable, to set up his account. Jeff Saward claims that a labyrinth has
only one pathway and a maze many (see Jeff Saward, Labyrinths and Mazes [New York:
Lark, 2003], and “Introduction to the Typology of Labyrinths and Mazes,” http://
www.labyrinthos.net/typology.htm [accessed May 11, 2005]).
9. Umberto Eco, Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language (Bloomington: Indi-
ana University Press, 1984), 81–82.
10. Penelope Reed Doob, The Idea of the Labyrinth from Classical Antiquity through
the Middle Ages (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).
11. Eco, Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, 81 (emphasis added).
12. In fact, Peirce even sketched a picture of this labyrinth of signs, reproduced as
“Peirce’s Representation of the Labyrinth of Signs” in Joseph Brent, Peirce: A Life (1993;
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 310. Peirce also writes: “We find our-
selves in the vestibule of the labyrinth. Yes, The Labyrinth—in the Vestibule only, but
yet in that tremendous, only Labyrinth” (The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,
ed. C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss, and A. Burks, 8 vols. [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1958], vol. 2, p. 42, par. 79).
13. Eco, postscript to The Name of the Rose, 525, and Semiotics and the Philosophy
of Language, 80–82.
14. See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and
86 Jerold J. Abrams
Schizophrenia (1987), trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2002), 21 (see generally 3–25). As Deleuze and Guattari put it: “A rhizome cease-
lessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and
circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles” (ibid., 7).
15. Eco also points out that “the universe of semiosis [i.e., the flow of signs through
the mind] can be postulated in the format of a labyrinth” (Semiotics and the Philoso-
phy of Language, 2).
16. For an excellent analysis of the differences between the film Lady in the Lake
and the novel—and there are plenty of differences—see Stephen Pendo, Raymond
Chandler on Screen: His Novels into Film (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow, 1976), esp. 63–85.
17. In the science fiction neo-noir film I, Robot (Alex Proyas, 2004), the detective
(Will Smith) is repeatedly told to think of the story of “Hansel and Gretel” (to pick up
the string of clues).
18. Hirsch, too, recognizes in noir “the labyrinthine underground of urban crime
and of the criminal mentality” (Dark Side of the Screen, 67).
19. Eco, postscript to The Name of the Rose, 526.
20. For Christopher’s analysis of the maze in The Third Man, see Somewhere in the
Night, 71–75.
21. Robert Porfirio, “No Way Out: Existential Motifs in the Film Noir” (1976), in
Film Noir Reader, ed. Alain Silver and James Ursini (1996; New York: Limelight, 2003),
90.
22. The Third Man is an exception here, as I’ll soon point out: Calloway is a better
detective than Martins.
23. Edgar Allan Poe, “The Murders in the Rue Morgue,” in The Complete Tales
and Poems of Edgar Allan Poe (New York: Vintage/Random House, 1935), 144.
24. Of Conan Doyle’s debt to Poe, Nancy Harrowitz says: “Dupin, in solving this
his first crime, sets up a distinct methodology and philosophy of crime detection which
became famous and is still used today in crime fiction. In fact, most of the principles
of Dupin’s method were lifted outright by Conan Doyle and immortalized in his cre-
ation of Sherlock Holmes” (“The Body of the Detective Model: Charles S. Peirce and
Edgar Allan Poe,” in The Sign of Three: Dupin, Holmes, Peirce, ed. Umberto Eco and
Thomas Sebeok [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983], 193). See also A Study
in Scarlet, where Watson says to Holmes: “You remind me of Edgar Allan Poe’s Dupin.
I had no idea that such individuals did exist outside of stories” (CSH, 24).
25. As Hirsch so aptly puts it: “Usually reflective and commonsensical, the voice-
over narrator is our guide through the noir labyrinth” (Dark Side of the Screen, 75).
26. Thomas Sebeok and Jean Umiker-Sebeok write that, with regard to the sen-
tence “Simple deduction my dear Watson” (commonly attributed to Holmes), “Holmes
never uttered the words cited; nor did Holmes ever say, ‘Elementary, my dear Watson’”
(“‘You Know My Method’: A Juxtaposition of Charles S. Peirce and Sherlock Holmes,”
in Eco and Sebeok, The Sign of Three, 49 n. 7).
From Sherlock Holmes to the Hard-Boiled Detective 87
27. “I teach you the Overman. Man is something that shall be overcome” (Friedrich
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter
Kaufmann [New York: Penguin, 1954], 124).
28. An excellent study of the concepts of sadism and masochism (as well as their
use in literary voice) is found in Gilles Deleuze, Masochism, trans. Jean McNeil (New
York: Zone Books, 1991). Deleuze writes that sadism and masochism can be seen even
in “the differences in the literary techniques and in the art of Sade and Masoch” (134).
29. Raymond Borde and Étienne Chaumeton, A Panorama of American Film Noir
(1941–1953) (1955), trans. Paul Hammond (San Francisco: City Lights, 2002), xii.
30. Raymond Chandler, one of the fathers of the hard-boiled detective, lays bare
the character’s form in a letter: “His moral intellectual force is that he gets nothing but
his fee” (Chandler to James Sandoe, May 12, 1949, in The Raymond Chandler Papers:
Selected Letters and Nonfiction, 1909–1959, ed. Tom Hiney and Frank MacShane [New
York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2000], 114–15).
31. Poe, “The Murders in the Rue Morgue,” 143.
32. CSH, 636. It should be noted that the line “The game is afoot” first appears in
Shakespeare’s Henry V, act 3, scene 1. I am grateful to Richard White and Clarinda
Karpov for pointing this out to me.
33. CSH, 93.
34. Marcello Truzzi, “Sherlock Holmes: Applied Social Psychologist,” in Eco and
Sebeok, The Sign of Three, 69.
35. Peirce credits Aristotle, Prior Analytics, bk. 2, chap. 25. Of course, there are
problems with abduction, even as a form of logic. In fact, some versions of it commit
the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent. Nevertheless, according to Peirce, ab-
duction is the fundamental mode by which the mind works—and works very well,
especially when it comes to detective work.
36. I get this excellent example (which describes Peirce’s logic) from Truzzi,
“Sherlock Holmes,” 69. I’ve made only one small emendation to Truzzi’s account: he
has deduction proceeding from case to rule (just a minor typographical error in the
original text).
37. Peirce, who was (at least once) a practicing detective, used this method of
abduction to discover the thief of his watch. But, much more famously, he placed this
logic at the center of his great contribution to philosophy—really America’s main con-
tribution to philosophy—commonly called pragmatism.
38. Peirce, Collected Papers, vol. 5, p. 117, par. 189.
39. CSH, 89.
40. As Harrowitz puts it: “The parallels between Peirce’s abduction and the play
of musement and Poe’s ratiocination are clear” (“The Body of the Detective Model,”
193). On the musement-abduction relation in Peirce and Holmes, see Sebeok and
Umiker-Sebeok, “‘You Know My Method,’” esp. 26–27.
41. Charles S. Peirce, The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, vol. 2,
88 Jerold J. Abrams
1893–1913, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998),
439.
42. CSH, 943.
43. I am grateful to Mark Conard for pointing out this example to me in conversation.
44. Umberto Eco, “Horns, Hooves, Insteps,” in Eco and Sebeok, The Sign of Three,
211–12.
Film Noir and the Meaning of Life 89
Part 2
Existentialism and Nihilism in Film Noir
90 Steven M. Sanders
Film Noir and the Meaning of Life 91
91
Film Noir and the Meaning of Life
Steven M. Sanders
Film noir is a fabric woven out of many threads. Its various styles, themes,
motifs, and forms make it a complex and contested cultural phenomenon.
I suspect that many readers of this volume would agree that they know
film noir when they see it even though they cannot define the term film
noir per se. While doubts persist about definition,1 we can say with some
confidence that film noir raises important questions about life’s meaning.
My aim here is to examine some of these questions and, thus, to use film
noir to motivate philosophical thinking about the meaning of life.
A useful place to begin is with the observation by Robert Porfirio that
film noir sensibility is an “underlying mood of pessimism which under-
cuts any attempted happy endings” and “nothing less than an existential
attitude towards life.”2 Porfirio suggests the ease and plausibility with which
one might string a large number of film noir pearls on an existentialist
thread. But what is this existential attitude of which he speaks? If it is a
pessimistic way of looking at the world, how is it embodied in film noir,
and is such an attitude justified?
My discussion will begin with a pan and scan of noir themes. Then I will
create a kind of storyboard of film noir’s philosophical presuppositions with
sketches of meaningless existence, pessimism, the human condition, and free-
dom and fatalism. Next, I will provide three models of meaninglessness as
bases for understanding claims about life’s meaning. Finally, I will raise some
questions about the attitude we should take toward life as such.
Noir Themes
It will be helpful to describe those features that appear widely in film noir
even if such a characterization lacks the precision of a set of necessary and
sufficient conditions.
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Noir themes and moods include despair, paranoia, and nihilism; an
atmosphere of claustrophobic entrapment; a nightmarish sense of loneli-
ness and alienation; a purposelessness fostered in part by feelings of es-
trangement from one’s own past even as one seems driven to a compulsive
confrontation with that past. Film noir presents us with moral ambiguity,
shifting identities, and impending doom. Urban locales give noir films au-
thenticity, adding texture to their psychologically dense and convoluted
plots.3
To get down to cases, film noir is the corrupt detective Hank Quinlan
(Orson Welles) in Touch of Evil (Orson Welles, 1958) asking the brothel
owner Madame Tanya (Marlene Dietrich) to tell his fortune and being told:
“You haven’t got any . . . your future is all used up.” It is the gangster Johnny
Rico (James Darren) in The Brothers Rico (Phil Karlson, 1957) telling his
brother Eddie (Richard Conte): “Maybe I’m gonna die. You’ve got even
bigger problems—you’re gonna live.” It is the nightclub piano player Al
Roberts (Tom Neal) in Detour (Edgar G. Ulmer, 1945) saying: “That’s life.
Whichever way you turn, fate sticks out a foot to trip you.” It is the mob
lawyer Joe Morse (John Garfield) in Force of Evil (Abraham Polonsky, 1948)
admitting: “I wasn’t strong enough to resist corruption, but I was strong
enough to fight for a piece of it.” And we know that we are at the center of
the gathering forces of film noir’s psychological storm when the private
eye Jeff Bailey (Robert Mitchum), reflecting on his obsession with femme
fatale Kathie Moffat (Jane Greer) in Out of the Past (Jacques Tourneur,
1947), says: “I never saw her in the daytime. We seemed to live by night.
What was left of the day went away like a pack of cigarettes you smoked.”4
There is an “underlying mood of pessimism” in all this, to be sure.
When we think of the typical film noir outlook, we may think first of a
bewildering admixture of alienation, betrayal, desperation, and fear, un-
derscored by odd angles, chiaroscuro visuals, and voice-over narrations.
But it is not merely that these films play out dramas that undercut “any
attempted happy endings.” Nor is it simply a display of the vulnerable pri-
vate eye confronting danger, corruption, and murder. The typical film noir
protagonist, so often in the grip of desperate emotional needs and sexual
desire (as typified by encounters with the femme fatale), must act against a
backdrop of human duplicity and the threat of imminent death. There is
the hand of the past wrenching his life from its present moorings, which
may themselves already be unstable. Noir characters seem ever on the run
(sometimes literally, sometimes only from themselves), the most hapless
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of them caught in frames and webs and structures with no escape. Above
all, film noir depicts a world of characters trapped in circumstances that
they did not wholly create and from which they cannot break free, charac-
ters hopelessly isolated and all but immobilized in moral dilemmas whose
implications they must follow out, as it were, to the end of the night.
Philosophical Presuppositions
Despite the affinity of film noir with existentialist themes, it would be a
mistake to suppose that American film noir was directly influenced by the
work of existentialist philosophers. Although both Albert Camus and Jean-
Paul Sartre explored with great intensity in novels and plays those strains
in the human condition that give rise to questions of meaning and pur-
pose and how one should live, there is nothing like a direct connection
between these writers and noir filmmakers. But, if explicit connections to
philosophers are lacking in film noir, the same need not be said of the
philosophical ideas and attitudes that these films presuppose and without
which much of their cachet would be lost. Perhaps we can identify some
philosophically salient element that goes beyond noir’s inversion of the
American dream and that puts the noir in film noir. I want to suggest that
film noir presupposes something general that gives it its philosophical in-
terest: a metaphysical and moral atmosphere that is the basis of all its pro-
tagonists’ problems and anxieties rather than a specific anxiety or difficulty.
The thread running through the design of film noir is the sense that life is
meaningless per se, not that one life just happens to be going wrong for the
time being and in one particular respect. The philosophically most promi-
nent feature of film noir, then, is its portrayal of the problematic fabric of
life as such. In this respect, every noir film thrusts its protagonist into crisis
because of the very character of life itself.
MEANINGLESS EXISTENCE
In situating film noir in a context of anxiety about life’s meaning, we should
keep in mind that many of film noir’s most memorable protagonists are in
extremis: Frank Bigelow (Edmond O’Brien), an accountant dying from the
irreversible effects of poison, explains his “murder” to the police even as
(in flashback) he seeks to confront his killer (D.O.A., Rudolph Maté, 1950);
a corpse (William Holden), floating facedown in the swimming pool of a
famous former Hollywood silent picture star (Gloria Swanson), narrates
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the strange turn of events that has brought him to this fate (Sunset Boule-
vard, Billy Wilder, 1950); Jeff Bailey (Robert Mitchum), an ex–private de-
tective, spills his guts to his fiancée about his sordid past, only to wind up
recapitulating those very mistakes that bring him to the edge of a personal
abyss (Out of the Past); a former police detective (James Stewart) falls in
love with a woman he has been following at the behest of her husband,
loses her to (what he believes is) suicide, and spends his days transforming
another woman into the image of his lost love. “Judy, please, it can’t matter
to you,” Scottie Ferguson implores the shopgirl Judy Barton (Kim Novak)
as he supervises her complete makeover into the woman of his obsession
(Vertigo, Alfred Hitchcock, 1958).
It may seem odd to suggest that the preoccupations of the characters
portrayed by Edmond O’Brien, William Holden, Robert Mitchum, and
James Stewart—no-nonsense guys who give every indication that they know
who they are and what they are about—have anything to do with the mean-
ing of life. But this oddness can be traced to the widespread misconception
that questions of life’s meaning are transcendental concerns, that is, ques-
tions exclusively about otherworldly meaning, plans, or purposes, or that
they concern how our life plans are to be subsumed by, in the words of
Thomas Nagel, “a single controlling life scheme,” such as the greater glory
of God.5 Leaving aside the psychological appeal of such a meaning-conferring
structure, this orientation to questions of life’s meaning is remote from
film noir’s thematic background, where any conceivable otherworldly an-
swers to questions about how to live and what to do are ruled out.
PESSIMISTIC ARGUMENTS
Philosophers have raised a variety of considerations to support pessimistic
conclusions about the meaning of life. Let us look at a few of the most
influential ones.
The notion meaning can be understood in more than one way. In fact,
philosophers have discussed the meaning of life by concerning themselves
less with the “positive” concept of meaning than with those general fea-
tures of human existence that contribute to lack or loss of meaning. This
approach reaches the peak of its perfection in the pessimistic writings of
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), who mounted a devastating campaign
against the Enlightenment ideals of human progress, happiness, and per-
fectibility. “The vanity of existence,” he writes, “is revealed in the whole
form existence assumes . . . in the contingency and relativity of all things;
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in continual becoming without being; in continual desire without satisfac-
tion; in the continual frustration of striving of which life consists.”6 Here,
Schopenhauer cites those very features of the human condition that pessi-
mism takes as its point of departure.
Given the transitory nature of all things, the perishability through death
of all our achievements, “nothing at all is worth our striving.” As we saw
Schopenhauer arguing above, life is by its very nature impermanent and
transitory, contingent and relative, consisting of continual desire without
satisfaction, striving without fulfillment. Moreover, Schopenhauer presents
a “moral” critique, one that fastens on the vanity of human wishes, on the
spectacle of human folly and wickedness, on the unceasing struggle against
boredom, and, more ominously, on the ill will, malice, and cruelty of other
people, whom Schopenhauer likens to a “den of sharks and swindlers.”7
Insofar as Schopenhauer’s pessimism is put forward as being in some
sense justified and not merely the expression of a mood or feeling, it is
appropriate to seek reasons for such conclusions. Some of his reasons de-
rive from his metaphysical system and are unconvincing without it. Oth-
ers, such as his claim that “that which in a moment ceases to exist [i.e., the
present], which vanishes as completely as in a dream, cannot be worth any
serious effort,” are value judgments with which reasonable people may
disagree.8 Still others are highly general empirical observations, as with his
reflections on the essential aimlessness of life, one random event following
another for no apparent purpose and ending in death. Pessimists frequently
invoke the fact of death to convey the idea that all life is pointless activity
coming to nothing. Our successes and achievements, such as they are, do
not remove the meaninglessness from our lives because our successes are
transitory and fade, our achievements are themselves impermanent and
do not last. Think of the ways in which people put countless years of effort
into their loves, friendships, and family lives, their education, jobs, and
careers—and for what? All of it is a Sisyphean effort leading nowhere and
ending in death. Of course, one may have some good effect on the lives of
others one cares about, but that serves only to illustrate the pointlessness
of it all, for they too will die.
Several types of reply can be made to arguments such as these. A tradi-
tional religious response, with its promise of an afterlife and heavenly re-
ward, may satisfy some, but it does not have universal appeal and raises
significant problems of its own. In any event, as I have already indicated, it
is not the way of noir. Others, such as Thomas Nagel, have argued that, if
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nothing we do now will matter in a million years, then by the same token
nothing that will be the case in a million years matters now.9 It simply does
not matter now that in a million years nothing that we do now will matter:
how could not mattering in a million years prevent composing a piece of
beautiful music from mattering now? Furthermore, it does not appear that
one needs some additional justification for keeping up one’s health, read-
ing a novel one enjoys, or pursuing a satisfying career. No comprehensive
plan or purpose that ties up all our everyday activities into a neat package
is necessary to give them meaning.
THE HUMAN CONDITION
The fact, however, that the standard pessimistic arguments fail to establish
the meaninglessness of life may not dispel the sense of doom that makes
film noir noir. To explain this, I must turn first to accounts of the human
condition and then to the conflict between freedom and fatalism.
Almost without exception, film noir drama is enacted against a secular
backdrop; noir characters are typically depicted as living in a godless world.
Belief in God and an afterlife are seldom part of the noir protagonist’s
backstory, and religion is rarely, if ever, invoked as providing solace for or
solutions to the problems he or she must face. Film noir’s moral universe is
filled with psychologically flawed characters: there is a penchant for shy-
ster lawyers, bought-and-paid-for politicians, cops on the take, down-at-
the-heels private detectives, businessmen on the skids, prison escapees,
ex-cons, psycho killers, party girls, drifters, opportunists, victims, and any
number of ethically compromised antiheroes.
The implicit link between narrative strategies employed in film noir
(with its extensive use of voice-over, flashbacks, dream sequences, and other
experimental narrative devices) and the human condition that it depicts is
no coincidence. A way of seeing the world becomes a feature of the world:
film noir makes the defamiliarization of life the fabric of life itself. Thus, as
countless instances have memorably illustrated, what emerges from even a
remote acquaintance with film noir is a depiction of the human condition
in which scenes may begin realistically but quickly veer into surrealism or
the absurd, especially when people are shown at the edge of their own
desperation. Characters in film noir have a tendency to be dependent on
others (think of the greed that binds Brigid O’Shaughnessy, Kasper Gutman,
and Joel Cairo in The Maltese Falcon [John Huston, 1941]), to be vulner-
able to their whims and irrationalities as well as their charms (as the insur-
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ance salesman Walter Neff is to the murderous Phyllis Dietrichson in Double
Indemnity [Billy Wilder, 1944]), or to be in competition with them (the
magazine editor George Stroud vs. the publishing magnate Earl Janoth in
The Big Clock [John Farrow, 1948], the Mexican narcotics investigator
“Mike” Vargas vs. the corrupt police chief Hank Quinlan in Touch of Evil)—
so much so that they are hostage to the malevolence of those whose ill will,
while perhaps not inevitable, is almost certainly forthcoming. (“It’s what
people want and how hard they try to get it,” the Van Heflin character says
as he tries to explain the corruption, misery, and suffering he has witnessed,
and, by the end of The Strange Love of Martha Ivers [Lewis Milestone, 1946],
he has witnessed plenty.)
FREEDOM AND FATALISM
A major challenge to any attempt to interpret film noir along strict existen-
tialist lines can be summarized in one word: fatalism. While existentialism’s
emphasis is on each person’s freedom to create his or her own values, film
noir offers us a compelling look at the sources of constraint on human choice,
with particular emphasis on the fatalistic reach of the past. In this fatalism
toward life, film noir makes its most dramatic departure from existentialism.
The existentialists sought liberation from the gray determinism of their time
through highly individualized styles of thought and action in which existen-
tial choice was the ultimate redemptive act. As Jean-Paul Sartre writes in
Being and Nothingness: “For human reality, to be is to choose oneself.”10
The idea that one often has to choose what to do, and is able to do so,
is uncontroversial. However, the existentialist doctrine that our every act is
freedom affirming and a choice of ourselves is, clearly, not uncontroversial.11
It is, rather, a highly debatable assertion, one that some philosophers have
taken pains to reject because the role of autonomy within the ambit of a
person’s motivational structure is far from obvious. “It is by no means clear,”
writes Frederick A. Olafson in his study of existentialism and ethics, “that
we can choose to love or to trust another human being,” although we can
choose to do the things that are the natural expressions of love and trust.12
Nor is it so very obvious that we can freely choose to prefer pleasure to
pain or, in general, to choose to experience the world as having both spatial
and temporal structure.13 These appear to be givens, not matters of choice at
all. It seems fair to say that there are greater limitations on the things a per-
son can decide or choose to do than the existentialist view acknowledges.
And now we are in a position to see that existentialist freedom is noth-
98 Steven M. Sanders
ing less than the pulled thread in film noir’s Freudian fabric, which treats
the far-reaching effects of the past (The Dark Past, Rudolph Maté, 1948),
psychosexual dislocation (Vertigo), and psychopathology in general (Un-
dercurrent, Vincente Minnelli, 1946) in ways very different from, if not,
indeed, inconsistent with, existentialism’s emphasis on free choice. How
can one’s criminality, for instance, be the result of free and conscious choice
if, at the same time, one is a product of, in the words of Spencer Selby, “the
deterministic tyranny of that past” over which one had no control?14 It is
precisely for this reason that film noir exploits the voice-over, confessional
flashback: the technique provides the kind of narrative closure that mir-
rors film noir’s inherent fatalism. The viewer thus knows the ending to
come in these films because the future is prefigured in the past.15
Three Models of Meaninglessness
Different conceptions of meaninglessness provide models by which we can
enhance our understanding of the concept. Philosophers have elaborated
at least three such models: worthlessness, purposelessness, and absurdity.
WORTHLESSNESS
The first model, worthlessness, is suggested by Kurt Baier, who maintains
that, by using the criteria of unhappiness, pain, and suffering, we can com-
pare the life of this person and that and judge which is more or less worth-
while, which has a greater balance of suffering over bliss. The standard for
judging lives is “the average of the kind,” a comparatively worthless life
being one that falls far below the average of its kind with respect to the
balance of happiness over unhappiness, pleasure over pain, and bliss over
suffering: “When we ask whether a given life was or was not worthwhile,
then we must take into consideration the range of worthwhileness which
ordinary lives normally cover. Our end poles of the scale must be the best
possible and worst possible life that one finds. A good and worthwhile life
is one that is well above average. A bad one is one well below.”16
Baier is obviously thinking of such judgments as falling on a continuum:
on the scale of worthwhileness, approximately half of us live lives that are
above the average, half below the average. (As a matter of logic, we cannot
all be above average, any more than we can all be below average.) On this
model, meaninglessness is not all or nothing but, rather, more or less, and
meaninglessness might well be mitigated by doing things to increase one’s
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balance of happiness, pleasure, and bliss over unhappiness, pain, and suf-
fering, as characters in film noir often try to do through a variety of (mostly
illegal) schemes. “I can see you’re a man who likes his pleasures,” the cab-
driver Franz says in The Asphalt Jungle (John Huston, 1950) to the fleeing
ex-con Doc Riedenschneider, who has masterminded an elaborate rob-
bery and hopes to escape to Mexico to live the good life. “Well, Franz,” Doc
replies, “what else is there in life, I ask you?” Of course, noir being noir,
everything comes unhinged for Doc and his accomplices, who are either
caught or killed in the end.
PURPOSELESSNESS
The second model, purposelessness, is also suggested by Baier, who distin-
guishes between two senses of purpose, one that applies normally to per-
sons, one that applies normally to things. On the one hand, we can think of
the many things a person can do, “such as buying and selling, hiring
labourers, ploughing, felling trees, and the like,” that “it is foolish, point-
less, silly, perhaps crazy, to do if one has no purpose in doing them”: “Lives
crammed full with such activities devoid of purpose are pointless. . . . Such
lives may indeed be dismissed as meaningless.” On the other hand, there is
the sense in which having or lacking a purpose is attributed to things, such
as a row of trees or a pile of rocks. Such things may have (or not have) a
purpose depending on whether they have (or have not) been put to use by
those who have purposes of their own, in the first sense of purpose: “A row
of trees growing near a farm may or may not have a purpose: it may or may
not be a windbreak, may or may not have been planted or deliberately left
standing there in order to prevent the wind from sweeping across the fields.
We do not in any case disparage the trees if we say they have no purpose,
but have just grown that way. They are as beautiful, made of as good wood,
as valuable, as if they had a purpose.”17
Lacking a purpose, in the second sense of the term, means (according
to both Baier and the existentialists) that no purpose has been allotted to
us by anyone—and especially not by a supreme being to whom we uniquely
owe love, veneration, and obedience. Having no purpose, goal, or destiny
in this sense shows only that, if life is to have meaning, that meaning will
not be imposed on us by any external agency. If (the) meaninglessness (of
life) is a matter of pointlessness or a lack of purpose in the latter sense, that
does not imply meaninglessness in the former sense: one’s life can have
meaning in the sense that one might have a purpose (or many purposes) in
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one’s life even if one’s life (as a whole or in part) does not serve anyone
else’s purpose. Of course, even self-imposed purposes are no guarantee of
meaningfulness. Something of the idea of such activity to no apparent point
or result is suggested by the quest for the Maltese Falcon, “the stuff dreams
are made of.” For, while Kasper Gutman and Joel Cairo have their pur-
poses in seeking the statuette, their efforts come to nothing in the end.
ABSURDITY
The third model, absurdity, recalls the reflections of Albert Camus on the
failure of the universe to fulfill our expectations and needs and Thomas
Nagel’s idea of “the collision between the seriousness with which we take
our lives and the perpetual possibility of regarding everything about which
we are serious as arbitrary, or open to doubt.” According to Nagel, the
absurdity of the human condition consists in just this incongruity between
the seriousness with which we view ourselves and the “longer view” from
which we are as nothing, grains of sand on an infinitely vast desert, in-
stants on an incomprehensible cosmic clock: “Reference to our small size
and short lifespan and to the fact that all of mankind will eventually perish
without a trace are metaphors for the backward step which permits us to
regard ourselves from without and to find the particular form of our lives
curious and slightly surprising.” What, then, does Nagel recommend? Nei-
ther anger, nor resentment, nor escape, nor scorn, but an ironic acceptance
of the absurdity that “is one of the most human things about us”: “If a
sense of the absurd is a way of perceiving our true situation . . . then what
reason can we have to resent or escape it? . . . We can approach our absurd
lives with irony instead of heroism or despair.”18
According to Joel Feinberg, “irony is on balance an appreciative atti-
tude. One appreciates the perceived incongruity much as one does in hu-
mor, where the sudden unexpected perception of incongruity produces
laughter.”19 Although neither Nagel nor Feinberg discusses film noir, it is
easy to see how their accounts might help explain its humor and accessibil-
ity to parody.20 It certainly seems at times that film noir protagonists are
supreme ironists—serious and playful simultaneously, each of these ele-
ments exerting sufficient influence to sustain the psychological equilib-
rium needed to carry out the actions they have to take. Both Bogart and
Mitchum (in character) wisecrack throughout their noir films. And they
are not alone. Consider the fast-paced repartee of Glenn Ford and Gloria
Grahame: “What’s your problem—you don’t like lobster?” “When I take a
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bite of my dinner, I don’t expect my dinner to bite back.” Or the spot-on
cynicism of Clair Trevor to her philandering husband George Montgom-
ery: “A civilized woman does not merely file for divorce, she gets even.” Or
the irreverent one-liners of the hit man Richard Widmark, who does “busi-
ness” by day and reads Dickens at night: “It was the best of crimes, it was
the worst of crimes.”21 The phenomenon of intentional humor in noir dia-
logue suggests the possibility of conceiving the noir protagonist-as-ironist
as harboring a nonstandard but noteworthy attitude toward life.
Attitudes toward the Human Condition
Now it is time to pull together the various points I have made about exis-
tentialism and film noir and apply them to the question of the proper atti-
tude to take toward life.
Existentialist philosophers have written as though the absurdity of the
human condition provides grounds for various negative attitudes—pessi-
mism, despair, defiance, and so on. Albert Camus writes that “there is no
fate that cannot be surmounted by scorn,” and Jean-Paul Sartre assures us
that a life lived authentically must repudiate the “spirit of seriousness” that
takes values to be “transcendent givens independent of human subjectiv-
ity.”22 Other philosophers have denied that such negative reactive attitudes
are appropriate and recommend irony even as they have accepted the data
on which existentialist claims about the absurdity of life are based. One
might even recommend indifference toward meaningless life on the rea-
sonable grounds that, if nothing matters, the fact that life is meaningless
doesn’t matter either. The assumption behind all these recommendations
seems to be that there is one proper attitude to take toward life’s meaning-
lessness. But is there a single attitude to take toward all of life? Is irony (or
resignation, or defiance, or any of the other candidates) always the attitude
one should take toward the human condition? Surely it is possible that
there simply isn’t in general one and only one attitude everyone should
take toward all of life.
Film noir’s attitudinal vector is much in evidence in the titles of the
very films we have been talking about. Life is a Dark Passage, a Detour, a
Journey into Fear with No Escape and No Way Out. Film noir characters
Walk Alone; they Walk by Night through The Naked City, through The As-
phalt Jungle, down A Street with No Name. They Live by Night, they Clash
by Night, they are sometimes Caught, sometimes Possessed, often Spellbound,
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but they are always On Dangerous Ground, always Where Danger Lives, their
Desperate Hours ticking down in a deadly throw of the dice with the Odds
against Tomorrow. On this view, life constitutes a catastrophe that we must
escape, if only we could—but we cannot.
I want to conclude by proposing an alternative way to look at life.
No outlook on life will be adequate without acknowledging that a
meaningful life is not an all-or-nothing matter but one of degree. Some
lives are more meaningful than others, and some stretches of an individual’s
life are more meaningful than others. Some lives are meaningful in view of
being lived under the guidance of a single, dominant end, and others are
meaningful even though they have been plotted out along multifarious
lines in accordance with a diversity of ends or goals. On this view, there is
no reason to insist that there is only one way a life can be meaningful, only
one plan or purpose sufficiently enriching to justify the judgment that one
is leading (or has led) a meaningful life. But does it follow that a person
who declares that his or her life has meaning cannot be mistaken?
Paul Edwards comes very close to defending such a position: “The ques-
tion ‘As long as his life was dedicated to the spread of communism it had
meaning to him, but was it really meaningful?’ seems to be senseless. We
are inclined to say, ‘If his life had meaning to him, then it had meaning—
that’s all there is to it.’”23 Here, one should perhaps distinguish between
two senses of meaningfulness. According to the first (“partial”) sense, to
say that a person’s life is meaningful is to say that he or she has certain
projects that matter to him or her and that these projects are realizable.
According to the second (“full”) sense, to say a person’s life is meaningful
is to say that the projects that matter to him or her are both realizable and
have positive value. It is in this full sense, I suggest, that we would not say
that a person had found the meaning of his or her life (to say nothing of
the meaning of life generally) unless we were prepared in some sense to
endorse that way of life.
I concede that my reluctance to call a life rich in diabolical designs a
fully meaningful one may well reflect a linguistic blind spot, not to men-
tion a failure of moral imagination. Conceding this, however, does not mean
conceding that, in our judgments of the meaning of life, anything goes.
Judging that life is meaningful (or meaningless) involves an evaluation based
on certain criteria. (In order to specify these criteria, I would have to put
forward a theory of value, a task impossible to undertake here.) While our
criteria for a meaningful life may be context dependent and open to revi-
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sion, it would be a mistake to hold that a meaningful life just is the life that
a person has chosen and that he or she insists is meaningful. The problem
with such a position is that it has the bizarre consequence that a person
necessarily must be living a meaningful life (as long as he says he is) even if
it involves nothing more than sitting in a room clasping and unclasping his
hands. Here, as elsewhere, with no criterion except that of “I say so” or “it
seems to me it is,” the possibility of any assessment of our lives in this
dimension at all is removed.
“On the far side of despair, life begins,” Orestes famously intones at
the end of Sartre’s The Flies, while Camus has Caligula declare: “Men die,
and they are not happy.”24 Film noir grasps these partial truths about life
and conveys them dramatically, exposing us to paradigms of human expe-
rience that are expressly dark and laden with conflict. Of course, filmmak-
ers must portray the world as their artistic visions dictate, and we should
not be surprised to find that the characters who inhabit such a one-sided
universe are uniformly grim in their attitudes toward it. But, to the extent
that film noir makes the fates of the doomed Frank Bigelow, the damaged
Jeff Bailey, and the obsessed Scottie Ferguson metaphors for the human
condition, it runs the risk of affirming that our projects are unrealizable,
that our lives must be meaningless. A more balanced view seems in order,
one that fits better with the fact that we are not in the position of the hap-
less Frank Bigelows or Jeff Baileys or Scottie Fergusons but rather in the
position of those for whom many things matter and who must, somehow,
make the best of the conditions in which they find themselves.
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The Horizon of Disenchantment
Film Noir, Camus, and the Vicissitudes of Descent
Alan Woolfolk
I don’t blame myself—you see, Mr. Gittes, most people never have to face
the fact [that at] the right time and the right place they are capable of
anything.
—Noah Cross to Jake Gittes, Chinatown
“Everything is permitted,” exclaims Ivan Karamazov. That, too, smacks of
the absurd. But on condition that it not be taken in the vulgar sense. . . . The
absurd does not liberate; it binds. It does not authorize all actions. “Ev-
erything is permitted” does not mean that nothing is forbidden.
—Albert Camus
Film noir may be understood as a cinematic form that, even more than
standard film genres (e.g., melodramas, musicals, westerns), defies exact
definition, not only because it is transgeneric in origin and to a consider-
able extent derivative of other genres, but also because it picked up certain
subversive cultural motifs of a rapidly changing late industrial society and
equivocally reshaped them in a way that, at best, challenged widespread
assumptions about material and moral progress and, at worst, merely con-
firmed the most devastating illusions of a culture vacillating, as Philip Rieff
once wrote, “between dead purposes and deadly devices to escape bore-
dom.”1 The desolate urban landscapes of classic film noir complemented a
societal backdrop of dead and corrupt purposes, ranging from middle-
class conformity and faceless bureaucracies to corruption at the top among
social and political elites. Likewise, the “deadly devices” of guns and vio-
lence, alcohol and drugs, cars and speed, and especially the erotic machi-
nations of femmes fatales, which were featured in the foreground of such
films, were both symptoms of these dead and corrupt purposes and com-
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pelling in their sheer immediacy. But the central drama of film noir, even
into the postindustrial age, or perhaps in the hindsight of our time, has
continued to be the struggle of the protagonist to achieve in some way
mastery of an ethically irrational universe, what Max Weber called a disen-
chanted world, rather than to succumb to it.2 Or, alternatively, the entire
history of film noir might be tentatively sketched in terms of the tenuous
resistances of protagonists to their fatal attractions, beginning with the su-
perficial but successful dandyism of Sam Spade in John Huston’s proto-
noir The Maltese Falcon (1941) and ending with (take your pick) Scottie
Ferguson’s devastating failure to secure a self-identity in Alfred Hitchcock’s
Vertigo (1958), the defeated dandyism of Jake Gittes in Roman Polanski’s
neo-noir masterpiece Chinatown (1974), or the complete surrender to psy-
chopathology of Nick Curran in Paul Verhoeven’s Basic Instinct (1992).3
The mark of the noir protagonist during the classic period of these
films, 1941–58, was neither moral victory nor moral defeat so much as a
personal struggle to define and maintain a coherent self-identity in the
face of a gnostic world of overwhelming darkness and distant light.4 Self-
mastery within a disenchanted world inevitably required a spiritual de-
scent into the darkness of society and the human soul, with the protagonist,
in many instances, simply attempting to control the terms of the descent
and, at other times, putting up all manner of resistances. The distinction
between control and resistance is important and, perhaps, most starkly
illustrated by contrasting Marlow in Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness
(1902) with Captain Willard in Francis Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now
(1979), which was, of course, a cinematic adaptation of what James
Naremore refers to as “the urtext of British modernism.”5 In Conrad’s semi-
nal text, the narrator, Captain Marlow, recollects with exquisite modesty
his spiritual journey toward Kurtz’s heart of darkness and his character-
defining moment of resistance to that darkness; in Coppola’s film, the nar-
rator, Captain Willard, is a professional assassin who recounts his murderous
journey toward and ritual elimination of Colonel Kurtz in order to be-
come his successor. Where Marlow triumphs by resisting the transgressive
possibilities of Kurtz’s disenchanted world, a world in which literally any-
thing can be made to happen—mass killings, torture, cannibalism—the
appropriately named Willard triumphs by embracing and making them
his own, resulting in an undisguised triumph of the will.
The noir worldview denies to the protagonist the realization of either
a transformative moment of resistance to its darkness or a triumph of the
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will to power. Film noir’s dark vision does not permit the possibility of an
unequivocal character-defining moment of denial because it is set in a world
so disenchanted that no ethic of resistance can hold. No compelling sym-
bol system of militant ideals defines the cultural horizon. No vocation or
social practice ensures the discipline of character formation. (Obviously,
the self-interested efforts of the typical private detective are but a shabby
substitute for the work ethic of Conrad’s beloved merchant marine.) The
most that one may expect is the ambivalent effort of Bart Tare in Joseph
Lewis’s Gun Crazy (1950) not to kill or the self-destructive call of Jeff Bailey
to the police at the end of Jacques Tourneur’s Out of the Past (1947) in a
last desperate effort to stop the lethal Kathie Moffat.6
Yet the noir protagonist also proves incapable of anything approach-
ing a triumph of the will. Unable to make Marlow’s ascent, the protagonist
is also typically unable to consummate Willard’s descent into an indiffer-
ent and hostile world because of some residual attachment to a world not
yet completely disenchanted. Trapped, or at least severely constrained, by
social and personal circumstances, he typically moves more deeply into an
ethically unintelligible universe in which accident, caprice, and misjudg-
ment rule and anything is possible, only to discover (again, typically) that
a female antagonist has descended more quickly and more adeptly ahead
of him—accepting and then betraying his love (e.g., The Killers [Robert
Siodmak, 1946], Criss Cross [Robert Siodmak, 1949]), revealing herself to
be ruthless and cold-blooded (e.g., Detour [Edgar G. Ulmer, 1945], Kiss Me
Deadly [Robert Aldrich, 1955]), or simply proving that she is more experi-
enced in the ways of a world in which anything is possible (e.g., Vertigo,
Chinatown). In the end, the classic noir protagonist can neither escape nor
embrace the not-so-benign indifference of the universe.7
The Horizon of Disenchantment
As the philosopher Charles Taylor has explained with considerable insight,
our lives unfold and take on meaning against preexisting cultural horizons
that are beyond the individual’s choice and that can be suppressed or de-
nied only in self-defeating moves, moves that have become all too preva-
lent in a “subjectivist civilization” that emphasizes individualist conceptions
of the self. Such inescapable frameworks normally define a cultural back-
ground of human intelligibility that makes “qualitative distinctions” be-
tween the high and the low, the good and the bad, the dignified and the
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undignified: “To think, feel, judge, within such a framework is to function
with the sense that some action, or mode of life, or mode of feeling is in-
comparably ‘higher’ than others which are more readily available to us.”
These frameworks have always defined human lives, even when the frame-
works have undergone transformations, are challenged, or have grown in-
creasingly unintelligible, as they have in modernity and, especially, the
twentieth century. “What Weber called ‘disenchantment,’ the dissipation
of our sense of the cosmos as a meaningful order,” Taylor argues, “has
allegedly destroyed the horizons in which people previously lived their spiri-
tual lives.” But, he maintains, the very lack of a preexisting, unchallenge-
able framework has created a new and very different type of spiritual agenda,
one with its own spiritual obstacles and risks that cannot be denied.8
Taylor contends that our cultural horizons, our spiritual frameworks,
have become “problematic” in the modern world, that the “existential pre-
dicament” on our “spiritual agenda” is no longer one in which “an unchal-
lengeable framework makes imperious demands which we fear being unable
to meet.” Rather: “The form of danger . . . which threatens the modern
seeker . . . is something close to the opposite: the world loses altogether its
spiritual contour, nothing is worth doing, the fear is of a terrifying empti-
ness, a kind of vertigo, or even a fracturing of our world and body-space.”
However, the very fact that we no longer have an established background
of intelligibility has itself been taken up as the basis of a new kind of frame-
work, one in which the model of higher life “consists precisely in facing a
disenchanted universe with courage and lucidity.” Within this disenchanted
horizon, dignity comes from the “ability to stand unconsoled and uncowed
in [the] face of the indifferent immensity of the world” and to find purpose
in confronting it.9 Weber himself clearly belonged within this spiritual frame-
work, as did Nietzsche, as did Camus, as have so many of the intellectual and
spiritual guides who helped define the inner life of the twentieth century.
Although film noir is clearly set within this horizon of disenchantment,
it is much more doubtful that the noir protagonist discovers dignity and
purpose in confronting “the indifferent immensity of the world.” Aside from
the fact that he is not an intellectual but more narrowly focused on immedi-
ate problems, what accounts for such discrepant responses? What explains, if
anything, the more vulnerable and tenuous stance of the fully developed
noir protagonist—ranging from Walter Neff in Double Indemnity (Billy
Wilder, 1944) through Scottie Ferguson in Vertigo during the classic noir
period—let alone the extended period of neo-noir? In addition to the fact
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that the horizon of disenchantment is generally unrelenting and hostile to
human purposes in film noir, what sets the noir protagonist apart? Here, the
work of the French existentialist Albert Camus offers some insights.10
Camus is helpful because he was a leading French literary figure and
exemplar of high culture who was directly influenced by the hard-boiled
American fiction of the twenties and thirties, which figured so prominently
in film noir.11 This influence is most evident in Camus’ early short novel
The Stranger (L’Etranger, 1942), originally titled The Indifferent, in which
an ordinary, unreflective protagonist, Meursault, who is completely un-
aware of his existence, inadvertently commits a motiveless killing for which
he is, in turn, tried and sentenced to death largely because he refuses to
play the socially acceptable role of a repentant criminal. On the one hand,
Meursault resembles many noir protagonists in the spareness of his inner
and outer life. (He is certainly no self-conscious existential intellectual like
Roquentin in Sartre’s Nausea [1938], who is disgusted with his own exist-
ence.) On the other hand, despite the terse, taciturn style of the novel and
the fatal entrapment of the protagonist by a series of circumstances and
apparent accidents, The Stranger lacks the dark gnosticism and grim fatal-
ism of the noir worldview (evident in some of Camus’ other early works,
such as the plays Caligula [1938] and The Misunderstanding [1944])—be-
cause Camus, in effect, qualified the horizon of disenchantment.
The Limits of Honesty
In The Stranger, Camus attempted to counter the horizon of disenchant-
ment with an ethic of honesty. As he wrote in a 1955 preface, Meursault is
“condemned because he does not play the game . . . he refuses to lie.”12
Indeed, Camus even went so far as to incorporate a vignette about The
Misunderstanding into The Stranger from which Meursault draws the simple
conclusion that one “should never play games,” even though this conclu-
sion elides the dark vision of the original play.13 But Camus was able to
employ his ethic of honesty in criticism of bourgeois society only because
that ethic was safely grounded in a neo-Romantic conception of nature as
moral source, drawn primarily from Rousseau.14
In the closing scene of the novel, Meursault exemplifies a sort of popu-
larized version of Nietzsche’s eternal return, in which he consciously af-
firms his life of self-love (i.e, amour de soi) against the vanity and pride
(i.e., amour-propre) of the conventional bourgeois society with which he
112 Alan Woolfolk
has come into conflict. As a consequence, he becomes defiant rather than
resigned, his self-identity solidified rather than subverted and defeated. In
stark contrast to the noir protagonist, who cannot escape the past, Meursault
is spiritually reborn, and time itself is redeemed:
And I felt ready to live it all again too. As if that blind rage had
washed me clean, rid me of hope; for the first time, in that night
alive with signs and stars, I opened myself to the benign indiffer-
ence of the universe. Finding it so much like myself—so like a
brother, really—I felt that I had been happy and that I was happy
again. For everything to be consummated, for me to feel less alone,
I had only to wish that there be a large crowd of spectators the day
of my execution and that they greet me with cries of hate.15
Whether or not one finds Camus’ vision of self-transformation com-
pelling, it is significant that the false and hypocritical vanity of the bour-
geois society that sends Meursault to his death is linked with the modern
city and the denial of nature. Indeed, time and again in Camus’ work, the
spiritual defeats of modernity are associated with those who turn their
backs on the beauty of nature and the natural world, whether out of middle-
class habit and routine or because of the intellectual overlays of civiliza-
tion.16 While the natural indifference of the universe is simply “benign,”
the horizon of disenchantment is darkened by civilization itself. Where
Camus suggests that there are safeguards built into human nature, ensur-
ing that human beings possess a limited power of agency and freedom to
create their own world, if only they can manage to rebel against the false-
hoods of civilization, the noir worldview suggests that deception and false-
hood may be built into the aspirations of human existence itself. Both
perspectives raise unanswered questions, but it is Camus’ that may, in fact,
pose the greater difficulties.
In the noir vision, an uncorrupted world of nature is almost completely
absent, finding no intersection with society. Or the idyllic becomes associ-
ated with a hopeless retreat into childhood memories, as in the cases of
Dix Handley in The Asphalt Jungle (John Huston, 1950) and Bart Tare in
Gun Crazy. Nonetheless, in Out of the Past, duplicity and falsehood extend
into the idyllic natural community itself. In the closing scenes of the film,
the deaf-mute Jimmy falsely confirms to Jeff Bailey’s love, Ann, that Jeff
had decided to leave with the femme fatale Kathie just prior to their deaths
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so that Ann may, unlike the noir protagonist, leave the past behind. Jimmy’s
final gestures of loyalty to Jeff may represent, as R. Barton Palmer argues,
“the world of melodrama” reasserting “its control.”17 But they are also a
repetition of Marlow’s “saving lie” of civilization, which he tells to Kurtz’s
fiancée at the close of Heart of Darkness, albeit with an unusual twist: where
Marlow falsely confirms Kurtz’s devotion to his beloved on his deathbed,
Jimmy suppresses the truth about Jeff ’s love for Ann. In the noir version of
the lie of civilization, the higher motives of the protagonist are repressed in
the memory of community so that its members can get on with their lives.
In both versions of the lie, however, civilization cannot withstand too much
honesty, especially when it concerns the contradictions and confusions of
the self. Hypocrisy and deception are sometimes necessary. For, without
Camus’ myth of a Rousseauian natural man or some other limiting fic-
tion,18 an ethic of honesty too easily leads to disturbing personal revela-
tions of the sort that are barely suppressed in films such as The Glass Key
(Stuart Heisler, 1942) and Kiss Me Deadly and later explode to the surface
in films such as Vertigo and Chinatown.
Resisting “the Cult of Multiplied Sensation”
As a loosely defined genre, what came to be called classic film noir drew on
the long-standing conflict between what Matei Calinescu has called “two
distinct and bitterly conflicting modernities,” a conflict that has been largely
resolved with the rise of a postmodern, therapeutic culture. On the one
side, modernity was conceived as a moral and political project grounded
in a doctrine of progress, scientific and technological advancement, and
capitalist economics and centered on the bourgeoisie, especially the mo-
rality of the bourgeois family. On the other side, an oppositional aesthetic
or cultural modernity arose out of the Romantic movement that was “in-
clined toward radical antibourgeois attitudes,” a modernity that led to the
rise, not only of modernism, but also eventually of the political and artistic
avant-gardes.19 Originally, film noir drew on the modernist heritage of aes-
thetic modernity, exploiting its critique of bourgeois modernity at a time
when the tension between conventional modernity and modernism, bour-
geois and bohemian, was growing to a close. Indeed, as Naremore has ar-
gued, the “blood melodrama” of noir films reveals the affinity between
these films and modernism as well as the close ties between this variety of
cinematic modernism and commercial culture.20
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By the term blood melodrama, Naremore means the influence of the
European art cinema on American directors and genres, specifically the
films of those Weimar Germans who specialized in “gothic horror, crimi-
nal psychology, and sinister conspiracies”; French films about “working-
class crime”; and English films by Hitchcock on international intrigue.
“What united the three types of cinematic modernism,” according to
Naremore, “was an interest in popular stories about violence and sexual
love, or in what Graham Greene once called ‘blood melodrama.’” How-
ever, Naremore also contends that the influence of blood melodrama may
be seen in the literature of Anglo-American high culture (e.g., Joseph
Conrad, Henry James) as well as in the rise of a “countertradition” to the conven-
tional detective story that built on the rapid rise of American working-class
pulp fiction during the twenties and the growth of novels about crime in the
late twenties and thirties that appealed to the middle class. This “second-
generation modernism,” according to Naremore, “interacted” with the mass
culture and, eventually, influenced the Hollywood cinema.21 But the na-
ture of this interaction needs further clarification.
Palmer similarly contends that Hollywood gradually became receptive
to producing full-blown film noir because the middle class began to accept
male, working-class pulp fiction during the thirties, but he also argues that
this shift in American popular culture, however important, was in itself
not enough. In addition to the expanding readership, one must also point
to the increasing hopelessness and fatality of the noir worldview. “In the
1940s,” Palmer observes, “the hard-boiled world became a grimmer place
where omnipresent evil and oppressive fatality reduce individual action to
insignificance.” From being romantic individualists who lived and survived
by their own code (e.g., Dashiell Hammett’s The Maltese Falcon [1930]),
the protagonists became rebels “doomed by their own natures and the fa-
tal force of circumstance” (e.g., James M. Cain’s Double Indemnity [1944],
Cornell Woolrich’s The Black Angel [1943]) who attracted a broader read-
ership. “These two changes together,” Palmer concludes, “account for the
advent of film noir and determine many of the phenomenon’s essential
features”—once the popularity of noir fiction had been clearly established
among the American middle class by the late forties.22
The rise of a bleaker noir vision—one in which self-possessed indi-
viduals, usually detectives, living by their own codes, underwent a marked
decline—is directly linked with the decline of an important ideal of aes-
thetic modernity closely associated with perhaps the single most signifi-
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cant figure of aesthetic modernity, Baudelaire. As Stanley Cavell has ar-
gued, Baudelaire’s ideal of the dandy has been an instructive presence in
American film for some time: “Our most brilliant representatives of the
type are the Western hero and Bogart; but we include the smaller and more
jaded detectives and private eyes of the past generation; and the type is
reiterated in the elegant nonprofessional solver of mysteries.”23 Like
Baudelaire, Cavell identifies the feature of a “hidden” or “latent” fire as
essential to the character of the dandy—what Baudelaire describes as “an
air of coldness which comes from an unshakeable determination not to be
moved . . . a latent fire which hints at itself, and which could, but chooses
not to burst into flame.”24 But what Cavell fails to note is that the jaded
protagonists of film noir are distinguished by their failure to keep their
fires banked.
For Baudelaire, the dandy was an aesthetic model for living that op-
posed both the corruption of the bourgeoisie and the temptations of a
disorderly bohemian life—what Baudelaire called “the cult of multiplied
sensation.”25 But, with the decline of the dandy as a model for life, noir
protagonists arose who were increasingly defenseless against the cult of
multiplied sensation. Where in the proto-noir The Maltese Falcon Bogart
can maintain a cold self-possession, even when his passions flare or he
appears to have lost control of a situation, in classic film noir the protago-
nist loses control of himself and his circumstances; his fires are no longer
banked. Philip Marlowe is literally drugged and at the mercy of the world,
including his own confusion and petulant temper (Murder My Sweet [Ed-
ward Dmytryk, 1944]); Al Robert’s “detour” begins when his fiancée leaves
him, and he initially loses emotional control while playing Brahms on the
piano (Detour); the Swede is so resigned to his fate that he proves inca-
pable of resisting his killers because he has been betrayed by Kitty (The
Killers); and Scottie Ferguson suffers from a spiritual vertigo so severe that
his adolescent “wanderings” leave him inwardly at the mercy of Gavin
Elster’s seductive world of “freedom and power” (Vertigo). All lack the
dandy’s self-possession and determination.
The model of the dandy also appears in the background of Camus’
oeuvre and informed his second line of symbolic defense against the hori-
zon of disenchantment, most clearly developed in The Rebel (1951) and
The Fall (1956). Evidence of the influence of Baudelaire’s model (and also
of the early Nietzsche) is evident in Camus’ attempt to justify life as an
aesthetic, rather than a moral, phenomenon in The Myth of Sisyphus (1942)
116 Alan Woolfolk
as well as in later writings in which he developed even further the notion
that the artist has important lessons to offer concerning the conduct of
life. All these efforts centered on attempts to restrict the possibilities of a
disenchanted world in which everything and anything is possible. In The
Myth of Sisyphus, Camus explicitly invoked aesthetic criteria, writing: “‘Ev-
erything is permitted’ . . . on condition that it not be taken in the vulgar
sense.”26 In the 1958 preface to the Lyrical and Critical Essays, Camus stated:
“I have artistic scruples just as other men have moral and religious ones. If
I am struck with the notion ‘such things are not done,’ with taboos in gen-
eral rather alien to my free nature, it’s because I am a slave, and an admir-
ing one, of a severe artistic tradition.”27
But, in The Rebel, Camus probed the contradictions of his moral uni-
verse more systematically and deeply when he based the model of the rebel
on his ideal of the artist, which he juxtaposed to both the complacent bour-
geois and the committed political revolutionary.28 His vision of the artist
as exemplary rebel had its origins in Sartre’s study of Baudelaire’s revolt
against his middle-class origins, in which Sartre charged that the rebel, as
opposed to the revolutionary, “shows signs of a bad conscience and of some-
thing resembling a feeling of guilt. He does not want to destroy or tran-
scend the existing order; he simply wants to rise up against it. . . . In the
depths of his heart he preserves the rights which he challenges in public.”29
Camus took this image of an ambivalent Baudelaire and fashioned it into
his own model of the literary artist as an ascetic cultural guide. In this
reformulation, the artist limits the danger of moving in strange perspec-
tives through devotion to vocation. In his 1956 study of Roger Martin du
Gard, for instance, Camus singled out du Gard’s commitment to an “as-
cetic vocation” and his “withdrawal from the world” as well as his “obsti-
nate pursuit of psychological truth” as the key to his integrity. But, even so,
his pursuit of “psychological truth” was limited by a sense of personal
modesty and shame.30
Time and again in Camus’ work one finds that his exemplary models
of conduct are entrapped in prisons of their own inhibitions—modesty
(modestie, pudeur), honesty (honnêteté), shame (honte)—and, in some in-
stances, engaged in vocations that apparently give them the inner strength
to confront and resist the disturbing possibilities of an indifferent uni-
verse. Without such saving inhibitions, one lacks what Camus called char-
acter. But character alone may not offer a vaccination sufficiently strong to
resist plagues and other diseases, whether natural or unnatural. In addi-
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tion, Camus’ “good modern nihilist,” Jean-Baptiste Clamence in The Fall,
learns how to exploit character flaws through his inverted vocation of
“judge-penitent.”31 In his case, the pursuit of psychological truth (uncov-
ering “the fundamental duplicity of the human being”)32 leads to the emp-
tying out of his character resistances and an escape into the spiritual
flatlands. Unlike Scottie Ferguson, Jean-Baptiste no longer suffers from a
serious dread of spiritual ascent and fears no devastating consequences
from moral falls because he has moved beyond the noir topography of
vertical descents and dark pasts. He stands for nothing. The noir protago-
nist, in contrast, stubbornly clings to character flaws because, if nothing
else, they reflect the flawed nature of the disenchanted universe and, there-
fore, lend a certain authenticity to the fractured narrative of the self.
Backward and Downward
As what Palmer has called a filmic chronotope (adapting a concept from
Bakhtin), film noir defines a narrative structure, a form of cinematic mod-
ernism, that emphasizes the “dark pasts” of its protagonists and resists as-
similation to standard Hollywood genres and the “consensus” values they
normally affirm. For Bakhtin, a chronotope “expresses the inseparability
of space and time (time as a fourth dimension of space).” In fact: “It is
precisely the chronotope that defines genre and generic distinctions, for in
literature the primary category in the chronotope is time.”33 Film noir
merges narrative space, time, and events in such a way as to give priority to
time past—“someone (or something) is always coming ‘out of the past.’”
This “backward turning” may be accomplished by “the discursive arrange-
ment of story events, whose forward movement is interrupted by the fill-
ing in of some bypassed gap.” Or it may figure as a “narrator relating what
has gone before and thereby demonstrating the presence of the past” within
the narrator’s thoughts. Or: “A third possibility is that the present admits
the return of characters who were thought to belong to the past who, it
seemed, had been bypassed as the protagonist embarked on a ‘fresh start.’”34
Or, to take Palmer’s formulations one step further: film noir threatens
to subvert the very concept of time, to obliterate the distinction between
past, present, and future, by placing individuals at the mercy of unknown
forces that not only negate simple notions of making a clean break with
the past but also deny the very notion of a coherent narrative of character
development. Thus, neither Jeff Markham in Out of the Past nor Jake Gittes
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in Chinatown achieves a decisive moment of transformation, melodramatic
or otherwise, that resolves his crisis and leads toward an integral life within
a stable community. Rather, as with many another noir protagonist, the
unknown and dark forces that transfix both characters are, paradoxically,
deeply personal and frighteningly impersonal, intimate and indifferent, in
a way that precludes any unifying personal knowledge of the self, society,
and the world. On the one hand, individuals are at the mercy of psycho-
logical obsessions and compulsions that threaten and frequently lead to
self-destruction; on the other hand, they confront impersonal social and
universal forces that preclude any remedy. Film noir tells us that existence
is irremediably fractured, that the self can neither be integrated into a com-
munity nor find a home in the universe, that self-identity is itself highly
contingent and subject to disintegration.
In film noir, there is no integrity of time and space because time is
contingent and space is discontinuous and fragmented. The protagonists
are always in transit. Once again, taking Out of the Past as his exemplary
example, Palmer argues: “Lacking a moment of reformative turning, the
film noir juxtaposes the false promise of a future with the reality of a present
that, instead, turns back to the past, trapping the protagonist ‘between times’
and in a multiplicity of irreconcilable spaces.” Of course, thanks to institu-
tional and cultural pressures for happier endings, many such films too eas-
ily resolve the problem of arrested character development by imposing
artificial resolutions in which the protagonists escape into a life of singu-
lar identity and devotion (e.g., The Glass Key, Murder My Sweet). But
such artificial, reformative turnings do not gainsay Palmer’s analysis of
the dominant, disenchanted vision of “cruel stasis” beneath the “illusion
of movement” that seems to define the dark inspiration of the film noir
chronotope.35
Nonetheless, the focus on the dark pasts of film noir protagonists and
the backward look of such films need further elaboration, for many of these
films appear to be as much downward looking as backward looking, in
some cases more so. In Kiss Me Deadly, for example, which reduces the
focus on the past to a minimum, the quest of the narcissistic, ruthless Mike
Hammer for the “great whatzit” takes him ever more deeply into a world
of amoral indifference and confusion, which even he can’t handle. In the
end, Hammer is finally forced to utter pathetically that he “didn’t know”
the gravity of the object of his search, which turns out to be a symbolic
container of highly dangerous radioactive material. Likewise, in the proto-
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noir The Glass Key, the predominantly amoral Ed Beaumont does not so
much look backward as descend into a sadomasochistic nightmare rela-
tionship with the henchman Jeff. In both films, the external forces that
batter and humiliate the tough, calculating ego of the protagonist evoke
inner threats that threaten the security and very identity of the self. As in
more obviously backward-looking noir films, it is the ego of the protago-
nist, and, by implication, the overweening, muscular ego psychology of
Americans, that seems to be under attack by unknown forces within the
self, society, and an impersonal, indifferent universe.
“A Cauldron Full of Seething Excitations”
If, for the moment, we give priority to the perspective that it is unknown
forces within the self, forces that are merely triggered by external events,
that shape and seal the fates of noir protagonists, then the psychology of
Nietzsche and Freud, rather than academic faculty psychology, is clearly
relevant because the study of unconscious motivations not only influenced
noir filmmakers but still offers important insights in its own right. In the
parlance of a now largely discredited psychoanalytic theory, these unknown
forces are the forces of the unconscious psyche, a return of the repressed,
specifically those of the libido or the id, as conceived by Freud (not Jung or
Adler). In the most powerful examples of film noir, it is the unknown and
unknowable id that is approached—“the dark, inaccessible part of our per-
sonality” that is primitive and chaotic. “We approach the id,” Freud states,
“with analogies: we call it a chaos, a cauldron full of seething excitations.”36
What could better describe the “great whatzit” of Kiss Me Deadly, the
Pandora’s box of radioactive material that burns and kills those who dare
to open it and to view its contents directly? Noir films are, of course, popu-
lated with male protagonists who encounter and probe their unconscious
only to find a disturbing and deadly knowledge that frequently comes via a
femme fatale.
The femme fatale may come from out of the past in a variety of ways.
She may reenter the protagonist’s life after a physical or even a psychic
absence, evoking memories of a very personal past that is suddenly near
with its baggage of obsessions and compulsions, or she may simply draw to
the surface of consciousness fatal weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the pro-
tagonist that have been denied and repressed. Regardless, she inevitably
drags the male protagonist downward into the nethermost depths of the
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psyche, in which the “reason and good sense” of the ego, the “reality prin-
ciple,” are left behind. In this nether region, “the id of course knows no judge-
ments of value: no good and evil, no morality.” But the primitive unconscious
also knows no “law of contradiction,” no negations, no “idea of time.” Thus:
“Contrary impulses can exist side by side.” Love can exist alongside hatred,
attraction alongside repulsion, respect alongside contempt, pleasure along-
side pain, but the unconscious never says no and does not recognize the
passage of time. Impulses and impressions are “virtually immortal.”37 Every-
thing becomes possible in the enormity of the present, even Noah Cross’s
incestuous relationship with his guilty daughter, Evelyn Mulwray.
Everything becomes possible because the femme fatale frequently helps
the protagonist identify downward with forbidden impulses and desires
until, as Ned Racine says to Matty Walker in Body Heat (Lawrence Kasdan,
1981), “It’s real, all right.” In Ned’s case, the “it” that emerges into con-
sciousness (albeit too easily) from “the it” or id of his unconscious is the
idea of murdering Matty’s husband. In the original Billy Wilder film Double
Indemnity, of which Body Heat is a remake, Walter Neff had already been
consciously thinking about “ways to crook the house,” which he had learned
as an insurance salesman. Here, the manipulative Phyllis Dietrichson pro-
vides the opportunity and, perhaps, some additional incentive, but she lacks
the erotic power of many another femme fatale, such as Kitty Collins in
The Killers, to draw the protagonist on her own toward self-destruction.
But, even in cases of powerful and dangerous women in classic noir films,
such as Kitty Collins, Anna in Criss Cross, and Kathie Moffat in Out of the
Past, their eroticized allure depends to a great extent on the depiction of,
and appeal to, a society, however corrupt, in which some semblance of
normative controls on transgressive sexuality still remains—or is at least
implied. Conventions of dress and language, symbol-laden manners, forms
of indirection and concealment, may be the most effective means of con-
veying the danger of identifying downward with the indifferent, imper-
sonal, hidden god of the unconscious.
By the time Body Heat was made in the eighties and Basic Instinct in
the nineties, the eroticism of the femme fatale could no longer be so effec-
tively depicted without more explicit, and, especially in the case of the lat-
ter film, transgressive, expressions of sexuality. But how can the power of
the forbidden be depicted in a culture that seems less and less concerned
about preserving some idea of forbidden knowledge? The stripping away
of civilized veneers and unmasking of instincts can only briefly shock a
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media-savvy postindustrial society in which forms and rituals of transla-
tion between private and public life are seen as superfluous and inauthen-
tic. Under such pressures, inherited limitations become nothing more than
barriers to personal happiness that must be overcome, as in John Sayles’s
Lone Star (1996), in which the interdict against incest is reduced to merely
another prejudice of the past. Not surprisingly, about the time a full-blown
postmodern therapeutic culture broke to the surface of American culture
in the sixties, the era of classic film noir had ended. Not only was the Pro-
duction Code revised (1966) and the claustrophobic urban industrial set-
ting of early film noir dying, but the very notion of leading an experimental
life in “transit” was becoming increasingly widespread and acceptable.
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Symbolism, Meaning, and Nihilism
in Quentin Tarantino’s
Pulp Fiction
Mark T. Conard
Nihilism is a term that describes the loss of value and meaning in people’s
lives. When Nietzsche proclaimed that “God is dead,”1 he meant that Judeo-
Christianity has been lost as a guiding force in our lives and that there is
nothing to replace it. Once we ceased really to believe in the myth at the
heart of Judeo-Christian religion, which happened after the Scientific Revo-
lution, Judeo-Christian morality lost its character as a binding code by
which to live one’s life.2 Given the centrality of religion in our lives for
thousands of years, once this moral code is lost and not replaced, we are
faced with the abyss of nihilism. Darkness closes in on us, and nothing is of
any real value any more. There is no real meaning in our lives, and one way
of conducting oneself and one’s life is just as good as another, for there is
no overarching criterion by which to make such judgments.
Quentin Tarantino’s Pulp Fiction (1994) is an odd film. It’s a seemingly
complete narrative that has been chopped into vignettes and rearranged
like a puzzle. It’s a gangster film in which not a single policeman is to be
found.3 It’s a montage of bizarre characters, from a black mobster with a
mysterious bandage on the back of his bald head to hillbilly sexual per-
verts; from henchmen dressed in black suits whose conversations concern
what fast-food items are called in Europe to a mob problem solver who
attends dinner parties early in the morning dressed in a full tuxedo. So
what is the film about? In general, we can say that the film is about Ameri-
can nihilism. First, a quick rundown of the film.
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The Vignettes
PART 1
Ringo and Honeybunny decide to rob a coffee shop. Jules and Vincent dis-
cuss what a Quarter Pounder with Cheese, among other things, is called in
France. They collect a briefcase that belongs to Marsellus Wallace from
Brett, Marvin, et al. Before Jules kills Brett, he quotes a passage from the
Old Testament. Marsellus has asked Vincent to take out Mia (Mrs. Marsellus
Wallace), and Vincent is nervous because he heard that Marsellus maimed
Tony Rocky Horror in a fit of jealousy. Vincent buys heroin and gets high,
then takes Mia out to Jack Rabbit Slim’s, a restaurant that is full of old
American pop icons (Buddy Holly, Marilyn Monroe, Ed Sullivan, Elvis);
they win a dance contest. Mia mistakes heroin for cocaine and overdoses,
and Vincent has to give her a cardiac needle full of adrenaline to save her.
PART 2
Butch agrees to throw a fight for Marsellus Wallace. Butch as a child re-
ceives a watch from his father’s friend, an army comrade who saved the
watch by hiding it in his rectum while he was in a Vietnamese prisoner-of-
war camp. Butch double-crosses Marsellus and doesn’t throw the fight; his
boxing opponent is killed. Butch must return to his apartment, despite the
fact that Marsellus’s men are looking for him, to get his watch; he kills
Vincent. Butch tries to run over and kill Marsellus; they fight and end up in
a store with Zed, Maynard, and the Gimp, hillbilly sexual perverts. The
perverts have subdued and bound Butch and Marsellus and begin to rape
Marsellus. Butch gets free and saves Marsellus by killing a hillbilly and
wounding another with a samurai sword.
PART 3
Returning to the opening sequence, one of the kids Jules and Vincent are
collecting from tries to shoot them with a large gun; he fails, and Jules takes
this as divine intervention. Jules and Vincent take Marvin and the brief-
case; Marvin is shot accidentally, and the car they’re riding in becomes
unusable. Jules and Vincent stop at Jimmy’s, and Marsellus sends Winston
Wolf to mop up. Jules and Vincent end up in the coffee shop that Ringo
and Honeybunny are robbing. Ringo wants to take the briefcase, but Jules
won’t let him. Jules quotes the biblical passage again to Ringo and tells him
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that he would quote this to someone before he killed that person. This
time, however, Jules is not going to kill Ringo. Ringo and Honeybunny take
the money from the coffee shop; Jules and Vincent retain the briefcase.
Transient Symbols
As I said, in general, the film is about American nihilism. More specifically,
it is about the transformation of two characters, Jules (Samuel L. Jackson)
and Butch (Bruce Willis). In the beginning of the film, Vincent (John
Travolta) has returned from a stay in Amsterdam, and the content of the
conversation between Jules and Vincent concerns what Big Macs, Quarter
Pounders with Cheese, and Whoppers are called in France, the Fonz on
Happy Days, Arnold the Pig on Green Acres, the pop band Flock of Seagulls,
Caine from Kung Fu, TV pilots, etc. These kinds of silly references seem at
first glance like a kind of comic relief, set against the violence that we’re
witnessing on the screen. But this is no mere comic relief. The point is that
this is the way these characters make sense of their lives: transient, pop
cultural symbols and icons. In another time and/or another place, people
would be connected by something they saw as larger than themselves—
most particularly religion—that would provide the sense and meaning that
their lives had and that would determine the value of things. This is miss-
ing in late-twentieth-century (and now early-twenty-first-century) America
and is thus completely absent from Jules’s and Vincent’s lives. This is why
pop icons abound in the film: these are the reference points by which we
understand ourselves and each other, empty and ephemeral as they are.
This pop iconography comes to a real head when Vincent and Mia (Uma
Thurman) visit Jack Rabbit Slim’s, where the host is Ed Sullivan, the singer
is Ricky Nelson, the waiter is Buddy Holly, and among the waitresses are
Marilyn Monroe and Jane Mansfield.
The pop cultural symbols are set into stark relief against a certain pas-
sage from the Old Testament, Ezekiel 25:17:4
The path of the righteous man is beset on all sides by the iniqui-
ties of the selfish and the tyranny of evil men. Blessed is he, who in
the name of charity and good will, shepherds the weak through
the valley of darkness, for he is truly his brother’s keeper and the
finder of lost children.
And I will strike down upon thee with great vengeance and fu-
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rious anger those who attempt to poison and destroy my brothers.
And you will know my name is the Lord when I lay my vengeance
upon thee.
Jules quotes this just before he kills someone. The point is that the passage
refers to a system of values and meaning by which one could lead one’s life
and make moral decisions. However, that system is missing from Jules’s
life, so, as we will see, the passage is meaningless for him.
The Hierarchy of Power
The absence of any kind of foundation for making value judgments, the
lack of a larger meaning to the characters’ lives, creates a kind of vacuum in
their existence, a vacuum that is filled with power. With no other criteria
available to them by which to order their lives, they fall into a hierarchy of
power in which Marsellus Wallace (Ving Rhames) calls the shots. Things
come to have value in their lives if Marsellus Wallace declares it to be so.
What he wants done they will do. What he wishes becomes valuable for
them and thus becomes the guide for their actions at the moment, until
the task is completed by whatever means necessary.
This is perfectly epitomized by the mysterious briefcase that Jules and
Vincent are charged to return to Marsellus. It is mysterious because we
never actually see what’s in it, but we do see people’s reactions to its obvi-
ously valuable contents.5 The question invariably arises, What’s in the brief-
case? However, this is a trick question. The answer is really, It doesn’t matter.
It makes no difference what’s in the briefcase. All that matters is that
Marsellus wants it back, and thus the thing is endowed with worth. If Jules
and Vincent did have an objective framework of value and meaning in
their lives, they would be able to determine whether what was in the brief-
case was ultimately of value, and they would be able to determine what
actions were justified in retrieving it. In the absence of any such frame-
work, the briefcase becomes of ultimate value in and of itself, precisely
because Marsellus says so, and any and all actions required to procure it
become justified (including, obviously, murder).
In addition to the pop iconography in the film, the discourse on lan-
guage here concerns naming things. What is a Big Mac called? What is a
Quarter Pounder with Cheese called? What is a Whopper called? (Vincent
doesn’t know; he didn’t go to Burger King.) When Ringo (Tim Roth) calls
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the waitress “garçon,” she informs him: “Garçon means ‘boy.’” Also, when
Butch’s girlfriend refers to his means of transportation as a motorcycle, he
insists on correcting her: “It’s not a motorcycle, it’s a chopper.” Yet—and
here’s the crux—when a lovely Hispanic cabdriver asks Butch what his name
means, he replies, “This is America, honey; our names don’t mean shit.”
The point is clear: in the absence of any lasting, transcendent, objective
framework of value and meaning, our language no longer points to any-
thing beyond itself. To call something good or evil renders it so, given that
there is no higher authority or criteria by which one might judge actions.
Jules quotes the Bible before his executions, but he may as well be quoting
the Fonz or Buddy Holly.
Objective Values
I’ve been contrasting nihilism with religion as an objective framework for
or foundation of values and meaning because that’s the comparison that
Tarantino himself makes in the film. There are other objective systems of
ethics, however. We might compare nihilism to Aristotelian ethics, for ex-
ample. Aristotle says that things have natures or essences and that what is
best for a thing is to “achieve” or realize its essence. And, in fact, whatever
helps a thing fulfill its nature in this way is, by definition, good. Ducks are
aquatic birds. Having webbed feet helps the duck achieve its essence as a
swimmer. Therefore, it’s good for the duck to have webbed feet. Human
beings likewise have a nature that consists in a set of capacities, our abili-
ties to do things. There are many things that we can do—play the piano,
build things, walk and talk, etc. But the essentially human ability is our
capacity for reason, since it is reason that separates us from all other living
things. The highest good, or best life, for a human being, then, consists in
realizing one’s capacities, most particularly the capacity for reason. This
notion of the highest good and Aristotle’s conception of the virtues, which
are states of character that enable a person to achieve his essence, add up to
an objective ethical framework according to which one can weigh and as-
sess the value and meaning of things as well as weigh and assess the means
one might use to procure those things.
To repeat, this sort of framework, whether based on religion or reason,
is completely absent from Jules’s and Vincent’s lives. In its absence, pop
culture is the source of the symbols and reference points by which the two
communicate and understand one another. And, without reason or a reli-
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gious moral code to determine the value and meaning that things have in
their lives, Marsellus Wallace dictates the value of things. This lack of any
kind of higher authority is depicted in the film by the conspicuous absence
of any police presence whatever. This is a gangster film—people shoot other
people dead, they deal and take drugs, they drive recklessly and get into car
accidents—yet there is not a single policeman to be found. Again, this sym-
bolizes Marsellus’s absolute power and control in the absence of any higher,
objective authority.
Jules
Pulp Fiction is, in part, about Jules’s transformation. When one of his tar-
gets shoots at him and Vincent from a short distance, empties the revolver,
and misses completely, Jules interprets this as divine intervention. The
importance of this is not that it really was divine intervention but that the
incident spurs Jules on to reflect on what is missing. It compels him to
consider the biblical passage that he’s been quoting for years without giv-
ing much thought to it. Jules begins to understand—however confusedly
at first—that it refers to an objective framework of value and meaning that
is absent from his life. We see the dawning of this kind of understanding
first when he reports to Vincent that he’s quitting the mob and then (most
significantly) when he repeats the passage to Ringo in the coffee shop and
then interprets it. He says:
I’ve been saying that shit for years, and if you heard it—that meant
your ass. I never gave much thought to what it meant, I just thought it
was some cold-blooded shit to say to a motherfucker before I popped
a cap in his ass. But I saw some shit this morning that made me think
twice. See, now I’m thinking, maybe it means: you’re the Evil Man,
and I’m the Righteous Man, and Mr. 9mm here—he’s the Shepherd
protecting my righteous ass in the valley of darkness. Or it could mean:
you’re the Righteous Man, and I’m the Shepherd; and it’s the world
that’s evil and selfish. Now, I’d like that, but that shit ain’t the truth.
The truth is: you’re the Weak and I’m the Tyranny of Evil Men. But
I’m trying, Ringo, I’m trying real hard to be the Shepherd.
Jules offers three possible interpretations of the passage. The first in-
terpretation accords with the way he has been living his life. Whatever he
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does (as commanded by Marsellus) is justified, and thus he is the Righ-
teous Man, with his pistol protecting him, and whatever stands in his way
is bad or evil by definition. The second interpretation is interesting and
seems to go along with Jules’s pseudoreligious attitude following what he
interprets as a divine-mystical experience (he tells Vincent, recall, that he
wants to wander the earth like Caine on Kung Fu). In this interpretation,
the world is evil and selfish and has, apparently, made Jules do all the ter-
rible things he’s done up to that point. He’s now become the Shepherd, and
he’s going to protect Ringo (who, after all, is small potatoes in mob terms,
robbing coffee shops, etc.) from this evil.
But that’s not the truth, he realizes. The truth is that he himself is the
evil that he’s been preaching about (unwittingly) for years. Ringo is weak,
neither good enough to be righteous nor strong enough to be as evil as
Jules and Vincent. And Jules is trying to transform himself into the Shep-
herd, to lead Ringo through the valley of darkness. Of course, interestingly,
the darkness is of Jules’s own making, meaning that the struggle to be the
Shepherd is Jules’s struggle with himself not to revert to evil.
In this struggle, he buys Ringo’s life. Ringo has collected the wallets of
the customers in the coffee shop, including Jules’s, and Jules allows him to
take fifteen hundred dollars out of it. Jules is paying Ringo the fifteen hun-
dred dollars to take the money from the coffee shop and simply leave so
that he, Jules, won’t have to kill him. Note that no such transformation has
taken place for Vincent, who exclaims: “Jules, you give that fucking nimrod
fifteen hundred dollars, and I’ll shoot him on general principle.” The prin-
ciple is, of course, that whatever means are necessary to achieve my end are
justified, the end (again) most often determined by Marsellus Wallace. This
attitude of Vincent’s is clearly depicted in his reaction to Mia’s overdose.
He desperately tries to save her, not because she is a fellow human being of
intrinsic worth, but because she is Marsellus’s wife and he, Vincent, will be
in real trouble if she dies. Mia has value because Marsellus has made it so,
not because of any intrinsic or objective features or characteristics she may
possess.
Butch
The other transformation in the film is that of Butch. There is a conspicu-
ous progression in the meaning and relevance of the violence in the story.
In the beginning, we see killings that are completely gratuitous: that, for
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example, of Brett and his cohorts, particularly Marvin, who is shot in the
face simply because the car went over a bump and the gun went off. There
is also the maiming of Tony Rocky Horror, the reason for which is hidden
from all, save Marsellus. Again, this is evidence that it is Marsellus himself
who provides the meaning and justification for things, and his reasons—
like God’s—are hidden from us. (This may, in fact, be what the bandage on
Marsellus’s head represents: the fact that his motives and reasons are hid-
den to us. Bandages not only help heal; they also hide or disguise what we
don’t want others to see.) The meaninglessness of the violence is also epito-
mized in the boxing match. Butch kills his opponent. When the cabdriver,
Esmarelda Villalobos (Angela Jones), informs him of this, his reaction is
one of complete indifference. He shrugs it off. Further, when Butch gets
into his jam for having double-crossed Marsellus, he initially decides that
the way he is going to get out of it is to become like his enemy, that is, to
become ruthless. Consequently, he shoots and kills Vincent and then tries
to kill Marsellus by running him over with a car.
The situation becomes interesting when Butch and Marsellus, initially
willing to kill one another without a second’s thought, find themselves in
the same unpleasant situation: held hostage by a couple of hillbillies who
are about to beat and rape them. I noted earlier the conspicuous absence
of policemen in the film. The interesting quasi exception to this is the per-
vert Zed. Marsellus is taken captive, bound, and gagged. When Zed shows
up, he is dressed in a security guard’s uniform, giving him the appearance
of an authority figure. He is only a security guard, not a real policeman,
however, and this is our clue to the arbitrariness of authority. In the nihil-
istic context in which these characters exist, in the absence of an objective
framework of value to determine right, justice, and goodness, Marsellus
Wallace is the legislator of values, the ultimate authority. In this situation,
however, his authority has been usurped. Zed holds the shotgun now, and
he takes his usurpation to the extreme by raping Marsellus.
Butch’s Transformation
Just as Jules’s transformation has a defining moment, namely, when he is
fired on and missed, so too Butch’s transformation has a defining moment.
This is when he is about to escape, having overpowered the Gimp, but
returns to save Marsellus. As I said, initially the violence is gratuitous and
without meaning. However, when Butch returns to the cellar to aid Marsellus,
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the violence for the first time has a justification: as an act of honor and
friendship, he is saving Marsellus, once his enemy, from men who are
worse than he and Marsellus are. Note that Butch gets out of his jam, not
by becoming like his enemy, that is, ruthless, but in fact by saving his
enemy.
Butch’s transformation is represented by his choice of weapons in the
store—a hammer, a baseball bat, a chain saw, and a samurai sword. He
overlooks the first three items and chooses the fourth. Why? The sword
clearly stands out in the list. First, it’s meant to be a weapon, while the
others are not (and I’ll discuss that in a moment). But it also stands out
because the first three items (two of them particularly) are symbols of
Americana. They represent the nihilism that Butch is leaving behind,
whereas the samurai sword represents a particular culture in which there is
(or was) in place a very rigid moral framework, the kind of objective foun-
dation that I’ve been saying is missing from these characters’ lives. The
sword represents for Butch what the biblical passage does for Jules: a glimpse
beyond transient pop culture, a glimpse beyond the yawning abyss of ni-
hilism, to a way of life, a manner of thinking, in which there are objective
moral criteria, in which there is meaning and value, and in which language
does transcend itself.
Butch’s Paternal Line
In contrast to the (foreign) samurai sword, the gold watch is a kind of
heirloom that’s passed down in (American) families. It represents a kind
of tradition of honor and manhood. But let’s think about how the watch
gets passed down in this case. Butch’s great-grandfather buys it in Knox-
ville before he goes off to fight in World War I. Having survived the war, he
passes the watch on to his son, Butch’s grandfather, who then leaves it to
his own son, Butch’s father, before he goes into battle during World War II
and is killed. Butch’s father, interned in a Vietnamese prisoner-of-war camp,
hides the watch in his rectum, and, before he dies (significantly) from dys-
entery, he gives it to his army comrade (Christopher Walken), who then
hides it in his own rectum. After returning from the war, the comrade finds
Butch as a boy and presents him with the watch. The way in which Butch
receives the watch is, of course, highly significant. His father hides it in his
rectum. The watch is a piece of shit; or, in other words, it is an empty sym-
bol. Why empty? For the same reason that the biblical passage was mean-
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ingless: it is a symbol with no referent. That to which it would refer is
missing.
The sword is also significant because it, unlike the gold watch (an heir-
loom sent to Butch by a long-absent father whom he little remembers),
connects Butch to the masculine line in his family. The men in his family
were warriors, soldiers in the various wars. Choosing the sword transforms
Butch from a pugilist, someone disconnected who steps into the ring alone,
into a soldier, a warrior, one who is connected to a history and a tradition
and whose actions are guided by a strict code of conduct in which honor
and courage are the most important of values.
Note also how Butch is always returning. He seems doomed to return,
perhaps to repeat things, until he gets it right. He must return to his apart-
ment to get his watch. This return is associated with his decision to be-
come his enemy. There’s his return to the cellar to save Marsellus, when he
transcends his situation and begins to grasp something beyond the abyss.
There’s also his return to Knoxville. Recall that the watch was originally
purchased by his great-grandfather in Knoxville, and it is to Knoxville that
Butch has planned to escape after he doesn’t throw the fight. After he chooses
the sword and saves Marsellus, Butch can rightfully return to Knoxville,
now connected to his paternal line, now rightfully a member of the war-
rior class.
Note finally that Butch’s transformation is signified by the motorcycle—
excuse me, chopper—that he steals from Zed and on which he and Fabienne
(Maria de Medeiros) make their escape to Knoxville. The chopper is named
“Grace,” indicating that Butch has at last found his redemption.
Notes
I wish to thank Lou Ascione and Aeon Skoble, who have helped me clarify and refine
my ideas about Pulp Fiction in discussions we’ve had. Earlier versions of this essay
appeared as “Symbolism, Meaning, and Nihilism in Quentin Tarantino’s Pulp Fiction,”
Philosophy Now, no. 19 (winter 1997–98): 10–14, and as “Pulp Fiction: The Sign of the
Empty Symbol,” Metaphilm, posted July 20, 2004, at http://metaphilm.com/
philm.php?id=178_0_2_0.
1. See Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Madman,” in The Gay Science, trans. Walter
Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), sec. 125, p. 181.
2. Actually, Nietzsche means something broader than this: by saying that God is
dead, he means that any notion of objective, absolute value or truth is lost, not just
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those inherent to Judeo-Christianity, but it is the latter that concerns Tarantino in
Pulp Fiction, so I’m restricting my discussion to it.
3. With one very important exception, to be noted below.
4. The quote is a paraphrase of the biblical passage and comes from the Sonny
Chiba movie Bodigaado Kiba (The Bodyguard; Tatsuichi Takamori, 1973). Chiba’s ver-
sion ends: “And you will know my name is Chiba the Bodyguard when I lay my ven-
geance upon thee.”
5. Cinematically, the briefcase is a reference to Robert Aldrich’s classic noir Kiss
Me Deadly (1955), in which the characters (notably the protagonist, Mike Hammer)
chase after a box that contains some mysterious, glowing contents, believing it to be
wildly valuable. Ironically, it turns out to be radioactive material, and, once released, it
unleashes an apparent nuclear holocaust.
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America as Wasteland in Edgar Ulmer’s Detour
Paul A. Cantor
It is easier for me to say this, coming from Europe, an area where nature
can be seen as friendly and domesticated, unlike the USA, where nature
is seen as either to be exploited or to be fled to as a relief from civiliza-
tion. I am continually shocked by the unhumanized nature in this coun-
try, no parks, no formal gardens. Nature never intended human beings to
live in the USA—only in just a little bit of Europe and in New Zealand.
W. H. Auden, Lectures on Shakespeare
In the history of film noir, Edgar G. Ulmer’s Detour (1945) occupies an
honored place, appearing on just about everybody’s short list of classics of
the genre, and frequently cited as the director’s best work.1 At the time
Ulmer made the movie, he was operating on the fringes of the motion
picture industry, virtually as an independent producer. Although Detour
was famously made in under a week and for less than $20,000, Ulmer de-
livered a professional piece of work, showing why he came to be known as
the “King of the B-Movies.” Despite some signs of haste and cheapness in
the production, Detour offers a textbook illustration of film noir. In terms
of technique, Ulmer makes use of many film noir conventions: voice-over
narration, unusual camera angles, and an effective use of lighting that harks
back to his training in the twenties when he worked in Berlin with F. W.
Murnau at the peak of German expressionist cinema. In terms of its sub-
ject matter, Detour tells a typical noir tale of an ordinary, basically decent
man who, through a quirk of fate, is drawn into a web of crime, chiefly as a
result of a chance encounter with a femme fatale. The story unfolds quickly,
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with a strong sense of inevitability, as every step the hero takes to avoid his
doom only brings him closer to it.
A film noir encyclopedia conveniently offers a summary of the plot of
Detour:
Al Roberts is a pianist in a New York nightclub where his girl friend,
Sue, is a singer. The two plan to marry, but Sue is ambitious and
leaves for “stardom” in Hollywood. Left alone, Roberts calls her
one night and Sue tells him that she works as a waitress. He de-
cides to hitchhike West and join her. Eventually, he is picked up by
Haskell, who is carrying a lot of cash and driving all the way to Los
Angeles. Haskell talks about a female hitchhiker who scratched him
viciously when he made a sexual advance. Later, he goes to sleep
while Roberts drives. When it begins to rain, Roberts attempts rous-
ing Haskell to put up the convertible top, but Haskell is mysteri-
ously dead, although his head hits a rock when Roberts accidentally
causes the body to fall out of the car. Roberts, believing the police
will never accept his innocence, hides the body and drives on alone.
The next day Roberts picks up Vera, initially unaware that she is
the same woman who scratched Haskell. Questioning him about
the man’s death, she does not believe Roberts’ story but agrees to
remain silent if he will follow her plans. Arriving in Los Angeles,
they rent a room; and Vera plans that Roberts will sell the car using
Haskell’s identity. But when she discovers that Haskell was the heir
of a dying millionaire and that his family has not seen him for
years, she plans to pass Roberts off as Haskell. That night they quar-
rel about this scheme, and Vera runs into the other room threaten-
ing to call the police but collapses drunkenly on the bed with the
telephone cord entwined about her neck. Roberts pulls on the cord
from the other side of the locked door, inadvertently strangling
her. Without even seeing his fiancée, Roberts flees to Reno, where
he sits in a diner and reflects on the strange circumstances that
have put him in such a hopeless situation.2
Deconstructing the American Dream
Even in such a bare summary, the bitterness and cynicism of Detour are
clearly evident. The film is a systematic deconstruction of the American
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dream. The hero’s quest for happiness—to find simple contentment with
the woman he loves—leads him only to his corruption and, eventually, to
his destruction (he is being arrested as the film ends). Like any good Ameri-
can, Roberts wants to make a better life for himself, and his chance en-
counter with Haskell seems to give him the opportunity, providing him
with all the external signs of success in American terms: a luxury automo-
bile, a fancy suit, and a wad of cash in his pocket. Roberts seems able to
trade places with the outwardly successful Haskell; he can step right into
Haskell’s clothes, and they fit him perfectly. But all these newly acquired
material goods turn out to be a burden to Roberts and are, in fact, what
trap him into committing further crimes.
The full polemical thrust of Ulmer’s film becomes evident when one
realizes that he is using Detour to restage a particular archetype of the
American dream. As a hitchhiker headed for California, Roberts is follow-
ing Horace Greeley’s immortal injunction: “Go west, young man.” But no
pot of gold, real or metaphoric, awaits Roberts at the end of the California
rainbow. Indeed, his girlfriend, Sue, has preceded him to Hollywood and
already failed to achieve her dream of becoming a star as a singer. Haskell
turns out to be a two-bit chiseler and gambler whose dream of a big payoff
at a West Coast racetrack ends with his body lying somewhere in the Ari-
zona desert. Vera, who dreams of making a fortune with a con game at the
expense of the legitimate heirs in the Haskell family, ends up strangled in a
hotel room. Everywhere one looks in Detour, the American dream, par-
ticularly of striking it rich, turns into a nightmare, and the West—tradi-
tionally the land of opportunity in American mythology—is revealed to
be, in truth, the land of shattered dreams.3
Thus, Detour is an anti-Hollywood film in both a general and a spe-
cific sense. It serves as a counterweight to the typical product of the Holly-
wood dream factory. Ulmer inverts a standard pattern of Hollywood
romance, one in which a young couple must go their separate ways in or-
der to pursue their independent goals in life but are in the end happily
reunited, usually with their goals accomplished and their love intact and
even deepened as a result of the obstacles they have encountered and over-
come. That Ulmer had the false narrative clichés of Hollywood romance in
mind is evident in the script of Detour. At one point, Roberts is contem-
plating how things might work out with Vera and imagines a variety of
stock Hollywood happy endings: “If this were fiction, I would fall in love
with Vera, marry her, and make a respectable woman out of her. Or else
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she’d make some supreme class A sacrifice for me and die. Sue and I would
bawl a little over her grave and make some crack about there’s good in all
of us.” The implication of these lines is clear: “If this were fiction . . . but it
isn’t.” Ulmer establishes the realism of his film by contrasting it with the
fantasy and sentimentality of standard Hollywood melodrama.4
But Ulmer goes further—he is debunking not just the generic Holly-
wood version of the American dream but the dream of Hollywood itself.
Early in the story, Sue decides to advance her singing career by leaving New
York for the West Coast: “I want to try my luck in Hollywood.” Roberts
tries to prevent her from pursuing this empty dream: “Don’t you know
millions of people go out there every year and end up polishing cuspi-
dors?” Aware of the deceptive allure of Hollywood, Roberts later tries to
console Sue over the phone when she finds that reality does not measure
up to dreams in California: “Those guys out in Hollywood don’t know the
real thing when it’s right in front of them.” At the beginning of the film,
Roberts thinks that he can distinguish reality from illusion, even if Holly-
wood talent scouts do not know the real thing when they see it. But, as he
journeys west, Roberts gradually loses his grip on reality and allows him-
self to be drawn into pursuing a dream as false as anything in Hollywood.
By creating an antifantasy film, Ulmer is criticizing Hollywood for serv-
ing up illusions to the American public, always telling them that their dreams
will come true if they just try hard enough and get a lucky break or two.
And he is specifically criticizing Hollywood for offering itself as its most
potent fantasy. The greatest myth that Hollywood has ever created is the
myth of being discovered in Hollywood (preferably at Schwab’s Drugstore)
and becoming a star overnight. We know how a movie like Detour would
have ended in the hands of the average Hollywood studio. Sue would have
gotten her big break as a singer, made the most of it, and used her newly
acquired wealth to get Roberts out of his predicament. In the last scene, he
would have been making his long-delayed debut as a concert pianist at
Carnegie Hall, with Sue in the audience cheering him on. But, at every
turn, Ulmer thwarts the plot expectations that his audience has inherited
from standard Hollywood fare. “This is the way life really is,” he seems to
be saying, “not the way you see it in the movies.”
Eminent Émigrés
It would be all too easy to give an autobiographical interpretation of De-
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tour. Ulmer had more reason than most to distrust the Hollywood dream—
for a time he lived it, and then suddenly he lost it all. Having immigrated to
Hollywood in the early thirties after some earlier experience in the film
industry, Ulmer got his big break when Universal chose him to direct a
feature film called The Black Cat (1934), a major assignment considering
that it was to be the first project to unite the studio’s two most famous
horror movie stars, Bela Lugosi and Boris Karloff. The Black Cat was a
triumph for Ulmer; many consider it one of the most sophisticated and
powerful horror movies ever made, and, more to the point, with Lugosi
and Karloff giving perhaps their best screen performances, and certainly
their best together, the film was a box-office success; it “proved to be
Universal’s hit of the season, with a profit of $140,000.”5
Ulmer’s future in Hollywood seemed bright. But, in a moment that
seems to anticipate the lurid plot twists of his own later movies, he had an
affair with the wife of a nephew of Carl Laemmle, the head of Universal.
The resulting divorce and Ulmer’s marriage to the woman he loved led to
his being banished from the Universal lot. Indeed, Laemmle was so power-
ful in the industry that Ulmer was effectively exiled from Hollywood for
over a decade, thus sending him off on his checkered career as a more or
less independent filmmaker, or at least one operating largely outside the
major studio system. Thus, Ulmer had personal experience of the elusive-
ness of the Hollywood dream and reason to criticize a system that had at
first embraced him and then rejected him. One could justifiably read De-
tour as the work of a man bitterly disillusioned with Hollywood and deter-
mined to get his artistic revenge with a film that exposes the illusory
character of the typical Hollywood fantasy and presents Hollywood itself
as the biggest illusion of them all.
But as much as Detour may have grown out of Ulmer’s personal expe-
rience, to view the film as solely a product of his private vendetta against
Hollywood would be to reduce its power in our eyes. To see how Detour
transcends merely personal issues, we need to place it in the larger cultural
and intellectual context of its day. In fact, in retrospect, we can now under-
stand Detour as an act of what has come to be known as culture critique. In
its attitude toward America in general and Hollywood in particular, Ulmer’s
film displays remarkable affinities with the thinking of the Frankfurt school
of philosophy. Discussing Detour and the Frankfurt school together will
mutually illuminate the two phenomena. The ideas of the Frankfurt school
will help clarify what Ulmer is saying about Hollywood in Detour, and
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Ulmer’s film will, in turn, help us understand the impulses behind the Frank-
furt school and the whole movement of culture critique.
The Frankfurt school is named after the institution where its members
first gathered, the Institute for Social Research (Institut für Sozialforschung),
founded in Frankfurt am Main, Germany, in 1923. Broadly speaking Marxist
in its orientation, the Frankfurt school nevertheless drew on the whole
German intellectual tradition, including Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and
Heidegger, and it was also heavily influenced by Freud. Among the figures
associated with the Frankfurt school over the years were Theodor Adorno,
Walter Benjamin, Erich Fromm, Max Horkheimer, Leo Lowenthal, and
Herbert Marcuse.6 Because the Frankfurt school associates were left-wing
intellectuals (several of the founders were members of the Communist
Party), they were forced to flee Nazi Germany in the thirties, especially
since many of them were Jewish or of Jewish ancestry. Those who man-
aged to leave Germany safely generally immigrated to the United States,
mostly to New York, but some to Los Angeles.7 Adorno, for example, ended
up living during World War II in the Brentwood area of greater Los Ange-
les and Horkheimer in Pacific Palisades, thus placing them just west of
Hollywood.8 As refugees from Nazi Germany, the Frankfurt school mem-
bers were generally welcomed by the Hollywood community and, thus,
had something in common with Ulmer in terms of their initial experience
of the United States.9
The Culture Industry
The central work of the Frankfurt school is Dialectic of Enlightenment by
Horkheimer and Adorno, first published in German in 1944 as Dialektik
der Aufklärung. The best-known chapter of this book, and the one most
relevant to Detour, deals with Hollywood—“The Culture Industry: Enlight-
enment as Mass Deception.” As the chapter’s title indicates, Horkheimer
and Adorno set out in it to present Hollywood as a fountain of illusions,
just the sort of dream factory that Ulmer has in mind in Detour: “The
culture industry perpetually cheats its consumers of what it perpetually
promises. The promissory note which, with its plots and staging, it draws
on pleasure is endlessly prolonged; the promise, which is actually all the
spectacle consists of, is illusory: all it actually confirms is that the real point
will never be reached, that the diner must be satisfied with the menu. In
front of the appetite stimulated by all those brilliant names and images
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there is finally set no more than a commendation of the depressing every-
day world it sought to escape.”10
In general, the Frankfurt school marks a turn in twentieth-century
Marxism from an economic to a cultural critique of capitalism. The Frank-
furt school thinkers were smart enough to see that orthodox Marxism was
losing the economic argument against capitalism. Traditionally, Marxists
had claimed that capitalism would lead to the progressive impoverishment
of the masses. By the forties, despite the significant setbacks of the Depres-
sion, the standard of living of workers in capitalist countries had risen sub-
stantially since the days of Marx—Adorno speaks of “the greater abundance
of goods within reach even of the poor.”11 “The poor with a greater abun-
dance of goods” is one of those marvelously paradoxical concepts devised
by twentieth-century Marxists, and, indeed, it was especially difficult for
someone arriving from Europe in the middle of southern California to
conclude that Americans were materially worse off because of capitalism.
Adorno and other members of the Frankfurt school had to find a way of
showing that the abundance of commodities that capitalism produces is,
in fact, bad for the masses—that, although they seem to be materially en-
riched by capitalism, they are really being spiritually and culturally impov-
erished.12 The work of the Frankfurt school came to focus on culture
critique, on analyzing the harmful effects of the commercial culture of capi-
talism, especially insofar as it takes the form of mass culture.
Thus, Hollywood seemed tailor-made for the Frankfurt school think-
ers, and, if they had not been atheists, they might have seen the hand of
Providence at work when their flight from Hitler dropped them in the midst
of a power they came to regard as equally sinister—Hollywood. “The Cul-
ture Industry” attempts to show that motion pictures with their links to
commercial advertising are the capitalist equivalent of totalitarian propa-
ganda. In an argument that has become familiar and widely accepted,
Horkheimer and Adorno claim that the motion picture industry manipu-
lates and even controls the American public. It gives the appearance of
merely providing the public with what it wants, but, in fact, it creates the
desires that it claims to be satisfying.
In the view of Horkheimer and Adorno, Hollywood is always foisting
unwanted products onto a gullible public: “It is claimed that standards
were based in the first place on consumers’ needs, and for that reason
were accepted with so little resistance. The result is the circle of manipu-
lation and retroactive need in which the unity of the system grows ever
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stronger. . . . The man with leisure has to accept what the culture manu-
facturers offer him.” Horkheimer and Adorno present American audi-
ences as the passive victims of an all-powerful entertainment industry
that manipulates them as cleverly (and cynically) as fascist dictators. In a
remarkable variant of the moral equivalence argument, they claim that
“the bourgeois . . . is already virtually a Nazi.” Later, they compare “the
spread of popular songs” to the rapid diffusion of Nazi propaganda slo-
gans, and, in a bizarre passage, they equate the radio transmission of a
Hitler speech with an NBC broadcast of Toscanini conducting a sym-
phony (this argument is particularly odd in view of the Italian conductor’s
courageous and unwavering opposition to fascism in his homeland and
elsewhere).13
The Big Casino
One might already note parallels in this view of the American public to the
vision of life in the United States that Ulmer develops in Detour. Critics
have often noted the passivity of the characters in film noir and particu-
larly in Detour—the way their lives seem to be governed by forces beyond
their control. The characters in Detour seem incapable of generating au-
thentic desires; they are always setting their goals on the basis of the mod-
els that American society offers them, and, as we see quite literally in the
case of Roberts, their aim becomes to step into the shoes of the other guy
only because he is admired in the community.
As we have seen, Ulmer strongly suggests that Hollywood is the princi-
pal source of these images of desire, shaping the dreams that govern the
average person’s life. But the parallels between Ulmer’s Detour and the
Frankfurt school go deeper than this. Horkheimer and Adorno view the
entertainment industry as capitalism at its most exploitative, forcing people
to spend their hard-earned money on forms of amusement that they could
easily do without and that they never wanted in the first place.14 But, for
the Frankfurt school, the sinister role of capitalism extends beyond merely
dumping unwanted goods on a hapless public. Itself the ultimate expres-
sion of capitalism, the entertainment industry seeks to provide an ideo-
logical justification for capitalism, to help make the system as a whole
function and sustain its power over the masses.
To accomplish this purpose, as the Frankfurt school understands it,
the entertainment industry must reconcile the masses to the system that
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exploits them and, thus, prevent them from even thinking about rebelling
against it. With this end in view, Hollywood creates a mass cultural myth
of hope, tantalizing the American people with the prospect of bettering
their lives and escaping from their downtrodden condition. Hollywood
manufactures a picture of society as a kind of giant lottery in which any-
one can win the big payoff. The vast majority of individuals in the capital-
ist system may have to live with being exploited and accept their passive
roles as losers, but, if they can be bombarded with striking images of win-
ners, of people who have been lucky enough to beat the system, they can
live on in hope that they too might someday cash in on good fortune and
join the magic circle of the successful.
Horkheimer and Adorno see that the culmination of this image of so-
ciety as a lottery is the myth of success in Hollywood itself. A key passage in
“The Culture Industry” is worth quoting at length:
Not everyone will be lucky one day—but the person who draws
the winning ticket, or rather the one who is marked out to do so by
a higher power—usually by the pleasure industry itself, which is
represented as unceasingly in search of talent. Those discovered by
talent scouts and then publicized on a vast scale by the studio are
ideal types of the new dependent average. Of course, the starlet is
meant to symbolize the typist in such a way that the splendid
evening dress seems meant for the actress as distinct from the real
girl. The girls in the audience not only feel that they could be on
the screen, but realize the great gulf separating them from it. Only
one girl can draw the lucky ticket, only one man can win the prize,
and if, mathematically, all have the same chance, yet this is so in-
finitesimal for each one that he or she will do best to write it off
and rejoice in the other’s success, which might just as well have
been his or hers, and somehow never is. . . . Increasing emphasis is
laid not on the path per aspera ad astra (which presupposes hard-
ship and effort), but on winning a prize. . . . Movies emphasize
chance. . . . [Moviegoers] are assured that they are all right as they
are, that they could do just as well and that nothing beyond their
powers will be asked of them. But at the same time they are given a
hint that any effort would be useless because even bourgeois luck
no longer has any connection with the calculable effect of their
own work.15
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The relevance of this passage to understanding Detour should be obvi-
ous. Just like Horkheimer and Adorno, Ulmer, as we have seen, portrays an
America obsessed with the lottery idea, of striking it rich. Haskell is liter-
ally a gambler; significantly, the horse he intends to bet on at Santa Anita is
named Paradisical, pointing to the American hope for heaven on earth.
But all the main characters in Detour are in one way or another gamblers,
and in the background, in Sue’s story, we sense that Hollywood may be the
biggest gamble of them all. Ulmer wants to efface the distinction between
gambling as an illicit or illegal activity and gambling as a part of everyday
life in America—perfectly symbolized by the way the decent citizen Rob-
erts seamlessly steps into the role of the bookie Haskell. Vera and Roberts
play cards to pass the time while waiting to sell Haskell’s car. And the film
is narrated from Reno, Nevada, where Roberts ends up in his effort to es-
cape Los Angeles—Reno, the capital of legal gambling in the United States
at the time Detour was made (Las Vegas was still only a gleam in Bugsy
Siegel’s eye in the early forties). When one adds up all the instances in the
film, Ulmer seems to be presenting gambling as the American way of life,
or, rather, the idea that the American way of life is fundamentally a gamble.
Mechanical Reproduction
There are more specific parallels between the way Ulmer pictures America
in Detour and the thinking of the Frankfurt school. The core of the
Horkheimer-Adorno critique of American culture is that it is a mass phe-
nomenon and that, in order to reach wide audiences, the entertainment
industry has to mechanize and merchandise culture. Here, they were draw-
ing on Benjamin’s well-known essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Me-
chanical Reproduction,” in which he argues that, in the modern world,
the work of art is losing its unique aura because it is being reproduced ad
infinitum by a capitalist economy—packaged, advertised, and, thus,
commodified.16 Adorno, who was a musicologist and a composer, was par-
ticularly interested in how this process was playing out in the world of
music. He adamantly defended the virtues of live performance; he objected
to presenting the musical classics in recorded form. As we have seen in his
strange equation of Hitler and Toscanini, he even objected to radio broad-
casts of live performances. Adorno believed, with some justification, that
only when people are physically present at a live performance can they
experience the full impact of the music. He was not impressed by the
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counterargument that radio and records were making classical music avail-
able to multitudes of listeners in a way that was simply impossible in the
nineteenth century.17 For Adorno, great classical music is inevitably com-
promised by any effort to make it widely accessible. He was struck by the
fact that radio stations play both classical and popular music and was ob-
viously disturbed by hearing performances by Toscanini right next to per-
formances by Guy Lombardo (Lombardo was a bandleader who specialized
in syrupy arrangements).18
Adorno believed that America was corrupting the sublime achieve-
ments of European composers by effacing the distinction between classical
and popular music: “The jazz musician Benny Goodman appears with the
Budapest string quartet, more pedantic rhythmically than any philharmonic
clarinetist, while the style of the Budapest players is as uniform and sugary
as that of Guy Lombardo.”19 Here, Adorno actually claims that the playing
style of the Budapest String Quartet was contaminated by contact with
American popular culture. Above all, he inveighed against jazz, America’s
distinctive contribution to world music.20 For Adorno, jazz summed up
everything that is vulgar and debased in American culture, and he was
particularly appalled by jazz arrangements of classical music: “No Palestrina
could be more of a purist in eliminating every unprepared and unresolved
discord than the jazz arranger in suppressing any development which does
not conform to the jargon. When jazzing up Mozart he changes him not
only when he is too serious or too difficult but when he harmonizes the
melody in a different way, perhaps more simply, than is customary now.”21
One would not expect to find this kind of sophisticated argument about
classical music translated into cinematic terms, especially in a B-movie, yet
that is just what Ulmer does in Detour. As the film opens in a roadside cafe in
Nevada, the first music we hear comes from a jukebox—the Benjaminian
technological nightmare par excellence. Roberts reacts violently to the juke-
box music and wants it turned off. He is upset because the song reminds him
of his lost love, Sue, but, almost as if he were a member of the Frankfurt
school himself, he also seems to be reacting against the sheer mechanical
reproduction of the music. In the first of the many flashbacks that make up
the movie, we see, by contrast, Roberts performing live as a pianist in a small
jazz combo with Sue as the vocalist. But, when the set is over and we get to
hear Roberts performing for himself, he is playing classical music—Chopin’s
Waltz in C# Minor, op. 64, no. 2. Sue addresses him: “Mr. Paderewski, I pre-
sume. It’s beautiful. You’re going to make Carnegie Hall yet, Al.”
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Ulmer sketches in the background quickly, but the basic story is clear.
Roberts has aspirations of being a great classical pianist like Paderewski
and performing in the high temple of classical music, Carnegie Hall. But,
for the moment, his aspirations are thwarted, and he must earn a living
playing jazz for the paying customers in a cheap nightclub. Ulmer rein-
forces the point; the next scene begins with Roberts playing Brahms’s Waltz
in A, op. 39, no. 15, but, after a few bars, he begins to jazz it up, launching
into a full-scale boogie-woogie version of Brahms’s original, delicate melody.
Roberts earns a ten-dollar tip from a nightclub patron for prostituting his
art and Brahms’s. It almost seems as if Ulmer has been reading Adorno.
But, evidently, Ulmer did not need Adorno to teach him about classi-
cal music. It was his lifelong passion, and he was extremely knowledgeable
in the area. His daughter, Arianné Ulmer Cipes, reports that, at one time,
he wanted to be a conductor; perhaps as compensation for not becoming
one, he sometimes used a baton when directing his actors.22 He was friends
with some of the most famous classical musicians of the twentieth century.
For example, the Hungarian conductor Fritz Reiner was godfather to
Ulmer’s daughter. With Reiner’s connections, Ulmer made the film Carnegie
Hall (1947), which features a remarkable number of major figures in clas-
sical music, including Jascha Heifetz, Artur Rubenstein, Gregor Piatigorsky,
Leopold Stokowski, Bruno Walter, Ezio Pinza, Lily Pons, and Reiner him-
self. Although his low budgets constrained him, Ulmer tried to make the
most of the musical scores in his movies. The Black Cat, for example, con-
tains some of the most effective and inventive use of classical music in any
Hollywood score.23 It draws on some classical warhorses, such as Tchaikovsky’s
Romeo and Juliet and Bach’s Toccata and Fugue in D Minor, but it also
includes unusual orchestrations of solo piano works, used in Wagnerian
fashion as leitmotifs—for example, Liszt’s Sonata in B Minor and Brahms’s
Rhapsody in B Minor, op. 79, no. 2.
Civilization and Barbarism
It may be hard to believe that the man who created movies with titles like
Girls in Chains, The Man from Planet X, The Daughter of Dr. Jekyll, Naked
Venus, and The Amazing Transparent Man was a highly cultivated aficio-
nado of classical music, but Ulmer certainly was. And this point is impor-
tant because it helps suggest an explanation for the otherwise puzzling
affinities between Ulmer and the Frankfurt school. Sometimes the resem-
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blances can be uncanny. Ulmer’s daughter describes his background: “He
was a European intellectual who had based most of his thinking on the
great minds of the German language, only to find that it led to a stupid
monster of an Austrian painter named Hitler. For the rest of his life he
tried to understand how civilization could end up in barbarism.”24 This
formulation seems to echo Benjamin’s famous statement in his “Theses on
the Philosophy of History”: “There is no document of civilization which is
not at the same time a document of barbarism.”25 Horkheimer and Adorno
offer a similar formulation of their task in Dialectic of Enlightenment: “It
turned out, in fact, that we had set ourselves nothing less than the discov-
ery of why mankind, instead of entering into a truly human condition, is
sinking into a new kind of barbarism.”26 But, despite what appear to be
verbal echoes of the Frankfurt school in reports of Ulmer’s thinking, I have
been unable to uncover evidence of any direct connection between him
and Horkheimer and Adorno. I would not, however, rule out the possibil-
ity because, through the Hollywood factor, their circle of acquaintances
probably overlapped.
But, if we set aside the question of direct or indirect contacts between
Ulmer and Horkheimer or Adorno, we do know that they grew out of the
same intellectual and cultural milieu and might well have been expected to
converge in their thinking, especially about their adopted home, the United
States. The similarity between Ulmer and Frankfurt school members went
well beyond a common passion for Austro-German classical music. Ulmer
also grew out of the same political tradition; his daughter says that “he was
part of the socialist revolutionary beliefs of his European era.” Ulmer was
well educated—in his youth he studied architecture and philosophy in
Vienna. His daughter points out that “he loved Thomas Mann, Schiller,
and Goethe.”27 Thus, he had the same literary tastes as the Frankfurt school.
The mention of Thomas Mann is especially significant since Adorno was
closely associated with Mann; for example, he helped with the musicologi-
cal details of Mann’s novel Doktor Faustus (1947), which tells the story of a
twelve-tone composer loosely modeled on Arnold Schoenberg. In short,
even if Ulmer never heard of Horkheimer and Adorno, his intellectual pro-
file was remarkably similar; in the forties, he was known around Holly-
wood as “the aesthete from the Alps.”28
Thus, what we are witnessing in the case of Ulmer, as well as that of
Horkheimer and Adorno, is the reaction of elite products of European high
culture to the vulgarity of American popular culture. All three were well
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positioned to be critical of culture in the United States, to measure it by the
sophisticated standards of European culture and find it wanting. But we
should remember that, as outsiders, they were also prone to misunder-
stand and misinterpret American culture. However intelligent and insightful
they may have been, they never had an insider’s feel for American culture;
it was easy for them to miss its nuances and, hence, whatever complexities
it might embody.
Their reaction—one might say their overreaction—to American popu-
lar culture was also colored by their status as more or less displaced per-
sons in the United States (this was truer of Horkheimer and Adorno than
of Ulmer, who came to America earlier and more voluntarily). Having been
plunged into an alien environment—and what could be more alien than
the bizarre world of Hollywood?—they inevitably had problems adjust-
ing, and it is no wonder that they found themselves repelled by many Ameri-
can phenomena. Their largely grim vision of America reflected their own
alienation. In Detour, Ulmer portrays America as a land of lonely drifters,
homeless and perpetually on the move. This may have corresponded to the
reality of America (particularly during the Depression),29 but it corre-
sponded even more closely to Ulmer’s own situation as a European émigré.
Having left his homeland to come to the United States, and then finding
himself exiled from Hollywood, he must have experienced a strong sense
of displacement, which then translated into his film noir vision of indi-
viduals alienated from the landscape and the community.30
This dark vision of the rootlessness of America is perhaps the most in-
teresting point of convergence between Ulmer and the Frankfurt school. Eu-
ropeans have always been struck by the mobility of Americans and have usually
reacted negatively to it. What looks like freedom to Americans looks like
chaos to Europeans. Coming from more centrally ordered and hierarchical
societies, many Europeans have difficulty appreciating the quintessentially
American desire to be able to go one’s own way. In particular, Europeans are
often puzzled by Americans’ devotion to—some might say their obsession
with—their cars. Europeans prefer trains, with their fixed routes and rigid
timetables, whereas Americans long for the freedom of the open road—sig-
nificantly called the freeway in Los Angeles. Europeans frequently sing the
praises of public transportation while condemning the extravagance and
wastefulness of that most private of vehicles—the automobile. Socialists in
particular hate the automobile; for them, it has often served as the ultimate
symbol of capitalism.
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All this suggests why the Frankfurt school members who ended up in
southern California must have felt—despite the climate—that they had
been plunged into some kind of hell specially reserved for European so-
cialists. Woody Allen has shown that, for someone who cannot drive, Los
Angeles is, indeed, hell, and it is documented that at least Adorno never
learned to drive.31 It is, therefore, revealing that Adorno often reacts nega-
tively to precisely those aspects of American culture that center around the
automobile.
“On the Road Again”
Adorno’s Minima Moralia (1951)—written during his stay in Los Angeles
in the mid-forties and, hence, right at the time of Detour—is filled with
reflections on the peculiar mobility of Americans and the effect that this
has on their culture. When Adorno looks at the United States, what he sees
is a country crisscrossed by empty roads: “[The roads] are always inserted
directly in the landscape, and the more impressively smooth and broad
they are, the more unrelated and violent their gleaming track appears against
its wild, overgrown surroundings. They are expressionless. . . . It is as if no-
one had ever passed their hand over the landscape’s hair. It is uncomforted
and comfortless. And it is perceived in a corresponding way. For what the
hurrying eye has seen merely from the car it cannot retain, and the vanish-
ing landscape leaves no more traces behind than it bears upon itself.”
Adorno could see the positive side of this kind of scene: “Beauty of the
American landscape: that even the smallest of its segments is inscribed, as
its expression, with the immensity of the whole country.”32 Still, as a Euro-
pean used to a densely populated countryside, he was obviously intimi-
dated by exactly what Americans have always cherished—the wide-open
spaces from sea to shining sea.
Adorno was also repulsed by what he saw growing up alongside all
those endless American roads—the culture of motels and roadside restau-
rants. He inveighs against the poor service in the United States, contrasting
American technical efficiency with the old-fashioned elegance he was used
to in Europe:
The division of labour, the system of automatized facilities, has
the result that no-one is concerned for the client’s comfort. No-
one can divine from his expression what might take his fancy, for
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the waiter no longer knows the menu. . . . No-one hastens to serve
the guest, however long he has to wait. . . . Who would not prefer
the “Blauer Stern” in Prague or the “Österreichischer Hof ” in
Salzburg, even if he had to cross the landing to reach the bath-
room, and was no longer woken in the small hours by unfailing
central heating? The nearer the sphere of immediate physical ex-
istence is approached, the more questionable progress becomes, a
Pyrrhic victory of fetishized production.33
We see in such passages how much Adorno’s critique of America grows
out of unabashed nostalgia for an aristocratic European past.34 His ulti-
mate nightmare is a peculiarly American institution, the drugstore lunch
counter: “the drugstore, blatantly a shop, behind whose inhospitable counter
a juggler with fried-eggs, crispy bacon and ice-cubes proves himself the
last solicitous host.”35 As Nico Israel writes: “The word ‘snob’ flies off of the
page in passages like these” (for me, the words old fogey were not far be-
hind).36 Adorno may have a point about the shabbiness of American tour-
ist establishments, but it seems a bit odd for a Marxist to use the standard
of European luxury hotels, the exclusive preserve of a wealthy elite, in or-
der to condemn the simple lunch counters of America, which tried to make
restaurant food available to all at a price anybody could afford. As in his
criticism of the music broadcasting and recording industry, Adorno seems
to condemn America principally for making available to the masses what
was reserved for a privileged elite in Europe.
Home on the Range
Ulmer does not seem to share Adorno’s snobbishness and elitism,37 but he
does have a very similar vision of America. Detour opens with a shot of an
empty road stretching out to the horizon in an empty landscape, and that
scene becomes typical of the film. Detour revolves around the automobile.
The plot centrally deals with the efforts of Roberts and Vera to sell a stolen
car. That eventually takes them to the most distinctively American of all
institutions—the used-car lot. A large percentage of the film consists of
characters talking in a moving car, first Roberts and Haskell, then Roberts
and Vera. Hitchhiking from the East Coast to the West, Roberts becomes
the perfect symbol of American mobility. And, in Ulmer’s distinctively
European vision of the United States, there is nothing between New York
Film Noir and the Frankfurt School 155
and Los Angeles—just a vast wasteland. Like the Frankfurt school refugees,
Ulmer lived a bicoastal existence in America, with New York and Los An-
geles essentially constituting the sum total of his experience of the United
States. At most in Detour one finds Reno between the coasts, “the biggest
little city in the world,” as its famous advertising sign proclaims (glimpsed
in the film)—a sort of reproduction of Los Angeles or New York in the
middle of the desert, which is to say in the middle of nowhere.
It is, in fact, extraordinary how empty the American landscape is in
Detour—miles and miles of bleak and inhospitable terrain. All Roberts
encounters on his journey west are gas stations, motels, roadside cafés, and,
finally, the one locale that sums up everything Adorno despised about
America—a drive-in restaurant, where he and Vera can eat without ever
leaving their car. And, above all, Roberts must always keep moving. For
him, life in America has turned into an endless journey, and, as the film
concludes, he is being picked up by a passing police car.
As Ulmer presents Roberts, he epitomizes the rootlessness of America.
When Roberts tries to settle down in an apartment with his “wife,” Vera, it
is, of course, a complete sham; Vera can only sarcastically refer to it as “home
sweet home.” Roberts spends most of the film separated from his real
fiancée, Sue, and they are forced to communicate—or not communicate—
by phone. When Roberts finally manages to get to the West Coast, he finds
that he is still separated from Sue: “Far from being at the end of the trip,
there was a greater distance between Sue and me than when I started out.”
There are no families anywhere in Detour—in Ulmer’s vision, America is a
land of atomistic individuals. The truck driver looking for companionship
who approaches Roberts at the beginning of the film stands for all Ameri-
cans: “I ain’t got nobody at all.” In the eyes of a European socialist, this is
the ultimate result of American capitalism—it destroys community, and it
isolates the individual.
Of course it would be wrong to dismiss Ulmer’s vision in Detour sim-
ply as a European misperception of America. The United States is a land of
highways, motels, and roadside restaurants, and the mobility of Americans
is genuinely one of their distinguishing characteristics. The vision of
America as perpetually on the move is by no means restricted to European
observers. An episode of the television series The X-Files entitled “Drive” is
very similar to Detour in the way it allegorizes the American landscape.
Owing to a government experiment gone awry, the main character of the
story must keep moving in a speeding car, and, just as in Detour, he must
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specifically keep heading west until he reaches California (with even more
disastrous results—in his case, his head explodes when he “runs out of
west,” as the episode puts it).38
The X-Files is an American television show, but it is just as capable as
any European source of identifying rootlessness as the fundamental condi-
tion of the United States. Still, in evaluating the truthfulness of Ulmer’s
vision of America in Detour, it is worth bearing his European origins in
mind. Even for a noir film, Detour presents an extraordinarily bleak view
of the United States, and one might with some justification question
whether the American landscape is quite as empty as Ulmer pictures it or
as devoid of positive human interaction. What is quite literally absent from
Ulmer’s view is the American heartland—just the portion of the landscape
with which a bicoastal European émigré is least likely to be familiar.
Under European Eyes
Thus, while granting a degree of genuine insight into the American condi-
tion to both Ulmer and the Frankfurt school—a perceptiveness enabled
precisely by their position as outsiders—one must also wonder whether
their status as aliens did not also work to color, cloud, and even distort
their view of the United States. Horkheimer and Adorno sometimes seem
to be devoid of sympathy for American culture. They appear to be tone-
deaf to its distinct accents; they just seem to miss the point of a Donald
Duck cartoon in a way that someone native to the American scene would
not.39 Above all, their insistence on the uniformity of American popular
culture is exactly the reaction of someone positioned outside a culture,
someone who lacks an insider’s ability to differentiate among its produc-
tions. It is ironic, then, that much of the study of American popular culture
to this day is still heavily influenced by the approach developed by
Horkheimer and Adorno back in the forties as displaced persons in the
United States. We should not ignore their largely negative judgments about
American culture, but we need to take those judgments with a grain of salt
when we realize how much they were rooted in European cultural elitism
and, specifically, aristocratic nostalgia.
Similar doubts arise about the validity of the film noir vision of
America—and not just in the case of Ulmer’s Detour. We tend to think of
film noir as an American cultural development, and, to be sure, the classic
noir films were generally made in Hollywood and have American settings.
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Their plots were often derived from American detective novels, such as The
Maltese Falcon and The Big Sleep.40 But, if one views the director as central
to the creation of a movie, suddenly film noir begins to look about as
American as apple strudel. Many of the great noir films were directed by
Europeans, including, to name just some of the most famous in addition
to Ulmer, Curtis Bernhardt, John Brahm, Michael Curtiz, William Dieterle,
Alfred Hitchcock, Fritz Lang, Rudolph Maté, Max Ophuls, Otto Preminger,
Robert Siodmak, Josef von Sternberg, Charles Vidor, Billy Wilder, and Wil-
liam Wyler. Indeed, however American the subject matter of film noir may
seem to be, it was often presented through European eyes behind the cam-
era, and the formal characteristics of the genre owe more to European than
to American directors, above all, to the masters of German expressionist
cinema.41
Why is it important to stress the European roots of film noir? Many
film analysts have treated the genre as indigenous to the United States and,
hence, an accurate reflection of the realities of life in twentieth-century
America.42 Certainly, the dark vision and even nightmarish quality of these
films give us a glimpse into the American psyche and its fears and anxieties
when confronted with some of the traumatic developments of the thirties,
forties, and fifties, such as the Depression, the rise of totalitarianism, World
War II, the cold war, and the threat of nuclear annihilation. Yet one must
be careful in talking about the “realism” of film noir when the genre is so
highly stylized and so clearly involves imposing a set of narrative and other
conventions on its material.43 To the extent that these conventions were
European in origin, they may have distorted the American reality that they
purported to represent. In short, in viewing film noir, we may not be get-
ting, as some critics have supposed, an unmediated look into the heart and
soul of America. Rather, because in film noir we are often looking through
European eyes, we may be getting an unduly negative and pessimistic view
of the American way of life. Film noir may be one more example of a long
tradition of European anti-Americanism, or at least a tendency to fault the
United States for failing to measure up to European standards of civiliza-
tion and culture.44
Here, the parallels between Ulmer’s Detour and the Frankfurt school
are genuinely informative since, in both cases, we can see how the very
sophistication of European observers can blind them to whatever is posi-
tive in American commercial culture. It tells us something about film noir
that a classic of the genre corresponds so closely to the vision of America in
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the work of a group of German left-wing intellectual émigrés. We can now
understand the otherwise curious fact that the supposedly American genre
of film noir has a European name. It is well-known that it took the French
to “discover” film noir and establish it as a topic for serious aesthetic analysis.
Perhaps a European sensibility was needed to appreciate film noir criti-
cally because the genre embodied a European sensibility in the first place.
The fear and anxiety characteristic of film noir may be a projection—pro-
jected by European directors onto an American landscape in which they
understandably did not feel at home. Ulmer may have been right in a way
he did not understand. Film noir is a kind of detour. In insisting on por-
traying the American landscape as a vast wasteland, it may tell us more
about Europe than it does about the United States.
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Knowledge, Morality, and Tragedy in
The Killers and Out of the Past
Ian Jarvie
Poetry is both more philosophical and more serious than history, since
poetry speaks more of universals, history of particulars.
—Aristotle
Students of film find film noir interesting because it is a critics’ rather than
a filmmakers’ category. Socially minded critics find interesting the pessi-
mistic mood of so many early films noirs, coinciding as they did with war-
time and the immediate postwar period.1 The pessimism, menace, and
violence of the films also clash with their prima facie status as mere popu-
lar entertainment. This leads me to my philosophical question. Perhaps
these films are more than they at first seem. Are these dark films a popular
extension of tragedy as Aristotle defined it, that is, dramas educing pity
and terror that offer an emotional purge or catharsis to both characters
and audience?2
Before I proceed, a methodological difficulty needs to be acknowledged.
Noir is, unlike the western or the horror film, a style or way of treating a
story, hardly a full-blooded genre with a locale or conventions of plot struc-
ture. This style is applied in many and various films over a long period.
True, 1941–53 is the golden age, according to Borde and Chaumeton, the
first critics to write on the subject.3 But the style remains a live option
available to filmmakers to this day.4 Trying to generalize over a large num-
ber of films noirs is liable to be vacuous. The case-study method offers a
partial solution to this kind of difficulty. For my case study, I have selected
The Killers (Robert Siodmak, 1946) and Out of the Past (Jacques Tourneur,
1947). The solution is partial because generalizing from them need not be
vacuous, but at best it may not be valid beyond the Golden Age. I shall
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argue that, although both The Killers and Out of the Past have tragic as-
pects, the claim that they and, by implication, other films noirs rise to trag-
edy is far from compelling.
Aristotle on Tragedy
In exhibit 1, I offer synopses of two tragedies by Sophocles, Oedipus Rex
and Antigone. These works are among the examples that Aristotle had in
mind when he wrote his treatise Poetics, which deals with what he seemed
to take as the three main kinds of poetry: epic, tragic, and comic. Each
drama ends with horror: suicide; mutilation; exile; the visitation on those
left standing of the awful things that can befall people who might be trying
to act well. In their staging, these dramas from twenty-five hundred years
ago little resembled what we think of as the theatrical arts. Some striking
points of divergence are these. Their performance was highly stylized, with
a few reciters taking all roles, using different masks. The verse was sung or
chanted to music. The stage was shared with a chorus that observed the
action and commented on it. And, finally, the material was mythical and
well-known: several of the great tragedians wrote variations on the same
plot.
Aristotle’s analysis of these kinds of poetry is sometimes called formal
Exhibit 1. Synopses of Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex and Antigone.
Oedipus Rex. Oedipus, the king of Thebes, is confronted with the problem of plague in
the city. Informed by the oracles that the plague is caused by the unpunished murder
of the former king, Laius, Oedipus vows to hunt down the criminal. Slowly and by
degrees, he comes to the realization that he himself is the murderer of Laius, also his
own father, and that he is now married to his own mother, Jocasta. Horrified at the
discoveries, Oedipus blinds himself and goes into exile, while Jocasta commits suicide.
Antigone. Antigone, the daughter of Oedipus, disobeys the orders of Creon, now the
king of Thebes, who forbids the burial of her brother Polyneices, a traitor to the city.
After Antigone buries Polyneices, Creon condemns her to death and has her buried
alive in a cave. Although warned by the prophet Tiresias, Creon sticks to his decree.
Creon eventually yields and decides to free Antigone, but he arrives at the cave too
late—Antigone has hanged herself and is already dead. Creon’s son, Haemon, who had
been engaged to marry Antigone, is enraged at his father and, failing to kill him, kills
himself. Creon’s wife also commits suicide.
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because he was very specific about which kinds of plot, characters, and
treatment were appropriate, and which were not, to each. The table above
is illustrative of this, being a summary of Aristotle’s views on the differ-
ences among the three kinds of poetry.
For Aristotle, all art is pleasurable representation, mimesis. While the
epic and the comic present no problems for pleasure, the tragic clearly
does. These grim and violent stories would seem to be no more pleasur-
able than dwelling on pain. One way to avoid the problem was to claim
that the beauty and music of the verse, despite its often grim content, would
deliver pleasure. But Aristotle went further, making an ingenious move
that remains mysterious and controversial. He argued that tragic poetry
arouses the emotions of pity (for those suffering undeserved misfortune)
and terror (that this might happen to us) and that the aftermath is a kind
of healing. Much scholarly ink has been spilled about this theory of cathar-
sis. Scholars cannot even agree on whether it is the audience or the charac-
ters who experience it, or both. There are many uses of catharsis in ancient
Greek texts where it scarcely resembles what Aristotle might be getting at.
But, at a minimum, he expects tragedy to arouse powerful emotions in a
way that has positive effects. Many scholars think he is taking issue with
Plato, who expressed doubts about the value of poetry that arouses socially
disruptive emotions.
A checklist of Aristotle’s prescriptions for tragedy would show that the
case could be made that at least some films noirs resemble tragedy (those
not utterly lacking in gravitas). Certainly D.O.A. (Rudolph Maté, 1950),
for example, has a pitiably undeserving hero and a terrifying premise. Al-
lowances would have to be made for time and social context as well as the
atrophy of many of the conventions of the ancient Greek stage. But my
Aristotle’s Classification of Three Types of Poetry
EPIC
Language
Rhythm
Agents better
than us
Narrative
TRAGEDY
Language
Rhythm
Melody
Agents better
than us
Dramatic
MEDIUM
OBJECT
MODE
COMEDY
Language
Rhythm
Melody
Agents worse
than us
Dramatic
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negative answer to the claim will not turn on these sorts of considerations.
It will turn, rather, on certain philosophical considerations relating to ques-
tions about knowledge, who knows what and when, and about the moral
behavior of the characters. I find the former difficult to fit into Aristotle’s
mold, the latter impossible.
Film Noir as Tragedy
What are these questions of knowledge and morality? Noir films are sel-
dom without an element of mystery. Principal characters, and/or the au-
thorities, and/or we the audience are in the dark about some event, or some
personal history, or some character trait. The mystery is compounded be-
cause, more often than not, appearances are deceptive. What you see is not
at all what you get. The films deliver pleasure by solving the mystery, by
letting us behind the appearances—however convoluted the exposition. A
characteristic deceptive appearance of films noirs is that the leading man
or woman is presented sympathetically, especially at first. One of Aristotle’s
prescriptions is that, if the protagonist is happy, the trajectory of the tragic
drama should be toward unhappiness and that, if the protagonist is un-
happy, the trajectory should be toward happiness.
This is not quite how things go in my two case-study films. In The
Killers, the male protagonist, Swede, is murdered in the first reel, literally
put out of his misery. But, as his backstory is pieced together, we find that
it begins in misery: an injury ends his boxing career. He takes up with an
alluring woman, Kitty, and seems happy. But his happiness is deluded: she
is using him. In Out of the Past, the male protagonist, Jeff, seems very happy
in the opening scenes. Then, as his backstory unfolds, we find that his start-
ing point was neither happiness nor unhappiness but ennui. His involve-
ment with a femme fatale named Kathy is what brings him alive enough to
be happy. He is happy with a woman who tried to murder her previous
lover and ran off with some of his money. His delusion is that her behavior
was an aberration. In the opening scenes, Jeff appears to have put Kathy
behind him and to have regained happiness. When his past catches up with
him, however, he risks losing his happiness to settle matters outstanding.
Neither of these trajectories conforms to Aristotle’s ideals.
Yet both antiheroes are presented sympathetically. Their deaths are an
end to misery (Swede in The Killers) and a (presumably redemptive) sacri-
fice (Jeff in Out of the Past). One is made unsure by the lack of a moral
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center in the films, the lack, that is, of a character or point of view through
which we can assess the moral choices of their antihero and antiheroine.
Their emphasis is, rather, on the antihero (or his substitute) judging the
antiheroine—Kitty, Kathie—and finding her wanting. At the same time,
the films invite us to accept the antihero’s view of himself as victim. When
the antiheroine implies that she does not want to harm the hero or claims
that he is as bad as she, the film’s script, direction, and, above all, casting
position us so as to encourage discounting her words. Partly, this is be-
cause the films’ psychology is banal or opaque. Woman as predator, man as
victim, is banal. We do not know why the antihero is so vulnerable to the
femme fatale; we do not know what has made the femme so fatale. No
insight is offered into the psychological interior of either sex. They show
what they are in action rather than words (despite films noirs being rather
wordy). This accords well with Aristotle, who wrote: “Tragedy is a repre-
sentation not of people as such, but of actions and life, and both happiness
and unhappiness rest on action. The goal is a certain activity, not a qualita-
tive state; and while men do have certain qualities by virtue of their char-
acter, it is in their actions that they achieve, or fail to achieve, happiness.”5
These films, then, have a double aspect: what you see is not what you
get, either in knowledge or in morals. The mystery story functions to dis-
tract us from the sleight of hand that is attractively showcasing antisocial
immorality and cowardice. Thus distracted, we are reassured that the dark
underworld has been kept at bay when the plot allows a semblance of nor-
mality to be restored. This seems quite removed from the aim of catharsis,
of which more below.
Knowledge and Tragedy in The Killers and Out of the Past
Pauline Kael, most philosophical of all film critics, paraphrases our two films
in exhibit 2. There is, however, more going on in these films than is allowed
even by the hyperintelligent Kael, first as to knowledge (which I shall discuss
in this section), then as to morality (which I shall discuss below).
I begin with context. In trying to make sense of the complicated plot-
ting and the moral confusion of Golden Age films noirs, it helps to restore
them to their social and cultural contexts. Their imaginary world and their
imaginary characters were ingenious means to titillate and to reassure con-
temporaneous audiences while remaining obedient to the general impera-
tives of society and culture and the specific imperatives of censorship.
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Martha Wolfenstein and Nathan Leites’s Movies is a near-contemporaneous
case study of themes in the movies of the 1945–46 season, the heyday of
original film noir. I find it unsurpassed for insight and careful methodol-
ogy—yet underappreciated.6 The authors, both social psychologists, argued
that it was a characteristic feature of the American movies of the time that
they played on the differences between reality and appearance. Thus, from
comedies of this period, they identified the figure of the “comic onlooker,”
the nosey person who pries into and observes the action but who charac-
teristically misconstrues as scandalous situations and gestures that are quite
innocent, with hilarious results (Sitting Pretty [Walter Lang, 1948] is a prime
example).
Not only comedy but also melodrama of this period often turns on
conflicts between appearance and reality, especially dramas of false ap-
pearances.7 Wolfenstein and Leites identified for the first time a pivotal
figure of film noir, the good/bad girl. She appears to be bad only to turn
Exhibit 2. Pauline Kael on The Killers and Out of the Past.*
The Killers. Ernest Hemingway’s short story about the man who doesn’t try to escape his
killers is acted out tensely and accurately, and, for once, the gangster-thriller material
added to it is not just padding but is shrewdly conceived (by Anthony Veiller and the
uncredited John Huston) to show why the man didn’t care enough about life to run away.
Under the expert direction of Robert Siodmak, Burt Lancaster gives his first screen per-
formance (and is startlingly effective), and Siodmak also does wonders with Ava Gardner.
With Charles McGraw and William Conrad in the opening sequence, and Edmond
O’Brien, Albert Dekker, Sam Levene, Donald MacBride, Vince Barnett, and Jeff Corey.
Out of the Past. A thin but well-shot suspense melodrama, kept from collapsing by the
suggestiveness and intensity that the director, Jacques Tourneur, pours on. It’s empty
trash,** but you do keep watching it. Kirk Douglas, a gangster, hires Robert Mitchum
to find Jane Greer, who has run away from him. Predictably, she gets Mitchum (at his
most somnolent-sexy droopy-eyed) in her clutches, and there are several killings be-
fore matters are resolved. The screenplay is by Geoffrey Holmes (a pseudonym of Daniel
Mainwaring), from his novel Build My Gallows High. Cinematography by Nicholas
Musuraca; with Rhonda Fleming and Dickie Moore.
*Excerpted from Pauline Kael, 5001 Nights at the Movies: A Guide from A to Z [New York: Holt, Rinehart
& Winston, 1982], 303–4, 440.
** Trash, it bears remembering, is a term of art for Kael (see Pauline Kael, “Trash, Art, and the Movies”
[1969], in Going Steady [Boston: Little, Brown, 1970], 83–129).
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out to be good and misunderstood, or she poses as good but turns out to
be very bad indeed. For the first, think of Vivian Rutledge (Lauren Bacall) in
The Big Sleep (Howard Hawks, 1946), Laura Hunt (Gene Tierney) in Laura
(Otto Preminger, 1944); for the second, think of Brigid O’Shaughnessy (Mary
Astor) in The Maltese Falcon (John Huston, 1941), Ellen Berent (Gene
Tierney) in Leave Her to Heaven (John M. Stahl, 1945), Kathie Moffat
(Jane Greer) in Out of the Past, Kitty Collins (Ava Gardner) in The Killers,
Diane Tremayn (Jean Simmons) in Angel Face (Otto Preminger, 1952).
Wolfenstein and Leites also explored the moral universe of the films, iden-
tifying two moralities that compete: “goodness morality,” namely, the
morality of winning and success, and “fun morality”—the morality of
having fun.
The comic onlooker and the good/bad girl embody the disconcerting
and disorienting discrepancies emblematic of the centrality of the con-
flicts between appearance and reality in large numbers of American mov-
ies of the time. In noir, we find heroes and others wrongfully accused,
criminal policemen, honorable hoodlums, and women who are not what
they seem. Wolfenstein and Leites note that the constraints of the censor
and the box office are “indicative of more or less widely diffused feelings
and attachments in American culture. . . . The selection of certain themes
and omission of others would seem to be . . . expressive of deeper and less
conscious emotional tendencies.”8
Are films noirs, then, of the “goodness morality” or the “fun morality”
genre? They are neither: they are amoral, as we will see later. Why then are
they pleasurable? Why do those pleasures hold up relatively well over time?
More specifically, do they invite us to broaden the notion of tragedy? That
is, do these dramas of lies, violence, corruption, misanthropy, and so on
transcend themselves and deliver artistic pleasure?
I chose The Killers and Out of the Past because, besides their obvious
attractions as superb pieces of filmmaking, each involves a quasi suicide.
This makes them challenging as they do not fit easily among the films of
the period and they seem to be unpromising material for entertainment.
As Wolfenstein and Leites note: “Suicides in American films tend, to a con-
siderable extent, to express an attack against someone else, in so far as it is
possible to discern a tendency in the rare instances.”9 The Killers does not
fit this tendency; Out of the Past does. Swede/Ole Anderson/Pete Lund (Burt
Lancaster) passively awaits his fate, which is duly delivered by the epony-
mous killers, and which initiates the efforts of the insurance inspector Jim
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Reardon (Edmund O’Brien) to find out the whys and wherefores. Jeff Bailey/
Jeff Markham (Robert Mitchum), fearing that he will be falsely accused
because of the machinations of Kathie Moffat, sets up a trap that, he has
good reason to know, will kill them both. Death is the only escape from the
tendrils that she has around him, the only way to protect from her the
“good” girlfriend, Ann Miller (Virginia Huston), whom he really loves.
The Kid, his deaf-mute sidekick, manages to convince Ann that Jeff died
still in love with his femme fatale, allowing her to get over him and move
on with her life.
Both films have the bad/good girl in extreme form, that is, the girl who
appears sincere and needy but who is, in fact, calculating and treacherous,
using and manipulating the male she has ensnared.10 Whom she really cares
for varies. Kitty in The Killers appears to care for her husband, although he
is a thug. Kathie Moffat seems to care for no one but herself, her wealth,
and her survival. Interestingly, in both cases, the casting places in the bad
girl roles women of surpassing beauty: Ava Gardner and Jane Greer. Each
was appearing early in her career, and each eclipsed the good girl.11 By
contrast, Swede’s original girl, Lilly (Virginia Christine), and Jeff ’s good
girl, Ann (Virginia Houston), are played by actresses whose names will not
ring a bell. The male casting is more complicated. Each film matched an
established star with a newcomer. In The Killers, Edmund O’Brien’s Jim
Reardon investigates the death of Burt Lancaster’s Swede. In Out of the
Past, Robert Mitchum’s Jeff is trying not to let Kirk Douglas’s Whit get the
better of him. The use of attractive male actors as the women’s victims is
artful. We may envy them their looks and manners; we do not envy them
their character or their fate. Both films were in the hands of expert direc-
tors. Robert Siodmak and Jacques Tourneur had each begun his career in
Europe in the thirties, as had most directors of the classic noir films. Each
did exceptional work in the horror genre and would go on to make further
masterpieces.12
So what pleasures do noir films offer? First, and obviously, they were
polished products of the dream factory. The American movie industry was
successful at finding formulas that its public relished. Second, the film noir
genre clearly grows out of a popular form of literature, the hard-boiled
detective story (Hammet, Chandler) and the simply hard-boiled (James
M. Cain, Cornell Woolrich). Third, the films are to be relished for the
sheer skill of their filmmaking. Throughout the thirties, black-and-white
film stock was improving, as was deep focus, so that, by the time noir
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began to gel, say between The Maltese Falcon (1941) and Double Indemnity
(Billy Wilder, 1944), the only limits on atmosphere, chiaroscuro, and self-
conscious framing of shots were the imagination of the director and the
skill of the cinematographer.
The opening sequence of The Killers, taken almost word for word from
the Hemingway short story, is simply breathtaking. The film begins over a
shot behind the heads of two men driving at night, the only illumination
the car headlights. The credits and loud music begin over a shot looking
from the shadows at the illuminated windows of a diner. As the credits
come toward their end, two men stroll into the shadow and try the door of
the closed gas station. They then show their hard faces before entering the
diner by different entrances and beginning the chilling exchanges that es-
tablish their dominance and their mission. This mood of somber menace
continues until the final fusillade of bullets is directed into Swede and we
move beyond Hemingway to Hollywood original.13 This is filmmaking that
would thrill any audience.
The opening sequence of Out of the Past is also set on a road but in
daylight, in a small town. The setting is the West, whereas The Killers is set
in the East. The dark underworld stretches from coast to coast, it seems. In
broad daylight, Jeff is informed that his former client, the “gambler” Whit
Sterling, wants to see him.14 The message is delivered by Joe Stephanos.
Joe’s kinship with the killers in The Killers is more subtly signaled by his
black trenchcoat, his throwing a match near the deaf-mute, and his wari-
ness as a police car cruises by. Cue to a long flashback as Jeff narrates the
backstory to Ann on the drive up to Sterling’s mansion at Tahoe. His story
is how he was ensnared by a fascinating woman until her acts of treachery
disillusioned him. Like Swede, who seems to consider running a waste of
time, if not an attempt to escape a deserved comeuppance, Jeff makes no
attempt to defy the messenger and disappear again. If they find you once,
they will find you again. There is nowhere to hide. The past and the under-
world are everywhere.
Fourth, the plots present occasions to contemplate the forbidden or at
least the unattainable. What ensnares the boxer Swede and the private eye
Jeff is the woman whose sexual allure is so overpowering that their ability
to judge character is switched off. The films put this allure on display to
please the audience. These women are too beautiful, too desirable, and too
ready to fall in with the antihero. His alarm bells fail. Sexual attraction is
presented as an intense, even overwhelming basis for a relationship, but it
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clouds all other aspects of character and background, and the man comes
to accept that his fate is destruction by this woman. Swede becomes an
armed robber (the robbery, captured in one continuous shot, is another
bravura piece of filmmaking); Jeff tries to evade the various traps and double
crosses but fails in the end. To stop Kathie, his own life must be the ulti-
mate bait.
Is this some sort of tragedy? In the Poetics, Aristotle is specific about
tragedy as a form. It is “a representation of an action which is serious,
complete, and of a certain magnitude—in language which is garnished in
various forms in its different parts—in the mode of dramatic enactment,
not narrative—and through the arousal of pity and fear effecting the kathar-
sis of such emotions.”15 The characters should be neither wholly good nor
wholly evil but, rather, fallible, capable of major error. They need also to
have a certain weight, a dignity and standing ensuring the importance of
what they undertake and undergo. One might view sexual susceptibility as
an error of sorts—but only of sorts as it is not the sort of error that Aristotle
appears to have had in mind. One way to bring sexual susceptibility into
the classical Greek framework is to treat it as hubris. This line of thought is
viable, no doubt, even though films noirs offer little context to support it,
since neither Swede nor Jeff ever gets to talk about his fatal attraction. The
absence of personal background information is not mythlike, as it is in the
classic westerns; rather, it hints at a lonely isolation that makes these at-
tractive males such easy victims. Still, it would be an interesting exercise,
not least because it would see the subclass of noir that features the bad/
good girl as in counterpoint to most other American movies, where ro-
mantic love, which always has a strong sexual component, is the mythical
answer to all life’s problems, including personal fulfillment.
Pity and terror are aroused when the consequences of choices are
worked out. A first mistake is made, and this leads to the dire consequences
that bring catharsis, provided the protagonist is serious: “A responsible
moral agent ought to know that disasters can have ordinary beginnings,
and to know how one mistake leads to another. The right tragic plot im-
parts that knowledge at the same time that it trains its audience’s moral
sentiments.”16 While I extravagantly admire these films and am excited by
their twists and turns, I am not moved by them or by the fates of their
protagonists. Still less do they educe pity and terror. They are cautionary
tales. What is of desirable appearance is not necessarily good for you. Beau-
tiful women can be dangerous. To call this banal would be an understate-
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ment. Such banality scarcely counts as knowledge, still less as material for
training the moral sentiments.
Other considerations regarding tragedy are these. First and foremost,
Aristotle is a formalist: he separates epic, tragedy, and comedy in a system-
atic way, depending on the kinds of people involved and the kinds of plea-
sures delivered, and he specifies restrictive structural features, such as the
unities of time, space, and action and the trajectory of the characters be-
tween happiness and misery, or vice versa. This formalism is hard to rec-
oncile with noir. As already noted, writers such as Schrader refuse to consider
noir a genre just because there are no fixed rules of locale, types of charac-
ters, or structural features of plot. The logic of noir is often romantic rather
than formal, and the stress on atmosphere and style would likely fall under
Aristotle’s category of spectacle, the lowest of the means to deliver pity and
terror. Failure to preserve the unities, the absence of moral nobility in the
characters, and the emphasis on spectacle strike me as quite un-Aristotelian.
On the other hand, the lack of psychologizing, the emphasis on action, and
the constant revelations and narrative reversals do accord with Aristotle’s
prescriptions.17 So I do not deny that a case could be made, even as I choose
to emphasize the differences rather than the conformities.18 I think that the
epistemology of these films can be reconciled with Aristotle; I think, how-
ever, that he would find their moral drama seriously wanting.
Tragedy or not, noir films are enthralling. They were successful in their
time, they stay in the mind, and they feature in the history books. They
take us into a world that seems to abut the world we normally inhabit, that
perhaps undergirds some of the things in our ordinary world, yet in which
people’s lives and motives seldom make sense to inhabitants of the ordi-
nary world. Two men enter a diner, and it is touch-and-go whether they
execute everyone present (The Killers); Joe Stephanos is demonstratively
genial, yet he is part of the plot to set Jeff up for a murder and later is sent
to kill him (Out of the Past). There are rules and codes in this world—but
not the familiar ones. They include the maxim that you are not safe unless
you take care to have a hold over others, be it violent, sexual, blackmailing,
or financial. Others are never what they seem. The more plausible and in-
viting the scheme, the more likely it is to be a trap, a setup. The characters
face moral choices that they flub.
Before turning to the detail of morality in the two films, we can note
how unpromising they are on general grounds. The best tragedy, for
Aristotle, does not involve wholly virtuous or wholly villainous protago-
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nists. It involves, rather, protagonists who mix innocence and guilt but who
at least have a noble or lofty purpose. They need to be acting on principle.
Then the tragedy becomes one of a clash of possibly equally worthy prin-
ciples, such as between Creon’s refusal to bury a traitor and Antigone’s
religious duty to bury her brother. The protagonists also need to make a
major mistake that somehow precipitates the disaster. In general, only the
first of these features is to be found in noir, namely, the mixture of inno-
cence and guilt. There is some acting on principle, especially in noirs close
to Hammett and Chandler, but, as we shall see, relentless self-centeredness
and self-pity are more characteristic. As to the major mistake: as I have
indicated, susceptibility to womanly wiles scarcely seems to amount to act-
ing on principle.
Moral Analysis of The Killers
The Killers is more morally conventional than Out of the Past. A crime is
committed, and the film traces its solution via flashbacks. Instead of the
authorities investigating the murder of Swede, however, they somehow end
up playing second fiddle to Reardon, an investigator for an insurance com-
pany.19 This allows for conflict between the sleuth, hot on the trail, and his
boss, who wants him off the case. By the sheerest coincidence, Swede’s gaso-
line supplier had insured its franchisees with the same company that in-
sured the hat factory Swede had robbed. As the backstory of the killing is
unraveled, it is the insurance investigator who is vouchsafed all the infor-
mative flashbacks. What emerges is that Swede “got in wrong,” as
Hemingway puts it. The film has “I did something wrong—once,” which
is less accurate. Swede’s boxing career ended when his hand was damaged.
He is smitten with Kitty and becomes a criminal in order to impress her.
He is so infatuated that he goes to prison for her. In prison, he thinks
about her. On his release, he is embroiled by Big Jim Colfax in an armed
robbery—and not informed that Colfax and Kitty are now married. Colfax
and Kitty are well aware of Swede’s bewitchment and use it to make it
look as though he has absconded with the take. When Kitty dumps Swede
and takes the money (to join Colfax), he is despairing and suicidal. He
changes his name and operates a gas station.20 He seems to be living a
quiet, “straight” life—but without a new love interest. When Colfax comes
on him working at the gas station, Swede feels ill and quits work, await-
ing the inevitable.
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The film strongly implies that Kitty is responsible for Swede’s death, as
well as for that of Colfax, as well as for those of the two hoodlums Blinky
and Dum Dum. It is for her that Colfax planned the big robbery and for
her that he wanted to cheat the others of their share of the booty. He has
used the money to set himself up in a business the legitimacy of which
Kitty claims to enjoy. Swede seems not to regret dumping his original girl,
Lilly, who ends up marrying the policeman Lubinsky. He seems not to re-
gret his misconduct. He seems to mind mainly his failure of judgment, his
failure to heed the warning of his cellmate, Charleston, not to listen to
those golden harps (a symbol of Kitty). These failures leave him tormented,
prostrate, and resigned to his fate.
The morality here is that Swede regrets mainly his own gullibility,
not his crimes, and not his shielding criminals. He does not cooperate
with the authorities, even though in this film they are sympathetic (“No,
I wouldn’t want to be a copper”). He shields Kitty from prison by telling
lies and evades the police by disappearing after the robbery and the double
cross. He has no family and no social background to speak of, and the
beneficiary of his life insurance is the hotel maid who once dissuaded
him from suicide. His resignation can be taken like this: having “got in
wrong,” he must now accept the personal consequences without any gen-
eral obligation to the ordinary sense of righting the wrong. Society’s de-
mand for justice is met, not because of his actions, but rather because the
disappearance of Swede and the money triggers a dispute within the gang.
Thus, Dum Dum kills Blinky so he can search Swede’s room; the police
wound Dum Dum, and Colfax kills him, but not before he has mortally
wounded Colfax.
Of the five, only Kitty is left standing, and we can imagine the string
of charges she is going to face. Her view of herself is: “I’m poison, Swede,
to myself and everybody around me. I’d be afraid to go with anyone I
love for the harm I’d do them.” This “poison” seems to consist of three
things: she is powerfully sexually attractive; she knows this and makes
use of it; and she is quite amorally interested in her own comfort. So
neither she nor Swede wants to atone for wrongs done or to pay any
debts to society. Swede at least does not run a second time from his come-
uppance, whereas Kitty collapses at the end, desperately trying to get her
dying husband to exonerate her.
Morality, then, is personal. It is about not being a sucker. It is about
self-preservation. As we have seen, Wolfenstein and Leites say that it is about
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winning. This helps explain why we never see the story from the point of
view of the authorities. The police are disinclined to investigate Swede’s
murder. Lieutenant Lubinsky assists Reardon rather than taking over the
case when the connection to the armed robbery turns up. It becomes per-
sonal with Reardon, so much so that he ambushes and holds at gunpoint
one of the hoodlums. Indeed, were it not somehow personal with him, the
case would not have been cracked. Yet there is no suggestion that Reardon
is fascinated by Kitty (as is Laura’s Lieutenant Mark McPherson by Laura),
nor is he obsessed with a sense of justice or of fair play. When finally he
meets Kitty, he is playing a game of cat and mouse. He knows that she will
try to set him up, and he tries to get as much information out of her as he
can before that. It is so personal that we are not even sure that his cracking
the case will benefit his insurance company.
There are no fewer than eleven flashbacks in this film.21 In almost ev-
ery one, we are given a fragment of information that is withheld from one
or more of the protagonists, all of whom are, therefore, embroiled in the
drama of false appearances. Swede is unaware of Kitty’s amorality and of
her view of herself as “poison”; he also fails to notice that Colfax is also in
thrall to her, a failure that prevents him from figuring out that Colfax might
also act so as to gain her favor. Blinky and Dum Dum know that Colfax
and Kitty are married but not that Kitty is manipulating Swede. This is
how they fail to realize that the beneficiary of the double cross is Colfax,
not Swede. Can we take it that only Kitty knows things for what they are?
Can we accept her self-assessment? Does she really love Swede? The drama
allows various interpretations. They all converge, however, on the idea that
female sexual attractiveness is powerful and dangerous to men and to soci-
ety. It is a force capable of making a man lose his moral compass (Swede
was not a criminal as long as he was in the ring) and take his misjudgment
as his personal failing or as his fate.
In a coda, Reardon and his boss discuss the plot endgame, minimizing
the cash value of Reardon’s solving it, and then, flippantly, the boss orders
Reardon to take a rest but to be back at work on Monday. Things are nor-
malized as though this was just another of the insurance company’s tangled
case files, all in a day’s work, so to speak. The slightly cocky humor of the
scene makes no sense other than as an artificially “up” way of ending a
very dark tale. It encourages the audience to make light of what has gone
before. If we read it as a framing chorus, then it woefully reduces the seri-
ousness of the drama. Without seriousness, there is no tragedy.
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Moral Analysis of Out of the Past
In Out of the Past, the sequence of events narrated is more complex than in
The Killers. This is partly because the film has no “normalizing” figure like
the insurance investigator Reardon. The puzzle of the opening call by the
hoodlum Joe Stephanos on Jeff Bailey both ushers in recollections of what
went before (in flashbacks) and initiates what is going to happen from this
point forward. Some questions are: When and how does Jeff know he has
been double-crossed? How does his current love, Ann, know he is honest?
The answers are opaque. Why does Jeff cover up Kathie’s killing of his part-
ner, Fisher? The answer never considered is that he is a coward; he sacri-
fices himself only when he can take Kathie with him and stop her. His
quasi suicide is an attack on someone else.
By contrast with Swede, Jeff is on the screen a lot of the time and is
given plenty of lines both in direct speech and in voice-over reflections on
his situation. He too “got in wrong,” perhaps inadvertently. Sent to find a
mobster’s absconding girlfriend, he is smitten. Instead of returning her to
his client, he enjoys an idyll with her. But Fisher, his former partner in the
private detective business, spots him, corners them, and demands his cut
of the money she took. Fisher and Jeff fight, and Kathie shoots Fisher. She
tells Jeff that he would not have done it and that they would eventually
have been betrayed. She leaves him to bury the body—and to find evidence
that she did, in fact, run off with the money, something she had earlier de-
nied. Jeff ’s reaction is the self-indulgent “I wasn’t sorry for him or sore at her.
I wasn’t anything.” Only if he felt something would he hunt her down—or at
least give Fisher a decent burial by calling in the authorities.
This is the crucial moment of error. Jeff knows that this woman is ca-
pable of murder and that he is not. He knows that she is capable of leaving
him to explain the corpse even though she claims to love him. He knows
that she is a flat-out liar who falsely denied having the money. With the
film barely one-third over, the false appearances are gone. But Jeff is hardly
the stuff of which heroes are made. He buries Fisher and changes his name
and profession. Thus, he is silent about a robbery and a murder because a
woman to whom he was attracted committed them. At first we do not know
why: he is inactive perhaps out of chivalry and perhaps out of cowardice,
of being scared that he will be suspected. He does not try to find her, much
less bring her to justice. He does not go to the authorities and try to explain
how Fisher met his end. Instead, he goes into hiding.
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Wolfenstein and Leites note how often the protagonists of films in this
period are without family or any other social context.22 In such absence,
the claims normally made on an individual are absent too. Such individu-
als can feel and act like free atoms, affecting only those they bump into. In
the classical tragedies, family ties and responsibilities are central.
Meanwhile, the renamed Jeff has been courting Ann, whose mother
objects to him precisely because no one knows who he is or where he came
from. He evades Ann’s questions by saying that they will be answered one
day, as, indeed, they are in the major flashback sequence where he tells of
his encounter with Kathie and its consequences.23 This insouciant moral
coward accepts that he must face Whit, the mobster whose girl he went off
with and whose money is missing. So, again, the morality is personal. Whit
does not seem inclined to punish him, instead demanding a quid pro quo,
that Jeff help retrieve some incriminating documents from a tax accoun-
tant, Leonard Eels. While at Whit’s mansion, Jeff encounters Kathie, now
back with Whit. Although Jeff plays along, he is quite aware that he is being
set up, but not by whom. When Jeff thwarts the first setup, Kathie sends Joe
Stephanos to kill him. Desperately trying to extricate himself, Jeff forces
Whit to see what Kathie is and to turn her over to the authorities. But she
kills Whit. Earlier, Kathie had said, “I don’t want to die,” and Jeff had re-
sponded, “Neither do I, baby, but if I have to, I’m going to die last.” With
Whit dead, Jeff sees no way out. He sets them both up with the police. Very
artfully, the film does not let us overhear Jeff ’s call to the police. After a
drink, his last words to Kathie are that they deserve each other. When she
sees the police roadblock, she calls him a double-crossing rat and pulls a
gun from her case. He briefly struggles with her, but she shoots him and
then at the police before being shot herself. Jeff does not get his wish to be
the last to die.
Jeff is hardly acting morally. He tries to set things right for himself. He
wants to disentangle himself from the web of crime and deception that
Kathie has lured him into, not to serve justice, conventional or natural,
public or private. He does not mourn Fisher,24 he does not mourn Joe, and
he coolly buries one body and moves another (Eels’s), always to protect
himself. He is willing to trade exonerating documents for his own skin
even though Whit had him framed and had Eels murdered. His death hardly
atones for all this.
Such personal morality, this kind of desperate struggle to peel back the
false appearances and find who really did what to whom at the expense of
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any social responsibility, is the imaginary universe of a great deal of film
noir. Sometimes the characters are sympathetic, sometimes not, but they
are all motivated by self-protection and their wish to know. They all are in
the grip of the idea that there is a plot hidden somewhere, behind the ob-
vious plot, one that explains what everyone is up to. If they could expose
this, then they would restore some kind of sense, some kind of normality
to their lives. Reardon could then go back to adjusting humdrum claims;
Ann could then marry the nice state official who carries a torch for her, but
only after she concludes that Jeff remained enthralled to the evil Kathie.
The deaf-mute, known only as The Kid, is the keeper of the secret that Jeff
did love Ann to the end, a very romantic take on his death. This is confus-
ing. Equally confusing is Lubinsky’s extraordinarily antiromantic remark
in The Killers, speaking of Lilly, now his wife: “She was always in love with
him [Swede] . . . and I was always in love with her. It worked out fine for
me, anyway.” Normality is restored, but it continues to be predicated on
lies and deception, on false appearances, and on a morality that permits
those who live by society’s codes to be protected from the dark truth
known to those who have “got in wrong.” If there is any profound moral
to the story, it is that we cannot condemn those who know that dark
truth, as we are hardly better, as we too live under and benefit from the
tissue of lies.
The morality of “let he who is without sin cast the first stone” is not
one that makes much sense in classical tragedy. We are not invited to miti-
gate Oedipus’s crimes because he is reformed, still less because we are all
guilty. Creon and Antigone clash because both act on principle. If the au-
dience were to view principles as floating on our lies, the outcome would
be not tragedy but irony.
Knowledge, Morality, and Tragedy: The Issues Joined
The idea of personal morality is, of course, incoherent. It is a false appear-
ance. The rules of morality are social institutions. Any claim to a personal
code that is not simply internalized social rules is, by definition, amoral, if
not immoral. So these films are morally incoherent. They sympathetically
portray men ensnared by femmes fatales even though these men are weak
moral cowards. These incoherencies in the morality of the films, including
their wholesale acceptance of the “sexy woman as succubus” myth, are evi-
dence that what drives them are the constraints of censorship, in the nar-
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row sense, and of a culture in which puritanism and the demand for li-
cense go hand in hand.25
Let me elaborate. The idea that some, if not all, very attractive women
are dangerous is a clear projection of fear of the power of sex. The puritan
variant is that only if it is completely repressed are we safe from it. No
annual bacchanalia or Sunday sport for the puritan. Hence, approved rela-
tionships, Swede with Lilly, Jeff with Ann, are low-key, respectful, headed
toward pair-bonding. The ability to live those lives, however, depends on
averting the gaze from, or not knowing about, the lure of powerful sexual
attraction and easy money and how these associate with the underworld of
immorality or amorality. The implied connection is that the one kind of
transgression, fornication, is at the top of the slippery slope toward others—
robbery, treachery, even murder. The connection is implied rather than
stated because of its manifest absurdity. One thing simply does not lead to
the other. Censorship demands only that the bad be punished. So Kitty
and Kathie must get their comeuppance because they sleep with men with-
out marrying them and manipulate them into buying them luxury lifestyles,
and they do not stop short of instigating murder, even carrying it out. Jus-
tice comes to Kathie from the guns of the police, to Kitty presumably from
the courts. The antiheroes who have transgressed and “got in wrong” also
pay with their lives for their expiation.
But censorship is only a narrow constraint. The wider one is that the
films of the period had to offer pleasures to the audience. Films that kill off
almost everyone bad, that never comment on the incoherence of personal
morality, that suggest that the past will catch up with you, offer some re-
assurance and satisfaction to the audience. Self-congratulation is some-
thing in which most people, especially those touched by the puritan spirit,
take pleasure. It is reassuring to be told that, if we allowed sex free rein, it
might turn all male heads. Such films allow you to contemplate seduction
by a highly attractive woman, but they prevent her from harming you be-
cause she is just a movie image and because the drama shows that what she
does to men is evil. So be happy that these temptations do not come your
way. Such films say that respectable life floats on a magma of violence,
viciousness, and evil but that this must be repressed, not acknowledged.
Do not let on to the innocent and good what lurks beneath.
The two films I have discussed are in some ways limiting cases. As
Wolfenstein and Leites point out:
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The hero [in noir] is typically in a strange town where there are apt
to be dangerous men and women of ambiguous character and where
the forces of law and order are not to be relied on. . . . If he relies on no
one but himself . . . he will emerge triumphant. . . . A minority . . . are
cautionary tales. The hero may succumb to his attacker; this is his
bad dream. . . . Out of greed and overconfidence, he may try to get
away with murder; he commits the crime of which he is usually
only suspected and has to pay for it. The girl may turn out to be
worse than he believed. . . . He may not be able to produce anyone
on whom to pin the blame for the crimes of which he is falsely ac-
cused; then he is a victim of circumstances. If circumstances fail to
collaborate with his need to blame someone else, he may even end
by blaming himself.26
Swede and Jeff blame themselves. Theirs are cases where their own im-
pulses are the problem: their vulnerability to the sexual siren and their
consequent loss of moral compass. Better we hew closely to our moral com-
pass and eschew the power of desire; otherwise, it will undo us and possi-
bly also our way of life. There is still room here to make a case for noir films
as tragedy, but their emphases on narrative and its uncertainties and on
spectacle immediately negate it.
For example, the point of view of the films differs from what one can
surmise from the travails of the characters. As I noted at the beginning, the
photographic style was made possible by technical advances. It helped that
the directors were adept at expressionistic mise-en-scènes. Much has been
written about the way the films look, how swiftly they move, and how they
manage to be both exciting and detached. They are also detached in their
point of view because they never settle on one. Much sophistication goes
into this. The opening of The Killers is narrated omnisciently: we see things
from the killers’ view, from the diners’ view, and from Swede’s view. Then
we switch to follow Reardon. But Reardon’s drive and intensity are those of
the film, not something we share. And, when it is his turn to be set up, we
switch to the point of view of Lubinsky, who kills Reardon’s would-be kill-
ers. The last shoot-out is offscreen, presumably as a lead-in to the prosaic
final scene in the insurance office. I have already commented on its odd
flippancy.
Tourneur’s style in Out of the Past is similarly expressive, with the added
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touch of High Sierra settings for Ann and Jeff ’s idyll. Again, the point of
view shifts, from omniscience at the beginning; to extended voice-over flash-
back by Jeff to Ann; back to omniscience in following Jeff as he tries to
disentangle himself, The Kid as he is followed in an effort to shoot Jeff, and
Jimmy the game warden tailing Ann (for whom he carries the torch) and
then talking to the police as they discuss tracking Jeff down. We end as we
begin, by being positioned as onlookers, not mourners, as The Kid lies to
Ann so as to free her from any guilt she may feel about moving on with her
life.
The casting is itself an act of mise-en-scène, a way of directing our
sympathies. The most alluring of the females are given the bad/good girls’
roles; the protagonists’ roles are handed to strong and attractive male stars.
Hollywood invested talent in these films, behind the camera and in front.
This itself was a way of glamorizing what it officially wanted to condemn.
The very fact that these films are invested with great skill to make them
absorbing, even enticing to watch hardly fits with the script message that
the whole bunch of characters and their complicated lives are low-life. Al-
though Swede is a loser, he is played by an attractive, up-and-coming star,
Burt Lancaster, which makes him seem a victim. Perhaps we are meant to
pity him. Robert Mitchum as Jeff is even more winsome. He is calm, insou-
ciant, the quintessence of what is now called cool. This in itself is an ad-
mired trait. He also has a remarkable facility with worldly, witty, deprecating
ripostes for someone who never cracks a book or even a newspaper. (James
M. Cain was an uncredited writer on Out of the Past.) He sails through the
mayhem for all the world as though he is just a put-upon regular joe. Yet,
to repeat, he is utterly self-centered. Preserving his own skin is what comes
first. He is played and portrayed by script and direction as a doomed ro-
mantic hero. The truth that he is “no good” comes from the mouth of
Kathie, at a point in the film when we have been taught not to trust any-
thing she says. Like most death in noir, his is quickly set aside.27 Death
without ceremony is hardly tragic.
The philosophical balance sheet, then, is this. The solution to the mys-
tery, the dark reality behind appearances, is disclosed to us as a warning.
Just because bad actions are in the past does not mean that they are settled.
The double aspect must be maintained. To protect the respectable, those
who have knowledge must tell lies. There is no bridge. Jeff cannot escape
his past but should protect Ann and her family from it; Lubinsky is happy
that Swede dumped Lilly. Kathie is dead; there is no escape to respectabil-
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ity for Kitty. Disruption of the respectable social order has been avoided.
Ann, Jimmy, Lilly, Reardon have all had brushes with the underworld, but its
disruptive potential has been contained. Restoration of the respectable order
is not what tragedy celebrates. The revelations, such as Swede’s discovery
that Kitty is not loyal to him or Jeff ’s discovery of the vicious side of Kathy,
could be said to resemble discovery of connections in classical tragedies, as
could the reversals that these discoveries trigger. But the manner of their
disclosure is mainly through narrative (flashback, voice-over), not action.
Tragedies are not dramas of false appearances. The classical tragedies
that Aristotle approved of were mostly set in families, often noble ones.
The protagonists all acted on moral principle. Because of some fatal error,
a chain of events is set in motion that leads to a situation where terrible
consequences cannot be evaded—usually because two principles clash. This
trajectory arouses pity and terror, and the purging effect of these emotions
is some sort of artistic pleasure. Protagonists who allow romantic love to
cloud their judgement, who act in self-serving and unprincipled ways, do
not resemble the doomed characters of classical tragedy. Their petty affairs
scarcely warrant pity and terror. In particular, Aristotle seems to have wanted
his protagonists to be neither wholly guilty nor wholly innocent in order
that the audience could make some connection to them. My argument has
been that film noir creates a world so exotic and unprincipled that the
audience makes no more than the superficial connection with it needed to
sustain its involvement. Moreover, the audience is encouraged by various
means to distance itself from the protagonists and the world they inhabit.
This disconnection, this reassurance, is, ultimately, why I think films noirs
fail as tragedy.
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Moral Man in the Dark City
Film Noir, the Postwar Religious Revival, and The Accused
R. Barton Palmer
The Dark Mirror
A principal problem for historians of the American film is how to explain,
as Andrew Spicer puts it, “the eruption of film noir’s dark, cynical, and
often pessimistic stories into the sunlit pastures of Hollywood’s character-
istically optimistic and affirmative cinema.”1 Although influences from
other cinematic traditions (primarily German expressionism) and from
literature (European naturalism, native hard-boiled fiction) have custom-
arily been taken into account, film scholars, Spicer among them, have for
the most part relied on what we might call the dark mirror theory to ac-
count for this surprising development. According to this view, the sudden
emergence and flourishing of film noir reflects the supposedly bleak and
fearful national mood that unexpectedly descended on the nation in the
wake of the war’s end, despite (or because of) the overwhelming victory
achieved by American arms in both the European and the Pacific theaters.
Most, if not all, historians of the period endorse this notion of pro-
found cultural change (something akin to a paradigm shift). The wartime
consensus of what has been termed victory culture, based on a sublimation
of racial and class tensions, is thought to have given way to a national state
of mind that Hollywood could profitably metaphorize as a dark cityscape.2
Film noir constructed a locus of entrapment, dislocation, anomie, and sexual
uncertainty whose most signal quality was the dreadful solitude of its per-
secuted protagonists, a state of being in stark opposition to wartime no-
tions of solidarity and civic connection. Film noir was not the only cultural
symptom of this new national mood. William Graebner, for example, sees
the widespread anxiety of the immediate postwar years as generating, in
addition to Hollywood’s dark cinema, developments as diverse as the in-
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creasing popularity of psychotherapy, the enduring national preoccupa-
tion with a UFO threat after dubiously documented sightings, and the sur-
prising adoption of existentialism by the country’s leading intellectuals
(including some notable theologians).
The postwar era thus became, in Graebner’s formulation, a “culture of
contingency.” The causes, Graebner argues, are clear enough. By the end of
the forties, unpredictable and destructive international events had succeeded
one another for more than two decades with bewildering rapidity. Ameri-
cans had, therefore, come to sense that chance, not the iron laws of eco-
nomics or the inevitability of human progress, was now ruling individual
and collective experience. A shooting war in which perhaps 50 million,
even more, had perished raised, in Graebner’s view, “the possibility of sud-
den, undeserved death” for one and all.3 And, even before the Russians
developed nuclear weapons of their own in 1949, a perhaps unwinnable
cold war had broken out, threatening slaughter on a scale never before
imagined in human history. Americans had discovered, as the theologian
Reinhold Niebuhr told his fellow countrymen in 1952, that they were “the
custodians of the ultimate weapon which perfectly embodies and symbol-
izes the moral ambiguity of physical warfare.” Once invented, “the bomb”
could not be renounced because no nation can justly dispense with the
means to forestall a threatened destruction. Yet, if forced to use it, Niebuhr
predicted, “we might insure our survival in a world in which it might be
better not to be alive.”4
The national mood, however, was not dominated simply by nuclear
dread and terror. Many commentators at the time also lamented the failure
or abandonment of traditional notions of human purpose and virtue,
prompting what Graebner terms a moral crisis, for “the seminal events of
the forties seemed to confirm that humanity had, indeed, been set adrift
from its ethical moorings.”5 For Niebuhr, the defeat of European fascism
and Oriental militarism was deeply ironic, calling into question the con-
ventional pieties of the national creed. He opined: “We are the poorer for
the global responsibilities which we bear. And the fulfillments of our de-
sires are mixed with frustrations and vexations.” Most frustrating, and
morally puzzling, was the fact that “the paradise of our domestic security
is suspended in a hell of global insecurity,” undermining the “conviction
of the perfect compatibility of virtue and prosperity which we have inher-
ited from both our Calvinist and our Jeffersonian ancestors.”6
The dark mirror theory proposes that noir films give narrative and
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visual shape to these deep doubts about national purpose and direction.
Characteristically set in a murky urban tangle of bars, cheap hotels, rail-
road stations, and underworld dives, they construct a frightening alterna-
tive, a life of permanent impermanence, to the settled, middle-class existence
that was ordinarily purveyed by a Hollywood formerly preoccupied, for
sound business reasons, with picturing “sunlit pastures.” Furthermore, as
I have argued elsewhere, the customary forward motion of Hollywood nar-
rative, its relentless movement toward the solution of problems and the
restoration of the status quo, is fractured by story elements that come “out
of the past,” obviating reassuring forms of closure, and confirming feck-
less protagonists in their isolation from conventional values, especially a
sense of regained righteousness.7
The rootless, morally compromised denizens of the dark city glimpse,
but only briefly, the domestic inclusiveness of melodrama (arguably the
most pervasive form of Hollywood fantasy) and its figuration of the pro-
tective, nurturing family as the destined end of the virtuous. In melodrama,
the home is a guarantor for one and all of a stable identity established by
unchallengeable notions of relatedness, a fortress against an intrusive, fright-
ening public sphere. In the anonymous dark city, by way of contrast, all are
strangers in a strange land. Noir characters find themselves embroiled in
narratives that unfold in transient spaces that, like city streets, are open to
everyone, yet no community, no system of values that might reflect or pro-
duce consensus, emerges to direct either their desires or their movements.
Such a mode of representation finds its structural reflex in episodic narra-
tives that, lacking little sense of determining causality, are difficult to fol-
low (for protagonists and spectators alike) and often, in fact, lead nowhere
or circle back to their beginning.
Affirmation and Redemption in Film Noir
There is obviously much to recommend the view that what Graebner aptly
terms the age of anxiety finds a more or less obvious cinematic correlative
in film noir. Yet we should bear in mind that such general propositions
(that film noir is essentially pessimistic, that the postwar era was pervaded
by angst and moral doubt) are most useful as heuristics guiding, but not
determining, textual analysis. Contextual approaches are most persuasive
when global characterizations of a film series are nuanced by the specific
connections that can be established between individual films and particu-
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lar historical trends or events. In the case of film noir, such work has been
significantly advanced by Paul Arthur, who demonstrates how narrowly
defined postwar themes (e.g., returning veterans’ difficult readjustment to
civilian life) find narrative and visual form within the larger traditions of
Hollywood filmmaking, thus figuring as constructions rather than reflec-
tions of contemporary reality. Arthur’s detailed study confirms the general
usefulness of the dark mirror theory, but it also suggests that understand-
ings of noir films and the social contexts that inform them may have been
formulated imprecisely because at too general a level.8
In this essay, I intend to take Arthur’s approach in a somewhat differ-
ent direction, with a view toward a further nuancing of the dark mirror
theory. In particular, I seek to recover here an important cultural move-
ment in the postwar world, neglected by noir historians, in order to better
contextualize a considerable body of films that, although deemed noir by
scholarly consensus, eschew in different ways the deep-seated pessimism
about the human capacity for virtue that is otherwise such a signal feature
of the series.9 These noir films whose theme is redemption in some sense
model patterns of experience that find eloquent and more reflective expres-
sion in Niebuhr’s various works, especially Moral Man and Immoral Society
(1932), a politicoreligious text that, although first published before the war,
reflects and defines important terms of the spiritual revival that was such an
important element of American culture in the late forties and the fifties.
The increasing concern with religiosity (and the psychological meliorism
that was its secular counterpart) was a broad and complex movement,
marked by a number of sometimes contradictory trends.10 Most notewor-
thy, perhaps, were the dramatic rise in formal church membership, the forg-
ing of syncretic rather then strictly sectarian forms of national religion
based on the perceived commonalities of the Judeo-Christian tradition,
the flourishing of extraecclesial evangelism under the leadership of Billy
Graham, and the spread of pop psychology religion as preached by the
successful national ministry of Norman Vincent Peale.11 This deepening
interest in difficult moral experience and the possibilities of human bet-
terment found a therapeutic reflex in the neo-Freudianism of psycholo-
gists such as Karen Horney and, especially, Erich Fromm. If Horney
suggested ways in which neurotic personality formations might be over-
come by an increasingly sophisticated understanding of the workings of
the human mind, releasing the mentally impaired to seek self-realization,
Fromm (like Niebuhr, drawing heavily on Judeo-Christian traditions) en-
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thusiastically promoted the utopian expectation that man both individu-
ally and collectively might overcome the destructive forces within his na-
ture and create, to borrow the title of one of Fromm’s most influential
books, a “sane society” in which love could triumph over self-interest.12
These cultural developments, I suggest, find reconfiguration in those
noir films in which the descent into a nightmare world of criminality or
the intrusion of the dark past into a promising present leads neither to
destruction nor to some form of insincere reformation. Of course, the noir
canon includes a number of essentially grim narratives, such as Billy Wilder’s
Double Indemnity (1944), to which unconvincing salvational gestures have
been, perhaps somewhat cynically, added in order to satisfy the Produc-
tion Code Administration’s demand for compensating moral value. Here, I
will focus instead on those films that trace an authentically penitential and
eventually redemptive movement from sinfulness and isolation to social
reintegration. In connecting this noir subgroup to its cultural moment, I
shall be less concerned with either postwar evangelism or Peale’s promo-
tion of the “power of positive thinking,” perspectives on the encounter
with evil that, promoting what one theologian at the time termed cheap grace,
often offer little more than a thinly disguised Pelagianism that, with its irre-
pressible optimism, is more closely aligned with traditional meritocratic ver-
sions of the American dream.13
Of more relevance to a contextual analysis of those noir films about
difficult spiritual growth are the writings of Niebuhr and Fromm, who are
useful figures because they gave voice to widely held views even as they
exerted great influence in promoting them. Although predictably diverse
in their approach to the difficult moral dilemmas posed by the postwar era
for Americans (principally because of the strong influence of Marxism on
Fromm’s social theorizing), these two thinkers shared the view that deliv-
erance from evil or destructiveness must acknowledge and somehow tran-
scend, not minimize, the contradictions of human nature as expressed by
the Christian concept of original sin and the Freudian notion that, if be-
havior was driven in part by an urge toward life, it was equally constrained
by a death instinct.
American High?
It is, indeed, a historiographic commonplace to view the forties as split
between a culture of war, in which a crusade against political evil on a vast
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scale enabled Americans to occupy the moral high ground, and a culture
of peace, in which such clarity was quickly lost, giving rise to widespread
anxiety, directionlessness, and doubt. But this view ignores many signifi-
cant developments that point in an opposite direction. William L. O’Neill,
for example, concentrating on domestic life rather than intellectual or ideo-
logical developments, argues that the first decade and a half of the postwar
period can be termed the years of confidence, and this assessment is echoed
by others who emphasize the incredible prosperity the era witnessed, hith-
erto unexampled in the American experience, as a middle-class life, de-
fined by homeownership and a bounty of consumer goods, was attained
by a national (if largely white) majority.14 Contributing to this mood of
progress, Hollywood, for its part, continued to produce affirmative ver-
sions of contemporary American life.
It is a sometimes neglected fact that film noir was a substantial, but
always a minority and oppositional, presence on the nation’s screens at the
time. The social problem film, just to take an obvious generic example,
enjoyed a particular vogue in the late forties and early fifties, fueled by an
enduring sense of wartime solidarity, and energized by the amazing popu-
larity of Italian neo-realist releases with American audiences. In these texts,
otherwise disturbing aspects of postwar life (racism, anti-Semitism, juve-
nile delinquency, the readjustment faced by handicapped veterans) are sur-
veilled by a benevolent establishment and, ultimately, provided with
heartwarming solutions that endorse consensus values, especially middle-
class notions of responsible citizenship.15
If the mood of the postwar era was split between the celebration of
family life and a desperate worry about imminent nuclear destruction, the
Hollywood films of the period, it is hardly surprising, manifest a similar
mix of optimism and pessimism. Yet this binary opposition should not be
so starkly drawn if we are to make sense of the period’s complexity. Per-
haps, as Elaine Tyler May has argued, “cold war ideology and the domestic
revival” were “two sides of the same coin,” expressing “postwar Ameri-
cans’ intense need to feel liberated from the past and secure in the fu-
ture.” A key element in that liberation, May believes, was the hope for
domestic order, which was not a return to prewar notions of family life
so much as a desperate hope, especially among the middle class, for es-
cape from the increasingly anxiety-provoking and unrewarding public
sphere, defined equally by the increasing anxiety of geopolitics and the
stultifying nature of postindustrial corporate labor, the discontents of
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the so-called organization man. As May puts it, “rootless Americans
struggled against what they perceived as internal decay,” and, in that
struggle, “the family seemed to offer a psychological fortress that would
protect them against themselves.”16
This struggle can be seen as reconfigured within the terms made avail-
able for expression by the postwar Hollywood genre system, whose default
view of human experience is found in the “sunlit pastures” of screen melo-
drama. Some, perhaps most, noir films confirm guilt-ridden loners as for-
ever “in transit” because they prove unable to escape the lawlessness and
moral uncertainty of the dark city that is both within and without; such
characters can never transcend who they once were (although they might
desire a better world), and, thus, they can inhabit only a present that is
always already the past. But, in the films that I shall discuss here, the noir
vision melds (if at times uneasily) with the imagery, values, and themes
of melodrama. Such films focus on ultimately moral protagonists who
discover that they can, in fact, transcend the past as they undergo diffi-
cult, painful moral growth into a future of rootedness, love, and integ-
rity. The price that they are asked to pay is not inconsiderable, however.
Not only must they surrender their autonomy, but they must also occupy
the narrowly defined roles to which a still-constituting economy of do-
mestication consigns them, linking themselves to others in the way that
common sense (and dominant theories of human nature) at the time
prescribed.
In his widely popular The Art of Loving, first published in 1956, Erich
Fromm eloquently expressed the indispensability of togetherness, the source
of security in a world rife with unseen dangers: “The experience of sepa-
rateness arouses anxiety; it is, indeed, the source of all anxiety. Being sepa-
rate means being cut off, without any capacity to use my human powers.
Hence to be separate means to be helpless, unable to grasp the world—
things and people—actively; it means that the world can invade me with-
out my ability to react.”17 Thus, geopolitical anxiety finds a psychological
reflex in apartness, which must generate its own “deterrent” (loving con-
nectedness) in order to ward off the feared invasion of the world, defined
in moral terms as “things and people.” Such an attack against the inad-
equately attached, solitary self is an important element of many noir nar-
ratives, including William Dieterle’s The Accused (1949), which provides
us with a useful example of the noir “redemption” that exemplifies its most
notable features.
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The Penitential Journey of Constructing the Domestic Sphere
For May, the notion of containment, famously formulated by the diplomat
George Kennan as a strategy for countering postwar Soviet expansionism,
generated a domestic version, the family home, within whose walls “po-
tentially dangerous social forces of the new age might be tamed,” enabling
both men and women to obtain the “secure and fulfilling life to which
[they] aspired.”18 But the process of taming implies the imposition of force,
that “coercive factor in society [that] is both necessary and dangerous,” as
Niebuhr suggests. This question of the proper role of force in human soci-
ety is “particularly insistent,” he suggests, because of “the romantic over-
estimate of human virtue and moral capacity, current in our modern
middle-class culture.” In Niebuhr’s view, what has been lacking in the En-
lightenment tradition dominating the American self-conception is “an
understanding of . . . the limitations of the human imagination, the easy
subservience of reason to prejudice and passion.”19 Progress, both indi-
vidual and collective, thus depends on the victory (always provisional) of
reason over passion and prejudice, in the context of the acknowledgment
of what May considers “potentially dangerous social forces” or Niebuhr
“the ambiguity of man’s strength and weakness.”20
Such a taming process, overseen by a reason that is deeply male in
several senses (legal, therapeutic, and romantic) and in which domestica-
tion emerges as the end of female destiny, is, undoubtedly, the determining
element in The Accused, a noir film (recognized as such by the standard
histories of the genre) that traces how a career woman is forced to ac-
knowledge the dangers of sexual repression inherent in her social position
and accept the prospect of love, marriage, and perpetual unemployment
with a man strong enough to protect her from herself. In the postwar move-
ment of women from the workplace back to the family home, a trend anato-
mized by May and other historians of the period, such a narrative is
exemplary in its ambivalent portrayal of the protagonist, Wilma Tuttle, a
professional, unmarried, and, hence, unattractive woman whose life choice,
as we would now say, is presented as unnatural, a state of being dramati-
cally signified by casting. Wilma is played by one of Hollywood’s most glam-
orous actresses, Loretta Young, and so, in order to make her suitable for the
part, Young’s beauty needed to be restrained by a mannish wardrobe and
pinned-up hair, with the inevitable result that the character’s transforma-
tion into a sex object and suitable mate appears as a restoration of the real
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Loretta Young to herself, the overcoming of that foolish (and socially dan-
gerous) remaking that women must perpetrate on themselves in order to
fit into the masculine world of work outside the home.
Accusation and Deliverance
Interestingly, the movement that brings Wilma to abandon what her fiancé,
in a moment of righteous protectiveness, calls her “twopenny job” results
from a foolish and unthinking violation of professional decorum that can
be excused in the end only because women, it is argued, are emotionally
unstable, liable particularly to violent outbursts fueled by their fearfulness.
Encouraged, so the story implies, by some inner sense of being unfulfilled,
Wilma mismanages a relationship with a handsome male student, killing
the young man more or less accidentally, and exposing herself to ruin and
degradation. Because this error can be rectified only by a socially accept-
able relationship with a man of her own age, it becomes proof enough that
women, as patriarchal common sense would have it, lack rationality and
self-control, especially in sexual matters.
Dr. Tuttle is a tenured professor of psychology at a major West Coast
university who not only holds a doctorate (still a mark of special status, if
increasingly less so, in the postwar collegiate world) but also has designs
on becoming head of her department some day. With her education and
established professional success, she represents a powerfully viable alter-
native to wifedom and motherhood. Coupling with the proper man thus
cannot result from her working through the vagaries of the era’s sexual
economy, in which the principal problem for single women who wanted to
be married, although they were debarred from the obvious pursuit of men
if they wished to be thought virtuous, was finding a suitable mate. Only a
narrative of redemption can deliver her from the spinsterly professional-
ism that, it turns out, has trapped her in an unhappiness of which she is
initially unaware and whose figuration in the narrative is her unwilling
descent into a noir world of duplicity, guilt, and persecution.
As the story begins, romance has no place in Wilma’s life, a decision (if
that is what it is) for which the narrative offers no explanation. But per-
haps none is necessary since her devotion to her career would explain, at
least in terms audiences at the time might have understood, the absence of
a man. As it turns out, Wilma can banish men from her life but not sexual
desire, which, because she has repressed it, sets in motion a series of events
196 R. Barton Palmer
that swiftly and unexpectedly threaten her with the loss of all she has worked
so hard to attain. Bill (Douglas Dick), an attractive and older male student,
has been getting “fresh” with her in class, but, instead of reporting his con-
stant and invasive flirtation to the dean, Dr. Tuttle, whose gestures and
nervousness evidence the pleasure she takes in his attention, decides to
“correct” him by analyzing his psychological problems. This is a process to
which Bill, excited at the prospect of such easily gained intimacy, willingly
submits. As Dr. Tuttle explains to Bill, he is liable to be dangerously erratic,
having been raised by an overly permissive mother and a too-strict father, a
combination of contradictory influences that compromises his self-control;
in turn, Bill argues that she is repressed, a psychological condition evi-
denced in her constant, nervous checking of her pinned-up hair.
Unwisely, given what she suspects about him, and knowing now what
he thinks of her, Wilma accepts Bill’s invitation to dinner, and he drives her
out to the Malibu coastal highway, where, so he says, he often goes diving
for abalone. They share a meal, including martinis and cigarettes, and Wilma
is pleased that such “daring” disputes Bill’s analysis of her as a prude. Bill
parks on a lonely cliff above a rocky beach, ostensibly to show her more
about his hobby. Encouraged by her only-ambivalent rejection of his flir-
tation, Bill forces her to kiss him, and she responds with an evident passion
that surprises them both. But, when he somewhat roughly tries to make
love to her, she grabs a heavy piece of metal and, suddenly out of control,
kills him with numerous blows to the head. Wilma convinces herself that
no one will believe the truth of what happened (because she willingly went
in Bill’s car? because she felt attracted to him and enjoyed the power over
him he seemed to invite? because she overreacted to the threat he posed?).
So, fearful of exposure and subsequent professional ruin, she arranges the
scene of the crime to look like an accident, pushing his body onto the rocks
below, but not before drawing seawater into Bill’s lungs through reverse
respiration to simulate drowning.
Escaping into the night (a dark and threatening highway along which
she makes her way with difficulty) but returning home undetected, Dr.
Tuttle soon discovers that she cannot forget what she has done. In fact, she
must undergo a kind of penance for Bill’s killing, which leads to her moral
restoration and the legal establishment of her innocence. As Bill’s former
teacher, Wilma becomes embroiled in the investigation of what the police
immediately suspect is a homicide. The victim’s guardian turns out to be a
lawyer, Warren Ford (Robert Cummings), who, to his great surprise, falls
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in love with Wilma only soon to discover her involvement in Bill’s death.
Warren tries to convince her to leave the city and marry him. But his zeal-
ous attempt at protection fails when the police detective investigating the
case (Wendell Corey), who also finds himself attracted to the shy but beau-
tiful professor, asks Wilma to play the role of the killer in a reenactment of
the crime. She is to strike a plaster model of Bill’s head with the murder
weapon, and, her fear and sexual passion reawakened by this reenactment,
she hits out with revealing emotion.
Brought to trial as the film ends, Wilma, we are led to believe, can
expect acquittal because Warren argues so successfully for her innocence,
convincing the jury that everything she did was motivated by fear—of be-
ing assaulted, and, afterward, of being exposed, and, although Warren is
silent on this score, of her own sexuality as well. The film’s final shot shows
Wilma seated at the defense table, smiling adoringly at her husband-to-be
as he passionately defends her innocence (and, of course, weakness as well).
She is a woman transformed by love (and the dependence that is its cor-
relative). Dressed now in fashionable, feminine clothes (no more of her
plain and unrevealing suits, all of which, as Warren remarks, look the same),
the former mousy professor has been tastefully glamorized with makeup
and her hair, now unpinned, attractively styled. As if to confirm that she
has attained at last her natural position in the world, Wilma exudes more
self-possession and confidence than before, even though she is now stand-
ing trial for her life, her character besmirched, her professional life surely
ended by what is at best a shameful episode.
Remaking Fritz Lang
As commentators have observed, The Accused betrays a close connection to
one of the most successful noir films of the immediate postwar era, Fritz
Lang’s The Woman in the Window (1945), a much darker and more cynical
melodrama of mischance, to use Foster Hirsch’s term, in which the middle-
aged and married professor Wanley (Edward G. Robinson) becomes em-
broiled with a beautiful and perhaps disreputable young woman, Alice (Joan
Bennett), who “comes to life” beside her portrait in a gallery window
and leads him back to her apartment. There, her violent lover, yet an-
other older man, attacks Wanley in a jealous rage, and Wanley is forced
to kill him and then cover up the traces of what he has done in order to
prevent a scandal that would ruin his life.21 As it turns out, one of the
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professor’s close friends is called on to solve the murder, so he is invited to
participate in the investigation, suffering constant chagrin as he must re-
trace the steps he took to dispose of the body. Clues begin to point toward
Wanley, and an even more dangerous threat emerges when the dead man’s
bodyguard, attempting to blackmail the professor and his erstwhile girl-
friend, cannot be scared off. Wanley is then convinced that his involvement
in the killing will be exposed.
Innocent of murder, but guilty of moral indiscretions that would cost
him his family and career, the professor determines to kill himself and swal-
lows poison, not knowing that the would-be blackmailer has just been shot
down by the police, who are wrongly convinced that the dead man is, in
fact, the murderer they have been seeking. As the professor lies dying, the
telephone starts to ring. It is Alice, who is calling to share the “good news”
that they are now in the clear. But Wanley is too weak to answer and slips
into unconsciousness. In a surprising finale, however, the film forsakes such
fatalism and bitter irony. The story of temptation and murder is revealed
to be a dream, and, thus, the film becomes something of a cautionary tale
about the dangers of the surrender, however brief, to illicit desire. As, with
evident relief, the professor exits the gentleman’s club where he has taken
his troubled nap, he passes by the gallery window he  glimpsed in his dreams.
Yet another beautiful woman is standing nearby, but he flees in somewhat
abject and comic terror when she accosts him.
The Accused may share with its model a similar narrative structure,
one in which a sympathetic criminal is forced by circumstances to partici-
pate, first as an interested third party, and gradually as a suspect, in the
investigation of the crime he has committed, eventually manifesting his
guilt. But the two films differ fundamentally in how they treat the redemp-
tion, moral and social, that allows their respectable middle-class protago-
nists to escape from the frightening noir alternative universe of doubleness,
anxiety, and threat. In The Woman in the Window, Wanley experiences the
consequences of his momentary failure to observe the strict sexual stan-
dards of his class and professional position, a slip that renders him vulner-
able, not just to the police, but also to the blackmailing bodyguard, who
exploits the professor’s desire to prevent the loss of his good name. Wanley
corrects his behavior after being warned by an affecting rendition of the
hypothetical ruination he might have suffered, which, interestingly enough,
takes shape within the theater of his own unconscious. The dream thus
represents in some sense his own internalized sense of morality, the cen-
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soring of a desire that he cannot repress but that he is strong enough to
punish.
Lang’s pessimistic point, of course, is that the ethical sensibility that
Wanley demonstrates is superficial. In both his waking and his unconscious
avatars, the professor fears public shame and the loss of his position more
than he regrets the immorality of what he has either done or, in some sense,
desired to do. Tellingly, Wanley’s wife makes only a brief appearance in
both the dream and the narrative frame, deemphasizing his intended be-
trayal. The film’s version of the noir underworld may be only a bourgeois
nightmare, but that is precisely what gives The Woman in the Window its
dark humor, its playful engagement with illicit behavior and conventional
restraint. A vigilant respectability and a destructive desire for transgres-
sion reside in the same seemingly mild-mannered self, indicating the very
thin line that separates criminality from obedience to the law, and, thus,
disproving class-based notions of the separation of the dark city from, to
continue the metaphor, its more prosperous and law-abiding suburbs. Most
important, perhaps, Wanley is only chastened, not reformed, by his nar-
row escape from the promptings of his own id. His comically fearful en-
dorsement of right-thinking behavior, evident in that desperate flight from
the living reflex of the tempting woman of his dreams, is hardly a socially
reassuring message in the mainstream Hollywood tradition.
Becoming a Proper Woman
In The Accused, by way of contrast, Wilma Tuttle’s misdeed is real, not hy-
pothetical, but she is, in a sense, more innocent than Lang’s professor, whose
sexual urgings (a felt need for adventure and an attraction to an obviously
immoral and beautiful woman) are similarly repressed. The film demon-
strates the truth of what Warren Ford eloquently argues in defense of his
future wife: that Wilma acted out of fear, not malice, and, thus, should be
legally excused. More interesting, however, is that the narrative of investi-
gation in which she becomes embroiled quickly becomes therapeutic, de-
livering her to the new self that deserves a new life, which can only be
love and marriage with the same man who secures her vindication. Crucial
to Wilma’s transformation is Ford, who brings her “out of her shell,” doing
the cultural work first attempted maladroitly by Bill, whose flirtation, al-
though ending tragically for both, does, perversely, succeed in disqualify-
ing her professionally, a development that, in the film’s terms, is positive.
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Both men recognize that Wilma is, in her own psychological terms, a
“psychothymiac,” someone who represses her feelings. Bill inappropriately
attracts her interest by his compliments and attention (which are uncom-
fortably aggressive yet intriguing). He eventually forces her to make love in
a way that unleashes not only sexual passion but a deep-seated revulsion
and dread as well. Tellingly, she never tells Bill no, only complains: “You’re
hurting me.” In an intriguing symbolic gesture, just before his misguided
attempt at seduction, Bill leads her to the edge of the cliff and shows her
the wild surf below, arousing a fear and fascination that animate and excite
her, even arousing what Bill, who has learned much in her class, terms her
“phobicness.” Bill, in other words, recognizes that beneath a deceptively
prim surface lurks a woman whose transgressiveness might match his own.
Wilma’s overreaction to Bill’s aggression (she keeps hitting him after he
lets her go) indicates the dangers of her attraction to him and the power of
the repressed feelings that he arouses.
In contrast, Warren courts her with gentleness and respect, respond-
ing with evident (but controlled) ardor when Wilma starts dressing more
fashionably. This is, at first, an attempt to disguise her involvement in the
crime, but she quickly takes pleasure in her new look and the compliments
that it elicits. In any case, Warren’s flattery, like that of the similarly enam-
ored police detective, is never aggressive, and his deepening affection for
the woman who he realizes killed his ward makes him increasingly protec-
tive of her vulnerability. When Warren and Wilma share their first kiss, it is
chaste and brief, to be explained, Wilma blushingly admits, by her spinsterly
ways. If Bill awakens dangerous passions in the repressed schoolteacher,
Warren gently leads her toward an appropriately controlled and wifely af-
fection, confirming that she is, indeed, a “nice girl.” Wilma’s sexual nature
is thus shown to depend on what kind of man draws her out and relieves
her of the burden of separateness that she has borne for so long. Wilma,
then, in a deep cultural sense, is not responsible for the woman she be-
comes, and her “innocence” is established by the therapeutic aspects of the
investigation, which, like the Freudian talking cure, makes her relive a trau-
matic experience in order to rid her of its destructive effects.
Two scenes are crucial to this development. In the first, Warren takes
Wilma out for an evening at the prizefights after she admits that she’s fall-
ing in love with him against her will. There, she sees a young man who
bears an uncanny resemblance to Bill beaten brutally into unconscious-
ness. His body slides uncomfortably close to where she is sitting, and, sud-
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denly, Wilma experiences a flashback to what transpired on the cliff. Reliv-
ing her own part in those horrible events, she suddenly blurts out, “I didn’t
mean to, I didn’t mean to,” in a moment of unconscious self-revelation
that simultaneously makes clear to Warren not only that she is the killer
but also that she was innocent of any homicidal intent. In the second scene,
Wilma is also called on to relive the experience of killing Bill, but this time
she does so willingly. Asked by the detective to reenact the striking of Bill
with the metal club, Wilma agrees over Warren’s strenuous objections. She
first hits the plaster model of the young man’s head timidly, but then she
delivers blow after heavy blow, caught once again in the grip of the fear and
terror (but also long-repressed desire) that Bill’s advances had provoked.
As in the boxing arena, this unreflective behavior, unlike her conscious
denial of involvement, reveals the truth of her complicity—but also her
innocence of any intent to harm the young man.
An important element in Wilma’s therapy, of course, is the pain that
she is made to suffer from facing what she has done. In an earlier encoun-
ter with the police, she had been reluctant to hold the murder weapon or
do more than merely glance at the plaster head, storming out of the room
with an unconvincing show of offended dignity as she declined to face
what she had done. When asked to reenact the crime a second time, she
refuses to refuse, mastering her distaste and fear, and brushing off Warren’s
attempt to protect her from herself. Wilma willingly submits to the cha-
grin and horror of repeating her own actions, which now can be properly
surveilled by both the law and the man who loves her for (and in spite of)
what she has done.
Wilma’s journey toward wholeness (i.e., proper coupling with a loving
mate after a restoration of her “natural” self) is truly penitential, a difficult
working through of what Niebuhr considers “man’s strength and weak-
ness.” The doubleness of Wilma’s nature is not viewed ironically, with the
cynical pessimism so evident in The Woman in the Window, whose
professor’s unthinking assumption of virtue is punctured twice: first, by the
temptation to which, as a character in his own dream, he quickly succumbs;
and, second, by the fact that temptation and betrayal are possibilities ad-
vanced only to be denied in extremis by his own unconscious. Unlike Wilma,
Wanley is never forced to acknowledge what he has done; his own mind
leads him not toward repentance and reformation but toward escape through
the suicide that will forestall any proper accounting for his misdeeds. As
Niebuhr writes, in a formulation of ethical purpose that seems appropriate
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to the spirit, if not the patriarchal fact, of Wilma’s deliverance from repres-
sion and denial: “The final wisdom of life requires, not the annulment of
incongruity but the achievement of serenity within and above it.”22
The Advent of Therapeutic Culture
Such serenity as Wilma achieves, however, comes at the expense of her
character and independence, both of which must be denied. In fact, the
film does show, in the terms popularized by Karen Horney, that Wilma
“outgrows” the destructive forces within instead of restraining them with
an “inner strait jacket,” successfully disputing outmoded bourgeois no-
tions of proper behavior and moral probity.23 Her victory interestingly in-
vokes the “therapeutic culture” just then beginning to be a presence on the
American scene, an indication of what the sociologist Alan Woolfolk aptly
characterizes as “the defeat of moralities of self-denial based upon the as-
sumption that the path to individual salvation is through submission to
doctrines of communal purpose and adherence to narratives of spiritual
ascent.” As Woolfolk goes on to observe: “Where once religion, morality,
and custom accounted for human conduct in terms of good and bad, right
and wrong, today psychology guides us towards criteria of well-being and
sickness.”24 In The Accused, the lawyer becomes the therapist, the perpetra-
tor the victim, the crime a symptom of maladjustment, and the court a site
of transcendence. The noir city of dark desire and darker sin is left deci-
sively behind. Stylistically, the film’s most characteristically noir sequence,
Wilma’s escape through a shadowy and threatening night from the scene
of the crime in an effort to hide the truth, rhymes with the brightly lit
courtroom finale in which Wilma acknowledges the truth of her behavior
and, by that acknowledgment, is set free.
Fromm observes: “To love somebody is not just a strong feeling—it is
a decision, it is a judgment, it is a promise.” And fulfilling that promise, he
suggests, bespeaks “an attitude, an orientation of character which deter-
mines the relatedness of a person to the world as a whole, not toward one
‘object’ of love.”25 Wilma’s deliverance from repression and fear can be
understood precisely as this form of “conversion,” which is the narrative
movement that, Lary May suggests, characterizes the “more ideologically
conservative version of film noir,” a proposition that is certainly true
enough. These films, he observes, “focus on authority figures . . . who cure
the individual psychologically, allowing adaptation to the utopian dream
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of an affluent, classless American often centered on the suburban home
and family.”26 Yet such narratives of psychological healing and social rein-
tegration do not, as May believes, owe their power simply to victory culture’s
obsessive enactment of wartime solidarity, easily glimpsed in films such as
Casablanca (Michael Curtiz, 1942), whose protagonists must “convert” from
isolationist self-concern to collective self-sacrifice. With their foregrounding
of the inner life and their prescription of an archly patriarchal therapeutic
renewal that constitutes the domestic sphere, some of the so-called conser-
vative noir films are actually avant-garde. Redemptive noir films like The
Accused do not look backward to a historical moment in which the proper
concerns of the private sphere were forced to cede to the necessity to com-
bat the public threat posed by alien, imperialistic, antidemocratic forces.
Instead, this noir subgroup is the harbinger of an emerging era that Chris-
topher Lasch terms the culture of narcissism, whose first clearly perceptible
symptom is that revival of faith, both secular and religious, in the difficult
yet ultimately achievable perfectibility of human nature that is such a promi-
nent feature of the postwar era.27
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The Maltese Falcon
Deborah Knight
An elegant, dark-haired woman in a fur wrap enters the office of the pri-
vate detective firm of Spade and Archer. Sam Spade’s secretary has already
told him that he’ll want to see her because “she’s a knockout.” Miss
Wonderly, as she initially identifies herself, wants to hire Spade to find her
younger sister, Corinne, who has apparently run away to San Francisco
with a man named Floyd Thursby. Miss Wonderly insists that Thursby is
dangerous and will stop at nothing. Spade’s partner, Miles Archer, arrives
during the interview, obviously finds Miss Wonderly quite attractive, and
agrees to tail Thursby that evening. When Miss Wonderly leaves, Spade
and Archer agree that her story is suspicious but that she has certainly paid
well, perhaps too generously, for their efforts. Later that night, Spade is
awakened by a telephone call from the police telling him that Miles Archer
has been shot and killed. At the scene, Spade learns that Miles was shot at
point-blank range in a dark alley with his gun still buttoned down in his
pocket. Still later that night, Floyd Thursby is shot to death. The police
suspect that Spade killed Thursby in retaliation for Miles Archer’s murder.
Spade must now resolve Miss Wonderly’s case while finding out who killed
his partner and, in particular, must solve the murder of Thursby to get the
police off his back. Even though he wasn’t particularly fond of Miles Archer,
Spade is fully and ironically aware that, being a private detective, it is bad for
business if your partner is murdered and nothing gets done about it.
In this essay, I examine what I take to be the philosophical core of The
Maltese Falcon (John Huston, 1941), namely, its examination of the rela-
tion between reason and passion as exemplified by the two central pro-
tagonists, Sam Spade (Humphrey Bogart) and Brigid O’Shaughnessy (Mary
Astor), who initially calls herself Miss Wonderly. My approach is to start
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from certain distinctive conventions and structures of the hard-boiled de-
tective genre.1 These include the defining characteristics of the hard-boiled
detective, the central female character and her relationship to the detec-
tive, how the detective enters a story partway into its development, and the
strategies used by the detective to uncover the criminals and solve the crimes.
With respect to the philosophical status of the emotions, I am a cognitivist
and will briefly explain what that position entails. Part of my concern is to
debunk the view that hard-boiled detectives are dispassionate reasoners,
solving crimes through a detached rationality. Several key scenes from The
Maltese Falcon will help me make this point. But my ultimate goal is to
indicate that there is something special about the hard-boiled detective, as
opposed to the classic detective, something that has to do with his personal
and emotional investment in the events and people he is investigating, an
investment that requires that he act to ensure justice is done even after the
crime has been solved. This final step could not be taken, I argue, if the
hard-boiled detective were simply a dispassionate reasoner.
The Private Detective and the World of Film Noir
Private detectives have a privileged place in the world of film noir, a genre
itself identified with stories that take place down dark streets, skirt the
edges of the law, and involve deception and double-crossing. Film noir
private detectives typically operate among a host of morally dubious char-
acters pursuing their own gain at whatever cost. They are hard-boiled—
that is, they are tough, cynical individualists who have a history of ill-will
toward more obviously legitimate, although invariably plodding, repre-
sentatives of the law, such as police detectives and district attorneys. They
must inevitably—considering the petty criminals and other lowlifes with
whom they associate—look out for themselves. Their self-interest is un-
derstandable. Given their clientele and their clientele’s particular problems,
staying alive and out of jail is not for them as straightforward a process as
it might initially appear.
Film noir private detectives typically enter a situation in media res,
which is to say that they become involved partway into an ongoing course
of action that predates their involvement. Therefore, the most immediate
job for them is to figure out just what course of action they have gotten
themselves into. This is different from the situation in which classic detec-
tives find themselves, one in which the central crime has typically already
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been committed and the only questions left to answer are who did it and
how. The film noir detective, by contrast, must first discover what the real
situation is. A central task for him is to avoid being the dupe of his client,
who usually has good reasons not to communicate everything she knows
about the situation. Not all clients are duplicitous—one need only think of
General Sternwood (Charles Waldron) in The Big Sleep (Howard Hawks,
1946). But there is always some risk since even a nonduplicitous client typi-
cally does not fully understand the situation she wants sorted out. Thus,
the film noir private detective must critically analyze everyone involved:
not only his client, but also the people he is investigating. This is where
toughness and cynicism pay off. For private detectives, cynicism is more
than an attitude; it is something of a life skill, keeping them properly suspi-
cious of those who might try to take advantage of them. The consequences
of miscalculation here are dire, something Miles Archer (Jerome Cowan)
plainly should have learned before going down that dark alley. Not under-
standing the situation can lead to arrest and imprisonment and even, some-
times, death.
Because the private detective enters the situation in media res, he must
figure out, from the minimal information that he is originally given, pre-
cisely what is unfolding. This means that he is, in effect, operating herme-
neutically.2 Frank Kermode correctly observes that detection narratives
feature “a specialized ‘hermeneutic’ organization.”3 The detective’s goal is
to piece together the real story from the range of story fragments that he
learns about or discovers. One thing he discovers is that the initial object of
investigation invariably turns out not to be the central crime or puzzle,
although solving this initial situation is necessary if what will later emerge
as the main crime is to be properly resolved. So, in The Maltese Falcon, the
initial object of investigation is Miss Wonderly’s sister Corinne and her
association with Thursby. But it turns out that Corinne is merely a fic-
tional pretext invented by Miss Wonderly to cause Archer to trail Thursby
in order to throw suspicion on Thursby for Archer’s murder. Nevertheless,
solving Miss Wonderly’s involvement with Thursby is an important step in
Sam’s progress toward finding out who killed Miles.
It is generally agreed that the private detective must have exemplary
reasoning skills. This assumption is understandable since his job is to fig-
ure out “whodunit,” that is, to solve a complex situation, usually a crime,
by means of sorting out who has done what to whom. There is obviously
good reason to think that the private detective has particularly well-honed
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skills and that skill at reasoning is high in his repertoire. But we must ac-
knowledge that the sort of reasoning exemplified by a classic detective such
as Sherlock Holmes is very different in kind from the sort of reasoning
exemplified by a hard-boiled detective such as Sam Spade. As John Cawelti
persuasively argues in his analysis of the main differences between classic
detective fiction and its hard-boiled variant, classic sleuths such as Holmes
are typically upper-class amateurs whose chief satisfaction derives from
the demonstration of  “superior intellect and psychological insight” in solv-
ing the crime. The hard-boiled detective, by contrast, is much more di-
rectly involved, and his participation in the investigation of a crime quickly
becomes something more like a personal mission. First, he becomes “emo-
tionally and morally committed” to certain figures at the center of his in-
vestigation. Second, his involvement in solving the crime typically requires
that he extract himself from a threat to his own life or career. For these
reasons, it is not just the solution of the crime that is important to him.
Rather, he “remains unfulfilled until he has taken a personal moral stance
toward the criminal.” Unlike the classic detective’s work, the hard-boiled
detective’s work does not stop with the solution of the crime; instead, there
is an important further step, which Cawelti describes as “some kind of
personal choice or action,” that brings closure to his mission.4
While both hard-boiled detectives such as Sam Spade and classic de-
tectives such as Sherlock Holmes rely on guesses and hunches and use the
progress of their investigation to test their best guesses, the nature of their
involvement with the crime and its investigation is decidedly different. One
way to see this difference is to note that Spade is involved emotionally and
morally in the progress of his investigation, whereas no comparable emo-
tional or moral commitment is required of Holmes as he sorts out the facts
of the case and draws his conclusions. Yet it might initially seem a peculiar
thing to emphasize the role of emotion in the hard-boiled detective’s in-
vestigations, given that we typically think of him as a dispassionate reasoner
rather than as a passionate one. In fact, noticing his passionate side allows
us to ask what the proper relation between reason and the emotions might
be and how that question is resolved in the case of the film noir private
detective. Philosophers have often argued that reason is locked in a per-
petual struggle against the negative influence of the emotions. This idea
has roots that date back at least to Socrates and Plato. Roughly, Plato ar-
gues that reason must take precedence over the emotions since, obviously,
the emotions corrupt good reasoning.5 This view has recently been con-
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tested by a number of philosophers who argue that emotions are integral
to sound reasoning.6
The view that the emotions are themselves rational is known as
cognitivism about the emotions.7 The basic claim of cognitivism is that our
emotions contribute positively to, rather than inevitably distracting from,
our understanding of the world. Furthermore, our emotions are centrally
involved in our decision making, since they help us determine what we
desire and value. This means that the emotions are prerequisites, not only
for right judgments, but also for right actions. Proper moral agency does
not result from reasoning conducted in isolation from the rich resources
that our emotions provide for us.
Anyone doubtful about this claim should consider the description by
Antonio Damasio, the noted neurologist, of the remarkable aftermath of a
devastating accident that befell a man named Phineas Gage in 1848. An
iron rod with a lot of force behind it pierced Gage’s head and in fact trav-
eled straight through, exiting the other side, permanently damaging a quite
specific part of his brain, that which is responsible for feelings and emo-
tions. Astonishingly, Gage survived the accident, but crucial aspects of his
personality changed as a result of it. Most important from Damasio’s point
of view, Gage’s ability to make decisions and, in particular, to make good
choices was completely annihilated. Although “attention, perception,
memory, language, intelligence” were all undamaged, Gage’s decisions no
longer took into account his own best interests or advantage. Worse yet, his
respect for social conventions and for ethical matters more generally con-
strued disappeared. Damasio uses this case to illustrate the deep intercon-
nection among our emotions, our judgments, and our ability to operate as
moral and social beings.8
Still, it is not commonly recognized that emotions play a formative
role in at least some key decisions made by film noir detectives. We tend
simply to assume that private detectives exhibit a paradigmatic sort of ra-
tionality, and this assumption tends to obscure the role that emotions play
in their reasoning. Yet philosophers such as Robert Solomon argue that
emotions just are judgments about situations that we face, and private de-
tectives are first and foremost figures who must make good judgments,
since the consequence of bad judgment could, as mentioned above, very
well be death. Private detectives are practical reasoners in the sense that
they are professional problem solvers. This means that, in any situation,
they must be able to juggle competing answers to the main “whodunit”
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question. And they must be able to track the implications of various equally
plausible answers to that question, at least until they have focused in on
the real target of their investigation, the person who really did it. But emo-
tions need not be absent from any of these undertakings.
The Private Detective and His Client
Let us look at two key exchanges between Sam and his attractive client
after Miles Archer’s murder. These two interviews introduce various key
concepts that help us see how detective and client negotiate their relation-
ship with one another. The concepts I am thinking of include trust and
confidence and the sort of loyalty that is appropriate not only between a
private detective and his client but also between lovers. Trust, confidence,
and loyalty all seem to be products of the conjunction of reason and emo-
tion. I could judge you to be trustworthy—that is, I could arrive at this
judgment through reasoning—but still not trust you. For me to trust you,
there seems to be a necessary emotional component to my judgment. The
same seems to be true of confidence and loyalty. Given that Sam is still
largely in the dark about his client’s actual plans, it is little wonder that
his trust in her is based partly on his feelings. Of course, Sam doesn’t
need to trust her to continue his relationship with her. In fact, he needs
to know more about the scheme she’s involved in if he’s going to be able
to prove that he didn’t kill either Archer or Thursby. But Sam opts to
trust Brigid.
The first exchange occurs the day following Miles Archer’s murder.
After learning of Archer’s death, Sam tries to phone Miss Wonderly at her
hotel, only to learn that she has checked out and left no forwarding ad-
dress. The next day, she phones him and gives him her new address and
another name, Miss Leblanc. At the new apartment, she confesses her “real”
name to Sam—Brigid O’Shaughnessy. She begs for his protection and sup-
port. She insists that she is alone and needs help and swears that she was
not involved in the two deaths the previous night. Sam isn’t satisfied with
her story. He isn’t satisfied with its content, which may or may not be fac-
tual, but, just as important, he isn’t satisfied with its presentation as a plea
for his help. The combination is a potent one. He says, “Now you are dan-
gerous!” by which he means that her plea for help is a ploy to make him
overlook the irregularities of her situation and the omissions and contra-
dictions of the stories she has thus far told him. He realizes that her plan is
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to make him feel sorry for her and to feel responsible for her, a plan that, if
successful, might compromise him as a private detective.
Sam admits in this conversation that he and Miles had not believed
Brigid’s initial story about a missing sister, although, as Sam says, they be-
lieved her two hundred dollars. She had paid too much, but enough too
much to “make it all right.” This is meant to show Brigid that he has not
been taken in by her story, that he realizes she is up to something, and that
at the very least it is not obvious that he should trust her. But Brigid puts a
different spin on the question of trust, saying that she needs to be able to
trust Sam completely. His response is that Brigid does not need to trust
him so long as she can persuade him to trust her.
The very idea that someone must be persuaded to trust signals the
relation between the emotions and reason. Sam is working from a limited
amount of information, and he doesn’t yet know what part of that infor-
mation is reliable—in fact, important parts turn out not to be reliable,
which will have important consequences later on. Brigid is asking him to
trust her in spite of many facts he has learned about her, for example, that
she has lied in hiring him, has used false names, has changed addresses
without informing him beforehand, has paid too much for the work she
hired him to do, and in situations of apparently straightforward intimacy
between them has described her own situation in ways that Sam cannot
believe.
Brigid pleads with Sam to help her, asking him to share some of his
strength, but Sam suspects a con: “You’re good, chiefly your eyes, I think,
and the throb you get in your voice.” Brigid admits she deserves the re-
buke. “The lie was in the way I said it, not at all in what I said.” All this tells
Sam that she has confessed again to lying. Whether what she has said is
true—for instance, that she was not involved in the death of Miles Archer—
remains to be determined. But, at the same time, by admitting to the lie in
the way she spoke to him, Brigid has confessed that she is trying to ma-
nipulate Sam, trying to make him pity her, or be sympathetic, or worry on
her behalf. The way she said it was, as she confesses, an attempt to entrap
him emotionally. Sam resists, but this isn’t necessarily because he is dis-
passionate; rather, he seems to want another sort of emotional relation-
ship altogether.
The second meeting again takes place at Brigid’s apartment. In the
meantime, Sam has met with Joel Cairo (Peter Lorre) and learned of the
existence of the black bird, the object desired by all the main criminals in
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the film. He guesses that Brigid is also interested in the whereabouts of this
valuable statue. Moreover, he thinks that Brigid is involved in a situation
much more complex than the one she has so far disclosed to him. “You
aren’t exactly the sort of person you pretend to be, are you?” Sam says to
her. He means that the weakness and innocence that she projects is an act.
She admits that she hasn’t led a good life, that she has been bad. This strikes
Sam as a good thing since, if she were really as innocent as she pretended to
be, they’d never get anywhere.
In the first interview, Sam told Brigid that she needed to tell him enough
so that he would know what was going on, but Brigid would not reveal the
specifics of her situation. Sam manages to get some information out of her
in the second interview by mentioning Joel Cairo and watching her re-
sponse. Cairo had offered Sam five thousand dollars for the black bird.
This is far more money than Brigid has available if she has to bid for Sam’s
loyalty. This angers Sam, who reminds Brigid that so far she hasn’t given
him “any of [her] confidence, any of the truth.” He also accuses her of
having tried to buy his loyalty with money and nothing else. Brigid asks
what else she can buy him with, after which they kiss. What was initially a
professional relationship now becomes a personal relationship, complicat-
ing things still more. Sam isn’t interested in knowing Brigid’s secrets, he
tells her, but he insists that he has to have more confidence in her than he
has at the moment. Brigid wonders whether he couldn’t trust her a little
longer.
The Question of Trust
The question whether the private detective can afford to trust the principal
female character is a recurring theme in film noir. To take another example,
in The Big Sleep, Philip Marlowe (Humphrey Bogart) is hired by General
Sternwood to solve a blackmail plot targeting the general’s younger daugh-
ter, Carmen (Martha Vickers). During the investigation, Marlowe becomes
attracted to the general’s elder daughter, Vivian (Lauren Bacall), but her
involvement with a notorious gangster, Eddie Mars (John Ridgely), makes
trusting her difficult. Ultimately, Marlowe does trust her, and his trust is
rewarded, but again the decision to trust is partially based on his feelings
for her.
But anyone familiar with the conventions of film noir knows that there
is a major difference in the types of female characters represented, on the
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one hand, by Brigid O’Shaughnessy and, on the other, by Vivian Rutledge.
Brigid O’Shaughnessy is recognizably a femme fatale, whereas Vivian just
as obviously is not. Characteristically, the femme fatale lures men with her
sexuality and apparent vulnerability, manipulating them so as to achieve
some goal or other, usually involving money. The Big Sleep refashions the
femme fatale since the seductive and vulnerable figure in this film is
Carmen, yet in Carmen the two key aspects of the genuine femme fatale,
namely, sexuality and cold reasoning intended to promote ulterior mo-
tives, are disassociated.
At her first meeting with Marlowe, Carmen tries to sit in his lap while
he is standing up (to paraphrase Marlowe). Carmen has the sexual allure
of the typical femme fatale, but she lacks the brains. By contrast, Vivian is
sexually attractive to Marlowe, but she does not lure him. Ironically, Brigid
is sexually attractive to Sam but not on the basis of overt flaunting of her
sexuality. Rather, Sam falls for Brigid while she is using what he describes
as her “schoolgirl manner,” even though he doesn’t believe that this man-
ner is anything more than an act. In fact, Brigid initially presents herself to
Sam as clinging and needful, as weak and uncertain, and as emotional,
specifically, as alone and fearful. Sam is cast in the role of protector and
defender. Vivian, by contrast, is Marlowe’s equal—their verbal sparring is
reminiscent of the repartee between two other pairs of Howard Hawks’s
classic protagonists, Walter Burns (Cary Grant) and Hildy Johnson
(Rosalind Russell) from His Girl Friday (1940) and Harry Morgan
(Humphrey Bogart) and Slim (Lauren Bacall) from To Have and Have Not
(1944). Vivian associates with various crooks, gamblers, and blackmailers
and appears to move confidently in their midst. Her cool independence is
what attracts Marlowe to her, yet it also raises questions of trust between
them. As Marlowe eventually figures out, she is being forced to lie to him
by Eddie Mars, who is blackmailing her. Marlowe has already become, to
recall Cawelti’s words, “emotionally and morally committed” to Vivian, as
he is also committed to Vivian’s father, General Sternwood.
So, even though there is a question of trust, it is not because Vivian is
intentionally misleading Marlowe. This is different from the situation be-
tween Sam and Brigid. Although both Vivian and Brigid lie, Vivian does so
because she believes this will help her sister, whereas Brigid lies because she
is trying to help herself. Vivian is not a femme fatale, although she is cer-
tainly enigmatic. One thing is clear: as viewers familiar with the conven-
tions of film noir, we doubt that Vivian is a real threat to Marlowe, yet we
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know that Brigid is likely to be a threat to Sam. Given that Sam is a private
detective operating in the film noir world, we understand that Sam real-
izes, just as Marlowe does, that any situation in which he has less informa-
tion than he needs in order to make reliable judgments is one where he is
potentially at risk. In fact, Sam is more than potentially at risk: in the course
of the film’s action, he is held at gunpoint more than once, tailed, drugged,
blackjacked, and beaten, not to mention suspected of being the murderer
of Floyd Thursby.
Spade’s Decision
So far we have been considering The Maltese Falcon as a hermeneutical
process in which we are initially introduced to a private detective and a
client and are then immediately thrust into the midst of an ongoing series
of actions that Sam Spade must sort out as they develop. These events in-
volve deceit, lies, murders, and more. Given that this is a film noir, there is
a central female character who invariably functions as a femme fatale or an
enigmatic woman—in this case, a femme fatale. We have thought about
the private detective in terms of the role played by reasoning, the emo-
tions, and the detective’s personal, social, and moral stake in the crimes
under investigation. It is time to draw these themes together.
One standard way of thinking about detection narratives, especially
those featuring a male detective, is to say that the male detective operates
on the basis of reason against a variety of antagonists whose motivation is
based on desire, lust, craving, or even coincidence, happenstance, or being
in the wrong place. I have been arguing that even in the most unlikely of
situations, namely, hard-boiled detective fiction, we find much more than
dry rationality at work. I have also sketched a way of thinking about hard-
boiled detective fiction—a view that is, I think, mistaken—that associates
maleness and reason, in the case of the detective, and femaleness and the
emotions. But The Maltese Falcon and The Big Sleep show that it is mis-
taken to assume that the hard-boiled detective is simply a dispassionate
reasoner, let alone that the central female character is working primarily
on the basis of emotion rather than some long-range plan. The final scenes
of The Big Sleep and The Maltese Falcon make this case clearly.
Up to this point, I have had little to say about the Maltese Falcon itself
and the sorry crowd of criminals on its trail, including the now-deceased
Thursby as well as Joel Cairo, Kasper Gutman, known as “The Fat Man”
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(Sydney Greenstreet), and the gunsel, Wilmer (Elisha Cook Jr.). The ques-
tion raised earlier about Brigid’s (a.k.a. Miss Wonderly’s) relationship to
Thursby is slowly revealed. The two have been tracking the priceless Maltese
Falcon, as have Cairo and Gutman. One of the most compelling moments
of the film occurs when the bunch of criminals brought together in Sam
Spade’s apartment think that they have finally found their prize. The thing
they believe to be the Falcon arrives bound up in newspaper, is unwrapped,
and is proudly stood up on a tabletop. Then, to make sure they have the
right object in their hands, Gutman takes a knife to the Falcon, aiming to
slice off its black surface covering to reveal the jewel-encrusted statue that
should be beneath. They find that they have all been duped. The statue in
their possession is just lead, nothing more, certainly not the treasure they
had all been pursuing. The only one who sees the humor in this situation is
Sam Spade.
The time that Sam has spent with Gutman, Cairo, Wilmer, and Brigid
has apparently been entirely focused on the black bird, although of course
Sam has in addition been watching the others interact. At a particularly
tense moment before the arrival of the black bird, when Sam has made it
clear that he knows its whereabouts and that, if the others want it, they will
have to deal with him, Wilmer takes it on himself to hold a gun to Sam and
challenge him. Sam reasons with Gutman: if the others want the black bird,
they won’t dare kill him, since he’s the only one who knows its where-
abouts, and, if he knows they can’t afford to kill him, why would any threat
they make be persuasive? Gutman, tellingly, remarks: “In the heat of ac-
tion, men are likely to forget where their best interests lie and let their
emotions carry them away.” Still, Gutman persuades Wilmer to put away
his gun and a little later allows Sam to convince him that, of the various
candidates, Wilmer is the one they ought to hand over to the police as
Thursby’s killer.
The realization that the object they have been pursuing is a fake is of
course initially a disappointment, but, like anyone engaged in a grand quest,
Gutman quickly recomposes himself and suggests a way to carry on. He
even asks a flattered Cairo to accompany him. Wilmer has fled, fearing that
he will be handed over to the police as the fall guy. So Gutman and Cairo
happily leave Sam and Brigid as they go off to pursue their fetishized prize.
And, with their departure, it seems that everything should have been worked
out, most important, the crucial issue of who killed Thursby, since it has
been concluded that Wilmer, in fact, committed that murder. It would seem
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that Sam and Brigid are now free and clear, assuming that Sam can con-
vince the police about Wilmer’s role in the whole affair.
But not so. While Sam and Brigid are left together, this is not the typi-
cal happy ending that unites the correct romantic couple, a conclusion
seen so often in Hollywood movies, including even some films noirs, for
example, The Big Sleep. In fact, we are left with the only plausible romantic
couple that this film could produce, but it is not, in Hollywood terms or in
film noir terms, the correct one. For Hollywood cinema has its own moral-
ity with regard to romantic couples, ensuring that those who eventually
unite are in some important sense worthy, and at the same time ensuring
that those who are kept apart are kept apart for good moral reasons.
I speak broadly here, but the point can be illustrated, once again,
through a comparison of The Big Sleep with The Maltese Falcon. Despite
the fact that Vivian Rutledge has lied to Philip Marlowe, her deception has
been justified because of her desire to protect her younger sister. This ulti-
mate purpose clears the way to her reconciliation with Marlowe. Brigid, by
contrast, has used Sam throughout to further her own ulterior motives.
This is what Sam has finally realized throughout his involvement with her
and her nefarious coconspirators. In the final confrontation between pri-
vate detective and femme fatale, Sam presents his best reasoning about
why, after all, he is going to hand Brigid over to the police for the killing of
his partner, Miles Archer. But his best reasoning is importantly informed
by his awareness of the emotions that this decision calls for.
In this decisive moment, we recognize that what Cawelti warned us to
watch for, namely, the detective’s moral commitment to some character or
other in the film, has actually and unexpectedly been a commitment to his
dead partner, despite the fact that he didn’t like him and that Miles wasn’t
particularly smart. The right thing, in Sam’s situation, is to find out who
killed your partner; anything else would be “bad for business, bad all round,
bad for all private detectives everywhere.” The facts as Sam has reconstructed
them point unfailingly to Brigid as Miles Archer’s murderess. After all, as
Sam has known from his initial visit to the site of the murder, Miles was
found down a dark alley with his gun undrawn and buttoned down. It is
improbable that Miles went so incautiously down a dark alley with Thursby,
the reputedly dangerous man he was tailing. However, as Sam realizes, Miles
would have “licked his lips” and gone down that same dark alley with Miss
Wonderly. She is the only one in the entire case who could have lured Miles
to his death.
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But Sam has also already said that he isn’t worried about Brigid’s se-
crets. He has accepted that she has a dark past, that she isn’t “innocent,”
that she has had at least some relationships with men he regards as dubi-
ous, if not downright dangerous. Despite this seeming trust in Brigid, Sam
must now face the consequences of what he has learned about her. And he
must also resolve the problem he himself faces as the person the police
believe killed Floyd Thursby. The core problem pits reason against passion
yet, in a way that is oddly characteristic of the film noir detective, unites
reason and passion in the detective’s ultimate verdict. Sam’s final decision
about Brigid requires that he take a personal moral stand about her and
what she has done. It means that he must acknowledge the full implica-
tions of what he has learned about her through his investigations. And it
means that he must confront his own feelings for her, the fact that he might,
as he says, love her. Here is his conclusion: “I have no earthly reason to
think I can trust you, and if I do this and get away with it you’ll have
something on me that you can use on me whenever you want to. Since
I’ve got something on you I couldn’t be sure you wouldn’t put a hole in
me sometime.”
What Sam is saying is that he realizes that Brigid killed his partner, that
she lured Miles down a dark alley, and that she has lied to him about her
involvement in Miles’s death. In a case such as this one, there is no question
of forgiving and forgetting, since Miles was Sam’s partner. The problem is
trust—and, as we have seen, trust is a judgment at the intersection of rea-
son and the emotions. Up to this point, Sam has allowed his emotional
involvement in this case to shape his response to it, and his emotional re-
sponse has not, so far, let him down. He has discovered the identities of
those involved in the Maltese Falcon caper, and he has concluded who is
responsible for his partner’s murder. That said, he faces a serious choice.
The choice focuses on whether, knowing what he knows, he can trust Brigid.
And, at this particular intersection of reason and passion, he realizes that
he cannot in fact trust her. Whether he loves her, and whether she loves
him, is an issue to the side of the main one, whether they can trust each
other, or, rather, whether he can trust her. The question of trust is put on
one side of the scale, and the question of their possible love for one an-
other is put on the other. Sam’s conclusion illustrates the connection be-
tween reason and the emotions in this difficult decision. The question is
whether he will protect her from disclosure to the police, a question that
has been a running theme throughout their brief relationship, and, in an-
220 Deborah Knight
swer to that question, Sam says: “I won’t because all of me wants to, re-
gardless of consequences, and because you counted on that with me.” This
statement might seem as though Sam is rejecting emotion in favor of rea-
soning, insofar as he is sending Brigid over. But, in fact, Sam is letting emo-
tion inform his rational decision making.
What Sam realizes is that he and Brigid have very different sorts of
investments in their mutual relationship. Sam is not someone bound by
the niceties of legal conventions; he could harbor a criminal, possibly even
a murderer, if he had good reason to. The problem that he faces with Brigid,
as he explains, is that she has counted on him to play the sap, expected him
to take whatever fall would allow her to escape unharmed; in short, she has
been manipulating him from the start. The fact that maybe she loves him
and maybe he loves her simply doesn’t stand a chance against the fact that
he can’t trust her. And it surely hasn’t escaped Sam’s attention that, if he
had gone with Miss Wonderly that first night, she would have killed him
instead of Miles.
Sam has recognized all along that Brigid has consistently presented
herself in a stereotypically “feminine” manner—as Sam says, lisping and
blushing, or, as we might observe, as someone trying to ensure that a stron-
ger, more intelligent, more practical man could protect her. In fact, Brigid
has chosen Sam to be a dupe in her broader scheme—the scheme of killing
Thursby and trying to acquire the Maltese Falcon for herself. Brigid, as it
turns out, has used the stereotypical view of femininity as a disguise. She
has hidden herself and her motives behind the surface appearance of weak-
ness, passivity, indecision, and neediness. She has calculated Sam’s emo-
tional attachment to her, but she has used this against him, believing that
she has found the best possible fall guy. In fact, Brigid has been The Maltese
Falcon’s best exemplar of dispassionate reasoning. However counterintuitive
it might seem, Sam as the hard-boiled detective has used his emotions in
conjunction with his reason to do the morally right thing, namely, to let
Brigid assume responsibility for what she has done. By contrast, Brigid has
tried to use pure calculation and the affectation of emotion to manipulate
Sam. He has combined emotions and reasons to reach the best conclusion
about how he should treat her. His decision to turn her over to the police is
the right one, both personally and morally. In coming to this decision, the
hard-boiled detective has let reason and emotion inform one another,
whereas the femme fatale seems never to have let emotion enter her mind
at all.
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Ride the Pink Horse
Money, Mischance, Murder, and the Monads of Film Noir
Alain Silver
The holidays
go around and around
The merry go-round brings them
and takes them away.
—Federico García Lorca
Every man takes the limits of his
own field of vision for the limits
of the world.
—Arthur Schopenhauer
The history of film noir is simple enough. Despite occasional squabbling
over the identity of the first film noir, it is clear that, after some early pro-
totypes, the classic period of film noir transpired over a mere two decades.
While most commentators would agree on the key motion pictures that
constitute the body of noir films, beginning with John Huston’s The Malt-
ese Falcon in 1941 and ending with Orson Welles’s Touch of Evil in 1958,
there is certainly no consensus about the philosophy of noir. That the noir
phenomenon exists is indisputable. Although some of the critical analyses
that have followed in its wake have attempted to muddy the waters, most
agree that film noir is defined not only by its visual style but also by its
relation to the psychological and philosophical developments of the first
half of the twentieth century.
From a simplistic Freudian perspective, the imagery of film noir—its
dark corridors, wet streets, and figures lurking in the shadows—reflects
the underlying apprehension, even paranoia, of many of its protagonists.
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Many observers have perceived in the deterministic narratives of film noir
a reflection on the concepts of existential anguish and despair. The defin-
ing comment of Bradford Galt in The Dark Corner (Henry Hathaway, 1946)
is cited as a prime example of existential anguish: “There goes my last lead.
I feel all dead inside. I’m backed up in a dark corner, and I don’t know
who’s hitting me.” These characters who reflect on the uncertainty of their
situation, who don’t know who’s hitting them but must make choices none-
theless, are mired in existential despair. But, as a film cycle or movement1
that incorporated many generic indicators, film noir is not simply about
Freudian or existential motifs, about characters forced to make impossible
choices. If there is a noir prototype, it must be approached from a broader
base, something more akin to Bateson’s analysis of the “transcontextual”
double bind: “Exogenous experience may be framed in the context of
dreams, and internal thought may be projected into the contexts of the
external world.”2 Taken in transcontext, these issues so prevalent in film
noir, fate and free will, existential anguish and despair, are not such clear-
cut expressions, not instances, as Bateson often noted, of being “just that
and nothing more.”
There is no clear line from any preexisting epistemology to film noir,
not from Freud or Kierkegaard, not from German expressionistic film or
American hard-boiled fiction. Being neither philosophy nor aesthetics but
fiction, what film noir does take from these sundry influences is a dynamic
that uses different character perspectives to create dramatic tension. These
differing viewpoints of narrative events are defined with a transcontextual
expressive code; that is, some images and events are rendered subjectively
using point-of-view shots or voice-over narrative, while others are staged
objectively with the camera recording events from the position of a de-
tached observer. Because the aesthetic or system of visual and aural mean-
ing in film noir is fluid or relative, Einstein’s paradigm of the railway carriage
and the embankment, from which positions observers witness very differ-
ent behavior from a falling stone, could also apply to the universe of film
noir.3 The problem of Bradford Galt and of many noir protagonists can be
taken as one of perspective. From his dark corner, Galt can see only straight
lines; he cannot envision the parabolic narrative arc that has entrapped
him.
In his or her quest for the knowledge that promises salvation, the
noir protagonist conducts a metaphoric search for an absolute truth,
for the thing-in-itself. In an existential or transcontextual world, in any
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system of values that does not accept the concept of a simple, a priori
truth, such a quest is doomed to failure. Despite this, or because of this,
most of these figures actually survive their immersion in an unstable
noir underworld.
Arthur Schopenhauer and Ride the Pink Horse
What this essay proposes to briefly consider is Ride the Pink Horse (Robert
Montgomery, 1947) as a prototypical noir film and also as an embodiment
of aspects of the worldview/aesthetics of Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860).
In Schopenhauer’s major work, The World as Will and Representation, re-
vised over the course of four decades, the interplay of will, representation,
religion, and aesthetics defines an uncertain universe much like that into
which the noir protagonist ventures. As Schopenhauer’s first words assert:
“The world is my representation: this is a truth valid with reference to ev-
ery living and knowing being, although man alone can bring it into reflec-
tive, abstract consciousness. If he really does so, philosophical discernment
has dawned on him.”4 For Schopenhauer, the Kantian thing-in-itself is
undiscoverable; but the will to find it is not. What also imperils or destroys
any man is not misperception but that same will. Will causes discord, suf-
fering, and evil. Its relentless and compulsive grip on a rational being ren-
ders most human action pointless and, ultimately, absurd: “A man can do
what he wants, but not want what he wants.”5
Beyond any philosophical perspective on absolute truth, Schopenhauer’s
discourses probe the meaning of suffering and suggest that life is sub-
stantially without higher purpose. Rather than accept the belief in any
absolute, Schopenhauer accepts the world as what each man sees or wills
it to be. Ironically for Schopenhauer, although man has free will, he is
imprisoned by its pointlessness. The only escapes from will are through
sacrifice, through helping others and self-denial, and through an aes-
thetic experience. In fact, for Schopenhauer, art is more important than knowl-
edge, in that it helps man transcend his situation, for a person listening to
music or watching a drama is at moments free from self-consciousness and
will.
In the world of film noir, these same contradictions dog the charac-
ters. For Schopenhauer, mitigation of will is possible through denial,
through the arts, through transcendence, through religious conviction; but,
in the end, there is no escape. Action, even self-immolation, is an expres-
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sion of will that defeats the man who seeks escape. As Schopenhauer noted:
“The ancient wisdom of the Indians declares that ‘it is Maya, the veil of
deception, that covers the eyes of mortals, and causes them to see a world
of which one cannot say either that it is or that it is not, for it is like a
dream, like the sunshine on the sand that the traveler at a distance takes to
be water, or like the piece of rope on the ground that he regards as a snake.’”6
In film noir, the dream, the mirage, the slightest mistake, are typical ex-
pressive factors that embroil its protagonists in the struggle to survive. For
Aquinas, Kant, Leibniz, and other rational theists, God and truth exist to
prevent man and morality from being meaningless. Hence, a righteous man
can navigate a world of shifting monads without fear of running aground on
a shoal of misperception. For Schopenhauer, a rational atheist, his answer
was plain enough to be frequently co-opted by religion and nowadays is even
sold emblazoned on T-shirts: “Compassion is the basis of all morality.”
If Schopenhauer believed that truth traveled a bumpy road to valida-
tion,7 he could embrace a Keatsian view that equated truth with beauty.8 As
with most ironic drama, the narratives of film noir revolve around the
distinction between belief or perception and truth. It is in that nexus, where
who people are and what events represent may be confounded, that lines
between good and evil, between malice and morality, are blurred and that
noir figures grapple with their antagonists for survival.
The postwar film noir Ride the Pink Horse is based on a 1946 novel by
Dorothy B. Hughes. Hughes’s main character, known only as Sailor, who
travels from Chicago to a fictionalized Santa Fe, New Mexico, during a
fiesta week, is intent on blackmailing his mentor, “the Sen,” the former
Illinois senator Willis Douglass. The screenwriters, Ben Hecht and Charles
Lederer, had worked individually and as a team on such earlier noir films
as Cornered (Edward Dmytryk, 1945), Gilda (Charles Vidor, 1946), Notori-
ous (Alfred Hitchcock, 1946), and Kiss of Death (Henry Hathaway, 1947).
The star and director, Robert Montgomery, had just finished directing Lady
in the Lake (1947), adapted from Raymond Chandler’s 1943 novel. Together,
the filmmakers transformed the thoroughly venal Sailor into Gagin, a war
veteran with more ambiguous motives for extorting the petty mobster Frank
Hugo. In changing the self-aggrandizing Sailor into Gagin, who is likelier
to deprecate himself, and the elitist Douglass into the petty mobster Hugo,
whose cynical attitude is almost proletarian, the filmmakers define charac-
ters that are prototypically noir.
One striking element of the novel that was retained is the high point of
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the annual festival in Santa Fe, the burning of Zozobra, a god of anxiety or
gloom created by the local artist Will Shuster in 1924. While most of the
picture was shot on the Universal back lot—much of it centered around an
authentic tío vivo, or carousel, that the studio rented from another New
Mexico town, Taos—several scenes were shot on exterior locations in and
around the plaza of Santa Fe.
Themes and Characters
Although he is referred to only by his last name during the course of the
movie, the lead character, the main title announces, is named “Lucky” Gagin.
Gagin himself does nothing to explain his sobriquet. Aside from the burn-
ing of Zozobra, who the carousel owner, Pancho, explains to Gagin is the
god of bad luck, the only pointed references to luck, good or bad, come
from Pila, the young Indian girl who befriends Gagin. In their first meet-
ing, she gives him a good luck charm, a small carving of Ishtam, to “pro-
tect” him. Like Sailor in the novel, Gagin comes to town carrying a gun,
and, for him, that is the “best charm in the world. Keeps away the
boogeyman.” Of course, for Gagin, it is not Pancho’s boogeyman Zozobra
but Hugo that concerns him. Gagin, fixated on money and revenge, and
taking the limits of his own field of vision as the limits of the world, firmly
believes that “you make your own luck.” For Pancho or Pila, who crypti-
cally remarks, “It is a sign of good luck when you find a new bucket,” one
should take what the world offers. For them, fate and irony are as invisible
as Leibniz’s monads or the shadows at the back of Plato’s cave,9 but beauty
and compassion are not.
The interaction of the primitive and the sophisticate is a dialectic that
Schopenhauer could endorse. Balancing the willfulness, suffering, and pes-
simism of Gagin are the suffering and kindness of Pancho. Balancing the
rationalism and evil of Hugo are the morality and asceticism of FBI Agent
Retz. Transcending it all is Pila, whose instinctive and unaffected behavior
epitomizes the selflessness that Schopenhauer valued so highly.
Among the various portraits of weary veterans in postwar film noir,
Gagin is most literally devoid of identity. Since Lucky is an ironic moniker
confined to the main title, he has no real first name. The surname Gagin is
clipped, guttural, appropriate to Robert Montgomery’s taciturn portrayal.
Pancho gives him a sort of epithet when he observes: “That’s the kind of
man I like, the man with no place.” When asked his identity on his first
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visit to Hugo’s, Gagin says: “Just tell him Shorty’s pal called and will call
again.” Gagin comes from nowhere in particular, has no stated destina-
tion, and, as he offhandedly remarks to the inquisitive Pila, is “nobody’s
friend.”
Initially, the mise-en-scène supports this self-image. Gagin descends
from the bus, and the camera tracks him through the small terminal as he
deposits an envelope in a locker, conceals the key, then exits and enters the
town proper. The actions are direct enough, but the unbroken moving shot
in which they are inscribed rivets the audience’s attention. The use of a
long take instills suspense in the otherwise ordinary acts. From his silent,
methodical activity the concentrated staging also distills for the viewer a
sense of the tenacity in Gagin’s character. At the same time, the sustained
camera “imprisons” the protagonist temporarily within the unattractive
limits of the bus depot, giving a subtle hint of some underlying fatality
even as he emerges and takes the dusty road to town.
Gagin is not a mere cipher. The typical qualities of the embittered loner
in film noir, which the figure immediately evokes through this visual in-
scription, combine with the narrative development of his hatred for Frank
Hugo to create a more complex character. The initial assertion of Gagin’s
generic identity is grounded in understated conflict with both the envi-
ronment, in which he is stranger, and the imminent clash with the unseen
criminal presence, Hugo. San Pablo itself offers nothing other than the prom-
ise of finding Hugo within its confines, nothing to mollify the alienation that
Gagin sports so visibly, no alternate reality to the naturalistic images of the
terminal, the town, or the crowded hotel lobby. Only after Gagin’s quest to
even the score for his dead pal, Shorty, is necessarily suspended because of
Hugo’s absence does he discover Pancho, Pila, and the tío vivo.
From his demeanor and his statements, Gagin is clearly a willful and
determined man; yet, remarkably, all the supporting characters in Ride the
Pink Horse want him to embrace their point of view. This is expectedly the
case with Hugo, who wants the incriminating letter that Gagin holds over
him, and with Retz, who wants the same item with which to prosecute
Hugo. In their first meeting, Hugo lectures Gagin at length about his own
beliefs, about what makes his world turn: “[Shorty] got himself all crumbed
up looking for easy money. . . . Don’t kid yourself; you’re doing it for Shorty.
You’re doing it for you. We eat out of the same dish. You used to think if
you were a square guy, worked hard, played on the level, things would come
your way. You found that people are interested in only one thing, the pay-
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off. There are two kinds of people in this world: ones that fiddle around
wondering whether a thing’s right or wrong and guys like us.” At the end
of Ride the Pink Horse, when an injured and insulted Gagin is on the brink
of cooperating with Retz, Hugo offers a last, disdainful assessment of guys
like Gagin, who “work all your lives and end up with enough money to buy
yourself a hole in the ground.”
Compare Hugo’s attitude to Schopenhauer’s profession: “Money alone
is absolutely good, because it is not only a concrete satisfaction of one need
in particular; it is an abstract satisfaction of all. . . . Money is human happi-
ness in the abstract; he, then, who is no longer capable of enjoying human
happiness in the concrete devotes himself utterly to money.”10 Gagin would
likely agree that “money . . . is absolutely good.” As he ruefully explains
when Pancho asks him why he hangs around with Pila, why he doesn’t
have a princess with more flesh on her bones: “I’ve had princesses. I got
one now back east, but she’s busy with another guy. He’s got what it takes:
dough.” Although at odds with the statements of Hugo and Gagin, Pancho’s
attitude is also aligned with Schopenhauer’s in that he expresses a prefer-
ence for happiness that is not abstract. In his first meeting with Gagin in
the Tres Violetas bar, Pancho intervenes when Gagin pays with a twenty-
dollar bill for which the barkeep has insufficient change. In an unselfish
manner, Pancho suggests that Gagin take ten dollars and that he and the
others drink the rest of his change: “You want to make everybody happy,
sí?” Later, after he offers Gagin his own bed to sleep in, Pancho refuses
additional payment and adds: “Some people only happy when they got
money. Me, I’m only happy when I got nothing. Nothing and a friend . . .
they can keep everything else. Keep the whole world.”
Shortly after he meets her, as she leads him to the La Fonda hotel and
bumps into a post, Gagin tells Pila: “You should look where you’re going.”
In his unenlightened state, he does not yet realize that he should take his
own advice. His hatred of Hugo is matched by his distrust of institutions.
Of Retz, who represents social morality and the “government,” Gagin con-
temptuously inquires: “Doesn’t the government work for Hugo? It did all
during the war.” When Hugo’s girlfriend, Marjorie, proposes a compli-
cated double cross involving an honest attorney, his derisive retort is: “Hugo
buys them all—even the honest ones.” He is equally scornful of women, or,
rather, of “dames”: “They’re not human beings. They’re dead fish with a
lot of perfume on them. You touch them, and you always get stung. You
always lose.”
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While the filmmakers cannot express what goes on inside Gagin’s head
as directly as can the novelist Hughes, Montgomery’s direction and perfor-
mance go beyond the purely laconic prototype. His reaction to Pila is the
cornerstone of his character’s development and hints at the perception of
which Hughes wrote explicitly: “She was young, young as a kid, and she
was old, old as this country. . . . She was unreal, alien; yet she belonged, and
he was alien. [There was] something deep and strong and old under the
tawdry trapping, under the gimcracks. Something he did not understand
because he was a stranger.”11
Visual Style and Symbolism
While Hughes’s novel is not written in the first person, her original prose is
imitation Hammett, full of offhanded racism and sexism reflecting the main
character’s prejudices and fears. Her overt symbolism is restricted to fig-
ures such as Zozobra: “Made of papier maché and dirty sheets, yet a fan-
tastic awfulness of reality was about him. He was unclean, he was the
personification of evil.” But, as Sailor realizes moments later: “The evil
was manmade; it wasn’t real.”12
For the filmmakers working with viewer expectations associated with
film noir, symbolic construction is much easier. The opening shots of the
bus moving along the highway end at the local station where Gagin de-
scends and define a real, that is, nonstudio, environment. Montgomery
uses his own presence as the lead actor to draw the audience’s focus, then
stages his first appearance, the intricate sustained shot already mentioned.
Although the viewer may not be aware that there is no cut, the unbroken
shot creates both suspense and figurative meaning. Since there is no alter-
nate shot, no sudden shift of angles, permitted, the implication is that there
is no alternate possible outcome. In the next sequence, Gagin walks alone
down a porch toward an open area at upper frame center. He moves down
a narrow passageway, hemmed in by a wall on one side and a dark wooden
post on the other. Again, besides a sense of visual constriction, the staging
makes the pathway at frame center the only one available, the only course
to follow.
In their first meeting, balanced against the reaction shots of Gagin is
the physical aspect of Pila portrayed by eighteen-year-old Wanda Hendrix.
Although she was four years older than the fourteen-year-old Indian girl
created by Hughes, Hendrix’s aspect, while conforming to a Hollywood
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stereotype of an Indian, is striking. Because it is a movie, the contrast be-
tween that aspect and Montgomery’s is visually palpable and makes an
immediate impact not possible in Hughes’s prose: “scrawny . . . black fath-
omless eyes . . . brown face . . . strong black hair.” At the beginning and end
of the film, the black-and-white, Hollywood Pila has a dusky face with
black hair, parted in the center and braided on each side; but, after endur-
ing Gagin’s jibes, being called “Sitting Bull” and hearing that she should fix
herself up to “look like a human being,” Pila visits the beauty salon in the
hotel and gets her hair done. In the most perilous moments of the movie,
she sports an incongruous permanent wave with spit curls across her fore-
head and a flower on top.
Although the first encounter between the two is on a false exterior—
the soundstage containing the carousel set—the next sequence takes them
into the veritable Santa Fe plaza, just outside the genuine La Fonda hotel.
By using location here and in the night exteriors when Zozobra is paraded
to his pyre, Montgomery seamlessly imbues the studio sets with a portion
of their reality. Within this noir landscape, under the pull of some prede-
termined inclination, Montgomery/Gagin goes to the Tres Violetas that
first night, and Pila is there waiting in the darkness. How did she know he
would come to the bar? And, if she knew, why does she say: “I thought I
would never see you anymore”? There is another long take when an inebri-
ated Gagin and Pancho leave the bar. As the drunken men stumble away,
Pila comes up, then leaves. When they exit the shot, she returns, crossing in
the background to frame center, then coming forward. Although she has
offered Gagin a totem and now follows in his wake, Pila feels unable to
shield him from the deadly fate that she has foreseen, for, as she later will
admit to Retz, she has had a vision of Gagin lying dead.
A last long take is used when Gagin goes to a restaurant to exchange
the letter for Hugo’s money. En route, Gagin weaves through the crowd of
onlookers gathered for the parade and burning of Zozobra, and a dissolve
momentarily superimposes the effigy of Zozobra on a close-up of Hugo,
revealing the true face of Gagin’s god of back luck. Gagin appears at the
table like a waiter, asking: “Everything all right Mr. Hugo?” Marjorie leads
Gagin from the table onto the dance floor, and they waltz around the cor-
ner to the door. Montgomery ends the long take and cuts as they exit into
darkness. Outside, he holds on the silhouetted two-shot as Marjorie’s pur-
ported warning is revealed as treachery and Gagin gets stung by a dame—
that is, knifed in the back.
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Despite being wounded, Gagin overcomes his assailants, and then Pila
leads him back to the sanctuary of the carousel. It is not merely because it
gives the film its title that the tío vivo is the central image of Ride the Pink
Horse. Like other havens in film noir, like Rica’s apartment in Thieves’ High-
way (Jules Dassin, 1949) or Doll Conovan’s place in The Asphalt Jungle
(John Huston, 1950), the carousel offers refuge to the spiritually and physi-
cally wounded hero. But, in Ride the Pink Horse, Gagin is never fully at ease
around it, never understands the emotional relation between it and its pa-
trons. On his first night there, he insists that Pila have a turn on it, and she
asks which horse she should ride. Approaching the merry-go-round, Gagin
uncovers the horse nearest and suggests tersely, “Why don’t you ride the
pink one?” To Gagin it makes no difference which horse is chosen. They
are all essentially the same, all traveling in the same circle, all taking their
riders nowhere and ending up in the same spot. To Pila, who understands
instinctively the significance of choice, it makes all the difference. The car-
ousel is at once one of the most stylized objects in the movie—both by
nature as a theatrical “amusement” and also because it is photographed
on a soundstage under neutral gray light that differs subtly from the “real-
world” location shooting—and the one object that is most free of artifi-
cial restraints. By its very artifice, by the aspects of ritual that its patrons
attach to circling a finite space on the small wooden horses, the tío vivo
becomes a quintessentially noir set piece. Gagin, who comes to it bur-
dened by the complex codes of behavior imposed by the noir universe,
focused on the belief that he must even the score, cannot see its broader
dimensions.
The symbolism of the carousel as Lorca and others have perceived it is
simple: you go a long way in a circle and end up in the same place as you
started, a pessimistic metaphor for life, or, as Schopenhauer observed: “Af-
ter your death you will be what you were before your birth.”13 On one level,
the enclosed world and the totemic horses are somewhat Platonic, ideal-
ized representations of the actual universe, as stylized as shadows on a cave
wall. On another, more primitive level, the carousel is a wellspring of pri-
mordial energy, or, as Lorca elaborated:
On ponies
disguised as panthers
the children devour the moon
as they would a cherry.14
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Like ropes disguised as snakes, Lorca’s poetic imagery pierces the veil of
deception with symbolic language.
While long takes and low angles can underscore a sense of fatalism,
Montgomery also used montage for phenomenological effect, relating the
perceptual awareness of the characters to the visual style, as in the first
meeting between Gagin and Hugo. Both shot selection and set pieces color
the process. Hugo is hard of hearing, and, early in the scene, he holds the
phone upside down so that the earpiece is next to an oversized micro-
phone/amplifier clipped to his shirt pocket. The symbolism of this unset-
tling inversion is ambiguous. When Hugo and Gagin are speaking alone,
close-ups and over-the-shoulder shots alternately isolate and link the two
figures; but Hugo continues to sidestep. “Your pal Shorty wasn’t as tough
as he thought he was,” Hugo ingenuously clarifies.
GAGIN: So you had him killed.
HUGO: Let’s just say that he lost the argument.
GAGIN: To three guys with blackjacks.
HUGO: Were there three?
Shorty’s dead, so what difference does it make how many killers there were?
Displacement and indirection are part of Hugo’s modus operandi, the warp
and woof of his veil of deception. At midpoint in the scene, Hugo even
walks around Gagin in a circle, a menacing variant on the movement of
the tío vivo.
In the narrative progression of Ride the Pink Horse, Pila’s totem Ishtam
overcomes the bad luck god, as Gagin survives his encounter with Zozobra’s
personification in Hugo. In the symbolic and stylistic progression of the
movie, Gagin leaves as he began. Like Nick Garcos in Thieves’ Highway,
who learns to trust based on instinct, or Dix in The Asphalt Jungle, who
refuses to die until he gets home to the ranch in Kentucky, the lessons learned
in the sanctuary are critical. Only after he accepts the tío vivo as a benefi-
cent “uncle” does Gagin begin to comprehend its meaning. Conditioned
as he is to living with his estrangement, even taking solace in that emotion
as part of his role, Gagin alone cannot resolve his conflict. Only after the
sacrifices of Pancho and Pila can he make the right choice, reject evening
the score, and save himself in the process.
Perhaps the most telling interaction of the carousel, noir stylistics, and
the principles of Schopenhauer is in the beating of Pancho. Moments after
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he conceals a wounded Gagin next to Pila in one of the tío vivo chairs, two
of Hugo’s thugs arrive. Pancho keeps several children aboard the carousel
by offering a free ride. In several angles, the camera is mounted on the
carousel, focused on a young boy and girl, another boy alone, and Pila
wearing a blanket over her head like a mantilla with a covered Gagin beside
her. While the children’s heads turn to watch the men walk up in the back-
ground, Pila does not move. As the shadows of horses fly across their bod-
ies, the men stand on each side of Pancho, hemming him in. Their verbal
interrogation about the man Pancho met in the bar, the man whose name
he does not know, quickly gives way to a more severe approach. As they
beat him, Pancho’s cries and groans and the dull thud of a clenched fist are
mixed with the repetitive carillon sound of the carousel. The cutaways to the
moving camera reveal closer shots of the now terrified children, trapped on
the merry-go-round, and unable to run away, grimacing and whimpering as
the relentless motion of the mechanism takes them past the wall where the
men beat the prostrate Pancho over and over. Finally, as Pancho moans, “Oh,
my, you hurt Panchito,” the thugs relent, convinced he knows nothing.
Pancho crawls over to the lever that starts and stops the tío vivo, and, as
it slows, the children finally jump off and run away. Although his kindness
had already been demonstrated the night before, Pancho is not resentful.
Instead, he offers an aesthetic evaluation of the beating that echoes
Schopenhauer’s belief in validation and redemption through suffering:
“They want to know, where is Gagin. Hit me in the nose, I don’t know. Hit
me in the mouth, I don’t know. I fall down, and I don’t know.” Pancho re-
creates it vividly, almost gleefully, for Gagin, a man who conversely exem-
plifies that particularly pointless striving that Schopenhauer believed was
the real root of human suffering. Where a simple thank-you would have
sufficed, Gagin’s response is to offer to cut Pancho in, to give him $5,000—
when he gets it. Pancho had already voiced his casual acceptance of vio-
lence when he bandaged up Gagin’s wound: “Knife is good. More easy to
fix. I got knifed three times. When you’re young, everybody sticks knife in
you.” Just as casually, he shrugs off the possibility of a fortune that he doesn’t
need: “Lots of people gonna get lots of things, but they don’t.” Kindness
and friendship are their own rewards.
The Ideal Truth
Gagin’s self-deprecating remark to Hugo, “There are a lot of people in this
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world smarter than me, and they aren’t sitting up nights figuring out how
to help me,” neatly mirrors an observation of Schopenhauer’s: “The more
unintelligent a man is, the less mysterious existence seems to him.”15 In-
deed, the ending of Ride the Pink Horse reaffirms that an instinctive behav-
ior can be more effective than a more purely analytic one. The extortion
plot is resolved when a dazed and confused Gagin goes to confront Hugo.
Pila catches up to him at Hugo’s door but cannot prevent him from being
captured. After Gagin is slapped and loses consciousness, Pila is beaten. A
low-angle close-up frames Hugo leering like Zozobra over the shoulder of
a henchman as he tells him to “keep it up.” Then Retz intervenes, and
Gagin is saved. In a semicomic “afterword,” Gagin worries that Pila will be
quite upset when he goes to say good-bye. In a moment that recapitulates
his lack of understanding, he awkwardly makes small talk, returns her to-
tem of Ishtam, and is confounded by her easy acceptance of the fact that
their relationship is ending.
Two core beliefs of Schopenhauer could arbitrarily be linked to many
different movies or other works of art: that the world is a personal repre-
sentation and that what Schopenhauer calls unwillful perceptions of art can
help man escape the tyranny of self. But, in many noir films, as in Ride the
Pink Horse, the characters’ attitudes toward money and power, the striving
for a needless wealth that Schopenhauer compared to “sea-water: the more
you drink, the thirstier you become,” reflect a moral alignment between
the attitude of the filmmakers and the seminal values expressed in The
World as Will and Representation.16
From both an aesthetic and a philosophical perspective, Gagin remains
relatively unenlightened at the conclusion of Ride the Pink Horse. His final,
puzzled look as he glances back at Pila confirms this. Gagin still takes the
limits of his own field of vision for the limits of the world. Pila transforms
the moment at the Tres Violetas when she knocked out a Hugo minion
with a whiskey bottle. As she animatedly recounts it in Spanish and reen-
acts it for her friends, Pancho standing by nodding his approval, she turns
the event into art. As Schopenhauer observed: “The picture or the poem
will thus emphasize its idea, and give us that ideal truth which is superior
to nature.”17 The final shot of the picture fades out, not on Gagin, but on
the smiling face of Pila. As does Pancho, she realizes that the risks that she
took and the beating that she endured were the compassionate and moral
thing to do—and that a good story shared with friends is all the reward
anyone should need.
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